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 Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.

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PostSubject: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Thu Oct 11, 2012 11:55 pm

    A Nietzschean history of philosophy recovers in Plato what is fundamental to all the greatest philosophers, what ultimately moves or motivates them. Most fundamental are two passions or loves. Philosophy is the passion to understand the whole rationally, the love of wisdom that is, Socrates indicated in the Symposium, the highest eros of a whole that can be understood as eros and nothing besides. Political philosophy, the acts of communication and legislation undertaken on behalf of that primary passion, is driven by love of the human, philanthropy, as Socrates indicated in the Phaedo where Plato has him pause at the center to state that the greatest evil facing humanity is misology, hatred of logos or reason that entails misanthropy and stems from reason's inability to prove that the world is what the heart most desires it to be. The fundamental connection between these two passions, love of wisdom and love of the human, can be demonstrated exegetically in Plato only through detailed study of the Symposium and Phaedo, the study to be undertaken in the book to follow this one. The present book concerns Plato's presentation of Socrates' philanthropy. Philanthropy, a now common word, has an uncommon sense in the philosophers, for it denotes action on behalf of the human in its highest reach, its reach for understanding. A Nietzschean history of philosophy studies the actions undertaken by the greatest thinkers to further the human through the advancement of philosophy. The history of political philosophy, whose opening chapter this book chronicles, is ultimately the history of philosophic philanthropy, philosophic rule on behalf of philosophy. [Laurence Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, pp. 13-14.]

I think this paragraph from Lampert's latest book may serve as an introduction to both Lampertian Nietzscheanism and my current "break" with Lampert, Lampert's Nietzsche, and possibly even Nietzsche himself. The essence of Lampertian Nietzscheanism consists of said two passions, and the reason for said "break" is that neither the passages listed in the footnote immediately following this paragraph--i.e., all the passages in Lampert's previous books to which "the theme of philanthropy as the fundamental motive of political philosophy" is especially basic--, nor Lampert's private emails to me have allowed me to see a logical connection between said two passions. Indeed, the only reason I'm interested in political philosophy--which phrase I now think may well be an oxymoron--at the moment is that I desire to understand it. I even suggested to Lampert that the connection be precisely this desire to understand it--after all, one may have to engage in it in order to understand it--, but he did not think that was correct.
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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Fri Oct 12, 2012 11:44 pm

Would you explain in some more detail how Lampert unites or attempts to unite these two loves, or how he interprets Nietzsche to this end? And what is it about this attempt of his that you disagree with? Surely in your reading his books and conversing with him personally he has presented his reasoning by which these two supposed "loves", of knowledge and of mankind, are supposedly united together?

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Oct 14, 2012 12:44 am

Capable wrote:
Would you explain in some more detail how Lampert unites or attempts to unite these two loves, or how he interprets Nietzsche to this end? And what is it about this attempt of his that you disagree with? Surely in your reading his books and conversing with him personally he has presented his reasoning by which these two supposed "loves", of knowledge and of mankind, are supposedly united together?
I first wrote him asking for the connection when I'd just began to read his latest book:

    I'm already really looking forward to your next book, as the philosophical problem I am concerned with at the moment is the supposedly natural or logical step from philosophy to politics. I can understand the step from the philosophy of will to power to the 'religion' of eternal recurrence, but why must a circulus virtuosus deus [see BGE 56] care about whether anyone achieves such divinity or superhumanity in the relatively near future? I have some ideas, but as yet nothing has caused what Tom Wolfe calls "the Aha! Phenomenon" to occur to me---unless it be the crazy thought that, in order to understand, I must myself become a hero, a prophet, a Caesar, a savior, and/or a shepherd (WP 776): in which case it would be my philo-sophy driving me to politics..

    Perhaps you can point me in the right direction for finding the link between the philosophy of will to power or the 'religion' of eternal recurrence on the one hand, and the politics of the superman (in the sense not exclusive to Nietzsche/Zarathustra himself) on the other.

Then, when he did not reply--which later turned out to be because he was out of the country--, I wrote:

    No matter what the reason you did not (yet) reply, I should have followed up [on] the first footnote on page 14 of How Philosophy Became Socratic before writing you. I have done so now, and if there is one passage that's given me the key to solving my problem, it is this:

      Zarathustra leaves philanthrophy nameless, a riddle for the coming nutcrackers, if an easy riddle, given that Nietzsche himself points to it being the most spiritual will to power.
      [Nietzsche and Modern Times, page 137.]

