Naive valuation ("natural" valuation, not conceptualized/known)

Value ontology makes known directly the valuations and the mechanism/s by which valuation/s attain, thus that by and upon which all experiencing, conscious or unconscious, deep or shallow, large or small, profound or base, is founded. Because of this, understanding of value ontology directly undermines "naive valuing" or valuing done in an automatic-routine manner. Naive valuing is valuing seamlessly entwined with/in the subjective being, flowing upward and outward, into and onto, uniting the subject in it's myriad levels, types, forms, manners of being/s. A child is an example of total naive valuation. Many people, indeed most people personify this naivete when it comes to their own acts of valuation, even the philosopher.

Question: Does (or may) value ontology, properly understood, make impossible naive valuation? And to what extent might we affirm that naive valuation represents a health or necessary power/value for a subject?

If naive valuation is that "natural" or total seamless means by which a being "is itself", as itself, then value ontology inserts a radical break into the subject, cleaving being. (Being is of course always-already cleaved in many ways, even in/to it's great depths, but... at a certain level naive valuation still holds even for the most destitute, self-divided being [with the possible exception of a total psychosis] - however value ontology, again properly understood, does appear to be that which may act as or lead into a total erasure of naive valuing.

What happens to a subject, at the deepest levels of its "being", when its so-called naive valuing becomes largely or totally impossible to itself? Does this more represent transcendent possibilities for this subject, or more represent destructive-dissolutional possibilities? How might we tell? Perhaps this is decided only on the individual level of beings, for and by themselves alone.

It is possible that even total resignation, apathy, nihilism are forms of naive valuation - if this is true then we see a small window outward, a window opening toward a possible escape. But much work seems yet to be done before we can more fully understand how value ontology operates within a/the subject.

Value ontology seems here to bear a most radically destructive philosophic potential. Everything else previously considered "radical" or destructive that mankind has created seems a mild conservatism by comparison. Even Nietzsche and his will to power pale in comparison to value ontology, with repect to a potency of destructivity for naive valuing. In light of this even highest forms of nihilism and total despair seem merely silly and half-ass means of the subject's own saving face before itself, of its own (dis- or partial-honest) automatic-routine self-maintenance and self-clinging atavism.

I have found an angle to this problem using Parodites' understanding as rational consciousness being the cause of a splitting up of the organisms/natures drive-system into separately recognizable drives. What if this is what has made innocent, naive valuing impossible? If so, value ontology may be seen as that particular thought, form of rational consciousness, that may, just may, lead to a re-integrating of the natural drive-system into one, i.e. making the human animal 'innocent' again.

What would you say to this suggestion? Does it address the problem you see, or is it only avoiding it?

Fixed Cross wrote:

I have found an angle to this problem using Parodites' understanding as rational consciousness being the cause of a splitting up of the organisms/natures drive-system into separately recognizable drives. What if this is what has made innocent, naive valuing impossible? If so, value ontology may be seen as that particular thought, form of rational consciousness, that may, just may, lead to a re-integrating of the natural drive-system into one, i.e. making the human animal 'innocent' again.

What would you say to this suggestion? Does it address the problem you see, or is it only avoiding it?

I am first tempted toward saying that this does indeed avoid this issue of naive valuation, but I can see very quiet ways inward, perhaps toward a truth here. Recently the notion of valency forced itself powerfully upon me, as a "physical" (Real) medium-ground upon which acts of valuing attain, which is to say: that all objects to a subject (subject defined quite simply here as nothing but "that from which valuing eminates most centrally and sufficiently") attain with/in a certain valency with respect to this subject (to its 'center'). This valency seems to be a product of two things: what I will term "natural apprehension" and "subjective import". Natural apprehension would be when objects are sensed/perceived and thus regulated/referred-to a subject with respect to certain elements of this subject. This is when an animal finds food, or senses danger, or observes natural objects around it. This is probably also the case with animal's observations of its own body. Natural apprehension thus is a relatively large or distant valency, as objects observed under this schema are not "close" to the subject (to the subject with respect to this subject's more-centrality-for/to-itself). Subjective import would be when more specific/focused couplings are made with objects, intentionally reducing their valency, bringing these closer to the subjective core (processes, mechanisms, functions -- structurality). This is valuing. A subject will at times respond to objects in such a way to couple more intimately these objects with/in itself, provoking more powerful and immediate stimulus within itself as a result of the object-encounter. In the example of animals finding food, this is done "naively", which is to say non-teleologically. In the example of human love this is done "consciously", teleologically (with respect to ends, ex ante causa) (but this is not also to say that in this example of human love this is not also done naively as well, for it is easy to see that any conscious valuing must build from/atop a ground of naive valuing, and thus will incorporate certain degrees and elements/functions of this naivete -- progressively less over time as it becomes more and more conscious (assuming that it does)).