    But what Nietzsche calls "the most spiritual will to power" (BGE 9) is philosophy, not philanthropy---two distinct passions, according to page 14 of HPBS. The passage quoted above, then, suggests that these two passions are at bottom the same passion: not in the trivial sense that all passions are at bottom will to power, but in the sense that both these passions are the most spiritual will to power. And indeed, both in BGE 9 and what I think is the corresponding speech in Zarathustra, 'On Self-Overcoming', Nietzsche ties philosophising with moralising: the Stoics, for example, "want[ed] to impose [their] morality, [their] ideal, on nature" (BGE 9)---and human nature is of course a part of nature... Thus Zarathustra, in the speech already mentioned, says:

      But it [being] shall accommodate and bend itself to you! So willeth your will. Smooth shall it become and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection.
      That is your entire will, ye wisest ones, as a Will to Power; and even when ye speak of good and evil, and of estimates of value.
      Ye would still create a world before which ye can bow the knee: such is your ultimate hope and ecstasy.
      [trans. Common.]

    And the human being is also a being, of course. So I take it that the philosopher's 'philanthropy' is a particular manifestation of his philo-sophy---one that seeks to make the human being "accommodate and bend itself to" him; to make it "smooth" "and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection". He "would still create a [mankind] before which [he] can bow the knee"!

Lampert then replied that he thought the suggestion in my second mail was probably closer to the mark than the one in my first mail. He also said, though, that my question was very difficult for him to answer because he's not a philosopher, but an "exegete" (cf. BGE 211).

He also made an interesting observation: Seth Benardete, in his The Bow and the Lyre, shows that "Odysseus's discovery of nature [the moly episode] comes as a direct consequence of 'the mighty necessity' that moves him to rescue his men from Circe's charm." (Lampert's words.)

I then replied:

    The phrase "Odysseus's discovery of nature" makes it sound like Odysseus is to Homer as Zarathustra is to Nietzsche. And Zarathustra, too, first teaches the Superman, and only later discovers (the full extent of) the will to power.

I will now go off on a bit of a tangent. Nietzsche writes:

    The Christian morality has hitherto been the Circe of all thinkers--they stood in its service. [EH "Destiny" 6.]

Now according to BGE 56, Nietzsche only discovered (the full extent of) the will to power, and thereby the ideal of the man who wills the eternal recurrence, when he'd rescued the thinker in him from the charm of "morality" (i.e., the morality of "good and evil"--slave or herd morality--, whose epitome is the Christian morality)--indeed, he speaks there of "the spell and delusion of morality". Likewise, Circe's charm or spell was a spell from the magic school of illusion or delusion:

    To dig up the moly is to expose to the light its flower and its root; they belong together regardless of the contrariety in their colors. It is this exposure and understanding of the nature of things that is difficult but not impossible for men. Odysseus, then, would be armed with knowledge. This knowledge saves him from Circe's enchantment. Her enchantment consists of transforming a man into a pig, with its head, voice, bristles, and build, but the mind (noos) remains as it was before. His knowledge, then, is the knowledge that the mind of man belongs together with his build. They are together as much as the root and flower of the moly. There cannot be a change in one without a corresponding change in the other. Menelaus' encounter with constant becoming, in which there are no natures, must have been an illusion. [Benardete, op.cit., page 86.]

Now a note on the phrase "discovery of nature". Both Lampert and Benardete are students of Leo Strauss, and Strauss wrote:

    The purport of the discovery of nature cannot be grasped if one understands by nature "the totality of phenomena." For the discovery of nature consists precisely in the splitting-up of that totality into phenomena which are natural and phenomena which are not natural: "nature" is a term of distinction. Prior to the discovery of nature, the characteristic behavior of any thing or any class of things was conceived of as its custom or its way. That is to say, no fundamental distinction was made between customs or ways which are always and everywhere the same and customs or ways which differ from tribe to tribe. Barking and wagging the tail is the way of dogs, menstruation is the way of women, the crazy things done by madmen are the way of madmen, just as not eating pork is the way of Jews and not drinking wine is the way of Moslems. "Custom" or "way" is the prephilosophic equivalent of "nature". [Natural Right and History, pp. 82-83.]

Both the roots of "moral" and of "ethic" originally meant "custom" or "way". After his death, the works of Aristotle that dealt with unnatural phenomena were titled ta êthika, those that dealt with natural phenomena ta phusika, and those that dealt with the totality of phenomena ta meta ta phusika. Thus far my little tangent (for now).
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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Oct 14, 2012 1:54 pm

So philosophy, philo-sophie, characterizes the point of rupture at which one breaks with convention and custom, or breaks with the merely unthought of these. So why is this point characterized by a love? I quote Alain Badiou in his book Conditions:

    Philosophy is the site of thought at which truths seize us and are seized as such . . . the effect of seizing drives philoosphy with a singular intensity. This intensity resembles love, but it is a love free of the quandaries bound up with the love object, of the enigmas of its difference. More generally, philosophy, because its central category [of Truth] is empty, is essentially subtractive . . . At its core is a lack, a hole; is the fact that the category of Truth and its escort in time, that is, eternity, do not refer to anything in presentation (dans la presentation). Philosophy is not an interpretation of the sense of what is offered to experience; it consists in the operation of a category subtracted from the category of presence. And this operation of seizing truths indicates precisely that once seized, truths are distributed within that which interrupts the regime of meaning.


If we think of truth as the category which posits the movement beyond convention and custom, the act of assuming first that such a movement is possible and then, by virtue of this assumption, such movements begin to occur first of all as "leaps of faith", philosophy is indeed defined as acts of seizure of truths, the character of these truths themselves being usually negative, such as a negation of custom, convention, doxa, norm, status quo, etc. That which is given is opposed and inverted by philosophy and the consequence of this is the production of truths, truths which philosophy "seizes" and begins to utilize in order to fill in that "that which interrupts the regime of meaning" which by its very nature stands opposed to the given. This would therefore be the production first of negative truths, and then subsequently the incorporation of these truths into a larger structure of philosophic meaning, which is to say these truths become positive objects of this structure. All this would only be possible under the broader category of "Truth", the basic assumption that truths as such exist and can be seized and understood at all. Because this assumption is essentially empty, as it itself has no substance or content and rather is the form of an always-open question mark, a "_____?" that is applied to specific given situations to produce truths, Truth itself is "void", an "empty set" by virtue of which all other "sets", all other truths and genuine knowledge are made possible in the first place.

Why this tangent? I think this is important in light of what you wrote here,


    But it [being] shall accommodate and bend itself to you! So willeth your will. Smooth shall it become and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection.
    That is your entire will, ye wisest ones, as a Will to Power; and even when ye speak of good and evil, and of estimates of value.
    Ye would still create a world before which ye can bow the knee: such is your ultimate hope and ecstasy.
    [trans. Common.]

      And the human being is also a being, of course. So I take it that the philosopher's 'philanthropy' is a particular manifestation of his philo-sophy---one that seeks to make the human being "accommodate and bend itself to" him; to make it "smooth" "and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection". He "would still create a [mankind] before which [he] can bow the knee"!


Philosophy therefore is an act which inevitably links on the one hand its movements of negation or inversion/opposition to custom and convention, to the given, together with the widening sphere of its positive objects, its truths, that characterize positive philosophical knowledge on the other hand. Therefore the love of philosophy comes to embody two distinct qualities: a love of opposition, of resistance, of critique, and a love of inclusion, of acceptance, and of incorporation; love of destruction, and love of creation. The production of both these loves is a consequence of the philosophical act. As Nietzsche distinguishes between the "But it [being] shall accommodate and bend itself to you!" and the "Ye would still create a world before which ye can bow the knee", he also unites these together, the act of forcing being to bow (of opposing being, of subverting being to oneself) and the act of constructing a world before which we might bow. Philosophy both forces the world to bow to us as well as works for the creation of a world before which we ourselvs might too bow.