All this tends to have the effect of unifying valuing (unconscious vs conscious, or naive vs conscious) into one common sphere, a projected activity-mechanism/s upon/within the Real, these mechanisms then organizing into (relatively self-sustaining) organisms, these organizing to form systems which couple with/in each other, finally forming worlds.

To Parodites comment of the splitting-fragmenting of the drives, under my understanding here this would appear as a part of the process of the animal-becoming-human, and the human-becoming-more-human. Instincts-drives largely represent what I above called natural apprehension, naive valuing, emerging up from the prior genetics/physiology-structure of the organism forged over time through natural selection. The unity of these drives-instincts is never complete since they are always separate within the organism, but there is always a functional semi-unity that is relative and secures a survival potential for the organism. For this semi-unity to become either overly disunified or overly singularized would be to the detriment of the survivability of the organism, given its dependency for survival on remaining optimally environmentally responsive and adaptive. So we get an internal clockwork of functional semi-unity among drives-instincts, a natural-smooth regulation, wax and wane, of all relevant instincts-drives, all done with respect to environmental needs/conditions. This is all forged naturally, without telos, as a result of selective evolution across millenia.

But in man, the "valuing animal", the animal which most values in terms of itself, we take the power of "subjective import" and project it powerfully upon our interior/perceived or imagined objects. This is to say that: all experiences are objectifyings, and that all inner sensation, thought, idea, affect, imagination, are objectifyings of a subject before itself. At a certain level (of "the Real") these are no different from the perceptual objectifyings of sensational elements in one's exterior environment. To a subject objects always attain relative degrees of valency, and sometimes these valency's are the result of more direct subjective import rather than natural apprehension-construction. In man, and I think this is because we have become able to synthesize within ourselves imaginings and perceptions (which is to say objectify) certain of our own inner instincts-drives and sensations, this import becomes able to couple with such inner objects and draw them closer into the subjective sphere, toward the center, thus decreasing their valency (and subsequently altering the object-relations of these newly reduced-valency objects to other objects). Man experiences this decrease of valency (of certain of his inner objects) as "self-awareness" or "freedom of will", because this is what it feels like: the self determining itself, a subject's most-sufficiency for itself. So man is now being re-conditioned by a new possibility for organizing himself as a consequence of his ability to directly objectify certain of his inner sensations. The entire 'atom' of the organism Man falls within itself, collapses to a certain degree, becoming denser, and as a consequenec of this, also broader and larger, entailing a new electromagnetic and gravitational potential eminating from its now-reduced and focused 'core'.

So in a way, what Parodites identifies (the disunity and isolation of the drives, and the subsequent impulses to re-unite these) is a natural mechanism/consequence of the human ability to directly couple its subjectivity with more reduced-valence or subjectively-central objects. This naturally introduces differentiation into this subjective sphere, just as all consciousness introduces differentiation into our environmentally-perceptive sphere (sensation differences what is sensed). I see what he identifies as one part, one movement within a much larger symphony. Within this symphony, naive valuation would be an identifying/marking term that denotes certain types, qualities of occurences depending upon in what way the term was being used.

I see now. I had to read this twice with two days in between for it to fall into place. It literally did so as I was reading about the human atom collapsing in itself. An almost physical experience.

Quite the insight. I can see that this inner atom built of reduced valency's is a definition of "homo sapiens". Immediately I am led to question that all humans are in fact such atoms inside themselves. I have the impression that many still act largely in terms of their valency to their surrounding, as functions and are unaware of the possibility of this atom.

I am not certain that I can immediately agree with the difference natural apprehension and valuing. The rudimentary model of value ontology has these as one, of course -- natural apprehension would be valuing in terms of self-value as much as this more conscious valuing. Where is the border? The word "taste" comes to mind. I'll let you react to this before I seek any further, I am not entirely sure I understand, as the whole concept just became clear to me minutes ago.

Regarding naive valuation, then. I must relate this to myself to understand it. I wonder if I, as a result of this "psychosis" as I keep calling it had not entirely lost the capacity for naive valuation already. (value ontology then as a means to psychosis??) I suspect that this (what is not within parentheses) may be the case, as I kept reaching out for things to be "true" to me, but being well aware that they could only appear true, and only for a time, until my reaction to them was exhausted. The only homeostasis I found was within perfect deployment of my energies, in being totally immersed in chemical reaction. I was already "cynical" enough to understand value ontology.

Yes, this explains a lot -- how I would always seek out religions, entirely aware that they were fictions, but believing in them with all my passion -- seeking out the experience of naive valuation deliberately, un-naively.