Is this not one and the same impulse, the very same movement of truth acted out as Badiou notes, in both the act of subtracting and seizing truths from the given as well as the act of adding and incorporating these truths together, to produce something positive, something new, some new substance and 'world'? So Lampert's insight that the love of knowledge and the love of the world are intimately connected can be understood in light of the fact that philosophy as such constituted a movement productive of two natures, one oppositional and one accepting, one negative and one positive, one destructive of the world and one constructive of new worlds. Note that these new worlds are not originary novelties but are reinterpretations of the old world, having passed it through the forge-fire of philosophy, of Truth.

So how is any of this "love"? Or rather, the real question now is: how does the act of "will to knowledge" constitute a love of knowledge, and how does the act of "will to the creation of new worlds" constitute a love of these worlds, a philanthropy? Badiou writes:

    Philosophy . . . constructs an apparatus to seize truths, which is to say: to state that there are truths, and to let itself be seized by this 'there are' -- and thus to affirm the unity of thought. The seizing is driven by the intensity of a love without object . . . The whole process is prescribed by the conditions that are art, science, love and politics in their eventual figures.


Philosophy affirms the unity of thought, and is not all love such an "affirmation of [a] unity"? Is not the impulse toward love at heart a basically unifying act, an act of acceptance and "intensity" and rather even more so an act of intimate familiarity? If we categorize "love" as appearing under these three headings of acceptance, intensity and intimate familiarity then we can see how the philosophical act does indeed produce something that "resembles love", as Badiou says; we can see how the two fundamental philosophical movements of a will to [negative] truth and a will to [positive] creation manifest as loves, as instances of acceptance of truth and of the movements productive of truth, of intensity of these movements in both their supremely creative and destructive quality, and of intimate familiarity with truths, with that which is consequent of these destructions and creations, with what is either destroyed or created.

The love of knowledge is an intense and intimate love of destruction, a seeking for what lurks behind appearances, for what is not given, and this is fundamentally a radical love, often even an egoistic and narcissistic love; the love of the world, as philanthropy, is the accepting and familiar love of creation, of inclusion and arises from acts of giving and bestowing rather than from acts of taking. Or to paraphrase what Parodites wrote somewhere here regarding something that I believe Schelling said, 'No man who has ever tasted true freedom [truth, and philosophy] would not want to spread this freedom out like a cloak over the entire world.'

To know is to want to know more, and to want to bestow, which is to say to use one's knowledge and to demonstrate its truthful character; the descructive act reposes in creation, just as the creative act reposes in destruction, either finds their point of 'rest' and indeed even their conditioning possibility within the other. In Nietzsche's language, the most spiritual will to power is philosophy, yes, but philosophy manifests two natures, one creative and one destructive, one positive and one negative, one that opposes the given and one that gives [because it gives something other than that which is [already] given]. The will to power embodies both of these qualities of creation and destruction, in order to expands its reach and secure its willings to power, to broaden its power both through opposing and affirming -- the most spiritualized will to power will enact these two natures to the highest degree and of the highest order, namely as philosophy, characterized as those two movements of love of knowledge and love of the world, for no man could ever fully and only oppose and not accept, just as no man could ever fully and only accept and not oppose. These two intensities, taken together and to their furthest extremes, constitute the philosophical impulse. The will to knowledge spiritualizes to become the love of truth, and the will to accept truth and thus to create new worlds spiritualizes to become the love of man, as politics or philanthropy.




 

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"It would be wise to exercise caution with one's wishes." --Penny Royal AI

Odinwar <---[truth]---> Jeraz

Peace. War. Love. Wordz




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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Tue Oct 16, 2012 5:27 pm

Also important to note here... not all truth will necessarily result in a philanthropic passion. In fact we can witness how philosophers tend toward misanthropy as much if not more so than they tend toward philanthropy, and indeed, much philanthropy we do witness appears as quite shallow, simple or "impulsive", childlike, which is to say that it appears as quite unphilosophical. I cannot see how it would be correct to say that philosophy necessarily produces philanthropic passions and politics (is this what Lampert is saying, or is this what Lampert is saying that Nietszsche is saying? I'm still not sure...). Nor can I see how it would be correct to say that truth itself, as the category or 'goal' of philosophy, whether won by philosophy or by some other method, necessarily produces philanthropic passions or politics. Badiou's system which I offered here can work to show how Lampert's two passions can be seen as derivations of the same fundamental act, the act of philosophy: philosophy as seizing truth and being seized by truth, as constructing apparatus for this seizure; this seizing of truth manifesting as either a creative or destructive act, as either an act of inclusion-affirmation and building or as an act of exclusion-negation and tearing down. The risk here is that Nietzsche's thoughts on politics do not really stem from what we could call philanthropy or a "love of man or of the world", rather Nietzsche's take on politics seems to be that it is a war, as a will to power, that politics is an acting out of more primary psychological and evolutionary or natural forces within a "social" realm, thus transforming into "morality".


Given Lampert's theory on these "two passions" we can address these and attempt to show either how the one (politics as philanthropy) emerges or follows from the other (truth, or philosophical knowledge) or we can attempt to show how they are both co-occurring and the result of the same basic movement and method (which is the idea I was exploring first here by invoking Badiou); but I am still unconvinced that we can even break it down into these two passions as Lampert seems to do, unless I am still misunderstanding his basic point. I'm not saying that his idea isn't possible or that we cannot make sense of it, as through the use of my example with Badiou or perhaps by some other means; I'm saying that I am not sure what Lampert is saying is even correct. Can we really reduce a "Nietzschean history of philosophy" to the movements of only two loves or passions?

I think it must be noted that truth can and does at times produce a deep misanthropy. This is not to say that misanthropy is the most primary, important or final passion resulting from philosophy. But to conclude this:

    ...the highest eros of a whole that can be understood as eros and nothing besides. Political philosophy, the acts of communication and legislation undertaken on behalf of that primary passion, is driven by love of the human, philanthropy, as Socrates indicated in the Phaedo where Plato has him pause at the center to state that the greatest evil facing humanity is misology, hatred of logos or reason that entails misanthropy and stems from reason's inability to prove that the world is what the heart most desires it to be.


seems premature... certainly one can love reason and logos while at the same time detesting man and the world. And certainly the world is not "what the heart most desires it to be", not at all, unless we attempt to affirm a Nietzschean 'eternal return'. Maybe Lampert is indeed moving from a position of affirming the idea of the eternal return; that is really the only sense in which what he says here can make the most sense to me. But I still think it is quite a stretch to conclude that Nietzsche's thought on politics could be reduced to his category of eternal return... perhaps ideally so, for the ideal man or overman, this is what politics would become, but for historical and modern man this is certainly not the case.


I apologize if I am misunderstanding any of Lampert's ideas here. I am not really familiar with him and am only going off of what has been given of his thought in this topic. Please correct me where I have mischaracterized his ideas.

 

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"It would be wise to exercise caution with one's wishes." --Penny Royal AI

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Tue Oct 16, 2012 10:33 pm

I think I have to start again, in a way. Let us first note that, for Lampert, as I understand him, there is no difference between the great or genuine philosophers and the wise. My inference from this is that such philosophers are not (essentially) seekers of wisdom--i.e., of knowledge of the truth--, but lovers of a wisdom they already possess, to an extent. In Lampert's own words:

    "Why is there something rather than nothing?" remains an enigma that challenges inquiry; but that there is something, that there are these beings [i.e., beings that are will to power or eros and nothing besides], remains a marvel that draws from the most spirited being the blessing that lets them be what they are [i.e., "Be what you are, be eternally what you are!"]. [Nietzsche's Teaching, page 255.]

Now my question is: why should such a most spirited being care about whether there be other such most spirited beings in the relatively near future after his death (it is clear why he should care that there be such beings in the relatively distant future, as he wants himself and those in his relatively near past to recur eternally)? For this is what political philosophy is about for Lampert, as I understand him.

Now I haven't even mentioned Lampert's central suggestion in that email yet. He speaks there of "responsibility", though he immediately admits that that's probably not good enough, and then goes on to say that my second suggestion is probably closer to the mark. But the theme of responsibility allows me to make the connection to what I currently think is Nietzsche's position on the matter--and note that I distinguished between Lampert's Nietzsche and Nietzsche himself in my opening post.

    The genius--in work, in deed--is necessarily a squanderer: that he squanders himself, is his greatness... The instinct of self-preservation is suspended, as it were; the overpowering pressure of outflowing forces forbids him any such care or caution. People call this "self-sacrifice" and praise his "heroism" in this, his indifference to his own well-being, his devotion to an idea, a great cause, a fatherland: without exception, misunderstandings. He flows out, he overflows, he uses himself up, he does not spare himself,--and this is a calamitous involuntary fatality, no less than a river's flooding the land. Yet, because much is owed to such explosives, much has also been given them in return, for example a kind of higher morality. After all, that is the way of human gratitude: it misunderstands its benefactors.-- [TI "Forays of an Untimely Man" 44.]