Before I comment on this any further, please let me know if what I describe here makes sense pertaining to what you have thought up.
In any case the term valency is going to be useful in developing value ontology, it is precisely the sort of thing I suspected might be found when I contemplated studying chemistry. (It is very revealing that the two domains where the term (apparently) applies are linguistics and chemistry -- we see that out understanding of the physical world is coupled to the mechanism of understanding (grammar, logic) itself.)

Fixed Cross wrote:

I see now. I had to read this twice with two days in between for it to fall into place. It literally did so as I was reading about the human atom collapsing in itself. An almost physical experience.

Quite the insight. I can see that this inner atom built of reduced valency's is a definition of "homo sapiens". Immediately I am led to question that all humans are in fact such atoms inside themselves. I have the impression that many still act largely in terms of their valency to their surrounding, as functions and are unaware of the possibility of this atom.

I am not certain that I can immediately agree with the difference natural apprehension and valuing. The rudimentary model of value ontology has these as one, of course -- natural apprehension would be valuing in terms of self-value as much as this more conscious valuing. Where is the border? The word "taste" comes to mind. I'll let you react to this before I seek any further, I am not entirely sure I understand, as the whole concept just became clear to me minutes ago.

Regarding naive valuation, then. I must relate this to myself to understand it. I wonder if I, as a result of this "psychosis" as I keep calling it had not entirely lost the capacity for naive valuation already. (value ontology then as a means to psychosis??) I suspect that this (what is not within parentheses) may be the case, as I kept reaching out for things to be "true" to me, but being well aware that they could only appear true, and only for a time, until my reaction to them was exhausted. The only homeostasis I found was within perfect deployment of my energies, in being totally immersed in chemical reaction. I was already "cynical" enough to understand value ontology.

Yes, this explains a lot -- how I would always seek out religions, entirely aware that they were fictions, but believing in them with all my passion -- seeking out the experience of naive valuation deliberately, un-naively.

Before I comment on this any further, please let me know if what I describe here makes sense pertaining to what you have thought up.
In any case the term valency is going to be useful in developing value ontology, it is precisely the sort of thing I suspected might be found when I contemplated studying chemistry. (It is very revealing that the two domains where the term (apparently) applies are linguistics and chemistry -- we see that out understanding of the physical world is coupled to the mechanism of understanding (grammar, logic) itself.)

Having thought more on this myself, I would not be willing to claim that, given the distinction between naive valuation and subjective import as I've outlined, that the one is not "valuing" while the other is. Clearly both here are instances of valuing-activity. The substance here lies in the difference in the manners of each instance of valuing. I am not yet entirely clear on how to articulate or delimit this difference, it is highly subtle. But the employment of the notion of valency is clearly a means toward this end.

What appeared to me as valency was not merely a linguistic nor physical-chemical phenomenon, but something more (it is these too, of course, but not only there). I think valency here must be used as part of a sort of "cosmological" or architectural-structural modeling-apparatus for the Real. By Real I mean what most designates an "actual state of conditions/being" to which all phenomenal/experienced/subjective beings are subject. This is not an appeal to objectivity but more to a sort of "most sufficiency" of subjectivity, a most-universality or grounding of being. At this level of Real, what is occurring (according to my fledgling idea here) is that there are subjects and the objects of subjects. A subject is any nexus-center of perspectives/experiencing-as-form (subject to relatively constancy via limitation). An object is merely an experienced/denoted element of/to/for this subject. Thus the Real is a sort of agglomeration of or 'grand system' totalization of all this subjectifying activity. For each subjective nexus a valency, or rather interacting systems of multiple valencies attains. This means simply that every object for this subject (and as we also know, constitutive of this subject, as well) exists in a manner of residing within a certain valency-position with respect to the most-centered subject(-ive perspective). A subject is like the nucleus of the atom, each electron being its objects. However, of course the subject "itself" must also be said to be these objects as well, not merely that to which they are related, that by which they may be said to be object.

This is basic, at the level of rudimentary phenomena, as well as more macroscopic, "as below, so above" comes to mind - the human for instance, and any animal, is a prime example of a subjectivity-nexus with numerous objects at varying degrees of distance from the subjective 'core'. These distances are important because they represent the degree/s to which these objects centrally compose or constitute the subject "as it is", in its being-entity, being-thing. Objects impose upon the subject for which the object is object, and this always happens with relative and often also changing degrees of scope and power. This works from outside inward (objects and their relations-to-subject determining-delimiting subjective potentiality) as well as inward out (subjective-alignment that forms and organizes objects and object-relations, a form of actualizing of this potentiality, or of reflexive potentiating). And of course it gets much more complex because the subject must be said to be not only this center, not only this centre + the sum of its object-relations, but also this centre + the sum of its object-relations + the sum of its objects, and all manner of myriad double-articulated relations therein.