This, I think, is the only good reason why the most spirited human beings should leave their mark on mankind: because they can... And not just can, but must; they cannot keep their blessedness in.
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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Thu Oct 18, 2012 1:06 pm

I agree with this, that this "politics" or world-influence here emerges as a consequence of an overflowing nature; there is a love in this, too, often enough, it is not merely that such natures overflow naturally but rather than they desire that their overflow mean something, that it can be valued. Certainly the genius values it himself, but to see this value reflected elsewhere, in others, in the world, that certainly must be one of the few great pleasures afforded to the man of genius, the man of true intellect and "wisdom". As you said this man desires also after his own nature, to know what he already possesses, what truths already possess him.

Thus this desire to create, to share, to lift up and to influence (of course this also means the desire to tear down whatever stands in the way of this creation): like the sun that merely gives its life-giving warmth as a consequence of what it is, of its very nature and without thought, and yet in man this takes on also the form of thought, of "intention" and "affection", is endowed with a subjective ethical or "moral" quality of that self-valuing from which such an overflow occurs, for it is in our nature to interpret and reinterpret our experiences, regardless of their type, after the fact of our own subjective character and "human" constitution, as reasoning and passionate beings.

 

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"It would be wise to exercise caution with one's wishes." --Penny Royal AI

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sat Sep 26, 2015 6:22 pm

Lol, what more fitting? You two had the answer to "why politics?" All this time.

No more why, then. Only how.

I specially liked this passage for its simplicity, also for its main role in the denouement:

"And the human being is also a being, of course. So I take it that the philosopher's 'philanthropy' is a particular manifestation of his philo-sophy---one that seeks to make the human being "accommodate and bend itself to" him; to make it "smooth" "and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection". He "would still create a [mankind] before which [he] can bow the knee"!"

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sat Sep 26, 2015 8:42 pm

Thanks for reminding me of this thread. It indeed already contains the why, both teleological and nonteleological. However, I think I've come to understand it "even" better in the meantime, and also, the how I've found complicates matters. Thus in May of last year, I wrote a contact of mine:

Quote :
Almost two weeks ago, I posted an attempt at an aphorism on my Facebook wall. In its current form, it reads: "Insofar as one's happiness consists in giving the impression of happiness, one cannot pursue happiness but by pretending to be happy." Though it's a general statement, I actually meant something very specific.

I've told you that, [throughout the past four years], I pondered the question of political philosophy: why should a philosopher become political? I think I've found the answer, but that gave rise to a new problem.

In the course of inquiring into the "why", which has a general answer, I learned a lot about the "how", which has only particular answers. The Machiavellian "how", for example, was: "by promoting a social system in which scientists and inventors are praised and rewarded for improving the lives of the masses" (Bacon, New Atlantis, sweeping paraphrase).

Now the Nietzschean "how", which I've found in Strauss, and which I think not even Lampert has fully grasped, is: "by willing the eternal recurrence." But this implies happiness: for only someone whose happiness is so great as to "justify existence itself" (Zarathustra's Prologue) would, and indeed _could_, will the eternal recurrence.

And where might _I_ find such happiness? I think it must be the "blessedness" of "press[ing my] hand upon millenniums as upon wax"--of "writ[ing] upon the will of millenniums as upon brass" (TSZ Old and New Tables 29). But in order to do so, I must will the eternal recurrence. Catch-22!

So how can I pretend to be so happy as to will the eternal recurrence? I must find a happiness that approximates it.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sat Sep 26, 2015 10:07 pm

Chew on this big fat motherfucker of a tail:

The happiness of serving yourself the eternal recurrence that makes you happy.

Then, only then, will the how go from complicated to absurdly possible.

But this... Are you really capable of this? What the fuck exactly makes you so happy about reading Nietzsche? Honestly, I have never understood. Don't tell me though. If you ever tell me a how, it will be self-evident.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Sep 27, 2015 10:38 pm

While thinking about what to post next in the third Pentad cycle, I was reminded of this thread:

http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2109300#p2109300 (Note that it seems that, in Part V, I meant to write "if the war hallows the cause rather than vice versa".)