So in this sense the distinction between naive apprehension and subjective import becomes a tool with which to differentiate certain means and methods by which a subject comports itself, relates with/in/to itself. Naive apprehension might be said to constitute all manner of "automatic" experiencing-encountering and objectifying, even those otherwise "conscious" examples of this found in humans (e.g. choosing my favorite flavor of ice-cream at the store, thus "naively" apprehending (and organizing or maintaining) my object/s after the manner/s in which I am a projection-extension and actuality of my own subjective self-valuings). Subjective import might be understood slightly differently, as a more direct attempt by a subject (for any number of reasons) to draw a certain object further inward, closer and more central in/to itself. It now becomes apparent that this sort of import itself also attains to relative degrees of being more or less conscious.

Very clear. I will ponder this difference as well, try to observe my own valuings and relatings in daily life in these terms for a while. On the more general topic of valency, the following paragraph helped me understand something much more clearly, a subject crucial in the ethical domains of aesthetics, art and "pure" mathematics, but as I explore it, also in fields like economy and social sciences - ethics as it is commonly understood.

Quote :

This is basic, at the level of rudimentary phenomena, as well as more macroscopic, "as below, so above" comes to mind - the human for instance, and any animal, is a prime example of a subjectivity-nexus with numerous objects at varying degrees of distance from the subjective 'core'. These distances are important, because they represent the degree/s to which these objects centrally compose or constitute the subject "as it is", in its being-entity, being-thing. This works from outside inward (objects and their relations-to-subject determining-delimiting subjective potentiality) as wel as inward out (subjective-alignment that forms and organizes objects and object-relations, a form of actualizing of this potentiality, or of reflexive potentiating). And of course it gets much more complex because the subject must be said to be not only this centre, not only this centre + the sum of its object-relations, but also this centre + the sum of its object-relations + the sum of its objects, and all manner of myriad double-articulated relations and reflections therein.

Given this unfathomable myriad-ness of relations (to which of course also the different subjects perceived by each other as both subjective centers and objects to other centers, and all their reciprocal encroachings/encirclings belong) that make up the actual, the real, we can be certain of one thing: a tremendous limitation is being placed on the real/actual because of all the "claims" made to it. We can see here how this "most sufficiency / most-universality of subjectivity" approaches what has by "sacred geometricians", but also musicians and in general lyrical abstract thinkers, been called "truth" and "objectivity".

What I mean is that as the number of relating self-valuings increases, the universe of the relations between them becomes more and more, for lack of a better word, beautiful. Instead of an increasing commonality resulting in blandness, what must in fact happen is that it becomes increasingly potent to appeal to different valuings. Surely, a lot of uniqueness is being sacrificed or at least denied access to the grand scheme of relating, but what does enter into this cosmos must be of extremely positive value. So, the more plentiful the universe becomes, so also the more solid its splendor.

In fact then all pessimistic and fearful predictions of the world becoming more disintegrated and ugly find a strong counterweight here -- we may view the human world, as long as it remains densely populated, to be moving, despite all the obstacles in the way, inevitably toward a greater goog, and a greater stability of goodness.

Of course, the dynamic of the world moving toward this, is sustained by the increasingly fierce competition of self-valuings to shape the world in terms of themselves. This competition is battled out in at least two levels -- the direct confrontation and comparison of created/projected values, and the race of deepening valuing capacity and "digging up" possible values. The latter is not a direct comparison, but fought out "blindly" by being engaging in the conquest of valuing capacity for its own sake. The former is a direct comparison of things already found, which are being shaped/adapted in terms of both each other and the demand for them that presses on from all sides in different ways.

So in the human world, it will become increasingly necessary to be "deep" if one wants to be a self-valuing relatively free to itself -- and the fruits of this will become increasingly wondrous, yet relatively scarce, as common, shared values become increasingly sufficient and strong, and more and more entities will be able to self-value in the terms that are available to them, as if they are actively valuing the world in terms of their own self-valuing. In other words, the difference between the dynamics of self-valuing in terms of otherness on the one hand and valuing otherness in terms of self-valuing on the other will become more subtle, less perceptible... the world will become more seductive, and integrity will become both more rare and precious as well as more integer, more rich and deep.

I drew conclusions very fast -- from the "stabilizing and refining by increase of relations" factor that I still see, I drew consequences regarding the totality of the (human) system and these were unwarranted. As the valency-bridge crossing the greatest distance between different subjectivities becomes ever greater and more valuable, this does not mean that this bridge should represent all valuings. Not at all, not if it does not exert deliberately this influence. It does at this point exert this influence, and this is actually to the detriment of its value. The universal values should remain noble in the highest sense -- they should not enforce themselves, but simply be universal in that they are of value to the greatest amount of valuings.