The "great problem" that dawned upon me then now suggests itself to me as a solution. I need to reflect on this...

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Sep 27, 2015 11:10 pm

Sauwelios wrote:
While thinking about what to post next in the third Pentad cycle, I was reminded of this thread:

http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2109300#p2109300 (Note that it seems that, in Part V, I meant to write "if the war hallows the cause rather than vice versa".)

The "great problem" that dawned upon me then now suggests itself to me as a solution. I need to reflect on this...

Wow, nice style! Carefulness becomes an art here. Tactile approach to the intellect. I say try more, try onward.

And now I understand. In all his ontological strictness, Nietzsche is purely addressing what he knows to be half of the truth. That is, he always hails masculine virtues, and never feminine ones; only on a very small number of occasions does he reveal that the feminine nature is possibly higher than the masculine, which is essentially his way of saying that this nature actually exists, and might be contemplated.

I can now see it because I see why he did it, that he deliberately limited himself to his gender, make a trademark out of that, so to speak - this , from now on, was to be masculine philosophy. The force that emerges from such a polarized work is much greater, it spans a much greater field of time than a general one, as it is archetypical and not merely human. Magic, essentially. Chokmah as the polarity principle.

Self-valuing is, it must be, a feminine concept, a great mother from which will to power is born and into which it releases itself. Binah. Form, that makes sense. Thus the form of force and the form of form and the form of consciousness - where WtP is the force of force and the force of form and the force of consciousness. It does make quite a bit of sense. Because it is true that the way in which being self-values is essentially ruthless, especially a female.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Sep 27, 2015 11:24 pm

"If truth is a woman, has philosophy not so far been clumsy?"

Indeed, a more ruthless self-valuing is a more selective self-valuing.

"Women aren't deep. Thy aren't even shallow!" In my experience, a complete awareness of the taste of "now."

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Sep 27, 2015 11:50 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:
In astrology, the 'goddess' Venus rules over this domain, of unequality. She is the essence of unfairness. The cruelty of Mars only follows from her unequality.

I tentatively propose a basic Venus Mars religion for our coming age.

The last two sentences of the final version of my "Note on the First Chapter of Leo Strauss's Final Work" read:

Quote :
As in Heidegger's work (paragraph 2), so in Nietzsche's the room for political philosophy is occupied by gods or the gods: Dionysus and Ariadne (cf. paragraph 15 of the central chapter). And like Heidegger's (paragraph 8), Nietzsche's work, too, invites a dialogue with the most profound thinkers of the Orient: "The cyclic cosmology was also dominant in ancient India, where the universe was understood to be the endless cycles of creation and destruction. In Hinduism, those endless cycles were pictured as the cosmic dance of Shiva." (Seung, Nietzsche's Epic of the Soul.)

In paragraph 8 of his essay (which can be found in full at http://www.markfoster.net/struc/philosophy_as_rigorous_science.pdf), Strauss wrote:

Quote :
Hitherto every great age of humanity grew out of Bodenständigkeit (rootedness in the soil). Yet the great age of classical Greece gave birth to a way of thinking which in principle endangered Bodenständigkeit from the beginning and in its ultimate contemporary consequences is about to destroy the last relics of that condition of human greatness. Heidegger's philosophy belongs to the infinitely dangerous moment when man is in a greater danger than ever before of losing his humanity and therefore--danger and salvation belonging together--philosophy can have the task of contributing toward the recovery or return of Bodenständigkeit or rather of preparing an entirely novel kind of Bodenständigkeit: a Bodenständigkeit beyond the most extreme Bodenlosigkeit, a being at home beyond the most extreme homelessness.

Following Nietzsche rather than Heidegger, I took the "return of the gods" mentioned in that paragraph to be the return of Dionysus and Ariadne. However, in doing so, I was strongly influenced by an essay by Harry Neumann, "Liberalism's Moloch": see http://forums.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2432194#p2432194.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Mon Sep 28, 2015 2:15 am

In his ''Liberalism's Moloch'', Neumann wrote:
While nothing was so necessary as Moloch's pitiless wrath, nothing was more precious than the always endangered joys of peace protected by that wrath and sanctified by the goddess. [...] In endangered cities such as Carthage, this protection was a perpetual need. The Carthaginian woman was responsible for the domestic hearth while her men fought to preserve its sacred flame. [...]
Carthaginian hearts belonged to Tanith even when necessity compelled them to revile her. Yet the terrifying realization of Carthage's precarious position usually forced them to give Moloch pride of place. As in Sparta, military necessity demanded that Ares (Moloch) be given higher official honors, but Aphrodite (Tanith) was dearest to them. The Carthaginian woman did not enjoy equality of rights although--or because--she was at the heart of Carthaginian life. She was the center of the home for which her men fought their perpetual wars. [...]
In [Flaubert's] Salammbo, the male principle (Moloch) rules officially, although the unofficial, but actual, deity is the female principle (Tanith). Unless given this official priority, Moloch's wrath would oppress Carthage and not her enemies.

Contrast:

In her ''The apollonian Vishnu and the Dionysian Bhairava'', Elizabeth Chalier wrote:
From the exoteric socio-religious point of view, Vishnu is superior to Bhairava, who is no more than the terrible policeman god protecting the boundaries of the socio-religious community and, as door-keeper, the access to its temples from hostile external forces. [...] The terrifying divinity of transgression can never become the object of public cult as such, and the only means for him to receive communal worship is by transforming himself into the equally terrifying protector-god for a more central pacific and benign divinity. [... F]rom the esoteric standpoint of transgressive sacrality, Vishnu himself recognizes Bhairava as the supreme divinity. Nevertheless, Bhairava himself is anxious to "keep up the appearances," to maintain the distinction between what can be described as the exoteric and esoteric hierarchies, for he recognizes Vishnu's supremacy in the socio-religious domain in exchange for the latter's recognition of his own metaphysical and initiatic supremacy. [Source: http://www.svabhinava.org/brahmanicide/Vishnu-Bhairava/index.php]

I think what Neumann says goes for times of war or crisis, whereas what Chalier says goes for times of peace or stability (and likewise, that, other things being equal, a queen makes a better ruler in times of peace or stability, but a king in times of war or crisis).

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Thu Oct 08, 2015 11:27 pm

Amasopher wrote:
if there is one passage that's given me the key to solving my problem, it is this:

    Zarathustra leaves philanthrophy nameless, a riddle for the coming nutcrackers, if an easy riddle, given that Nietzsche himself points to it being the most spiritual will to power.[Nietzsche and Modern Times, page 137.]

But what Nietzsche calls "the most spiritual will to power" (BGE 9) is philosophy, not philanthropy---two distinct passions, according to page 14 of HPBS. The passage quoted above, then, suggests that these two passions are at bottom the same passion: not in the trivial sense that all passions are at bottom will to power, but in the sense that both these passions are the most spiritual will to power. And indeed, both in BGE 9 and what I think is the corresponding speech in Zarathustra, 'On Self-Overcoming', Nietzsche ties philosophising with moralising: the Stoics, for example, "want[ed] to impose [their] morality, [their] ideal, on nature" (BGE 9)---and human nature is of course a part of nature... Thus Zarathustra, in the speech already mentioned, says:

    But it [being] shall accommodate and bend itself to you! So willeth your will. Smooth shall it become and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection.That is your entire will, ye wisest ones, as a Will to Power; and even when ye speak of good and evil, and of estimates of value.Ye would still create a world before which ye can bow the knee: such is your ultimate hope and ecstasy.[trans. Common.]

And the human being is also a being, of course. So I take it that the philosopher's 'philanthropy' is a particular manifestation of his philo-sophy---one that seeks to make the human being "accommodate and bend itself to" him; to make it "smooth" "and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection". He "would still create a [mankind] before which [he] can bow the knee"!

While ticking off all references to the "Übermensch" in Nietzsche's notebooks, I found the following interesting note:

"Not for justice do ye all fight, ye just ones, but for this, that your images of man may triumph.
And that by my image of the Superman all your images of man may shatter [zerbrechen]: behold, that is Zarathustra's will to justice." (Nietzsche, Nachlass Sommer 1883 13 [5], entire, my translation.)


This could not fail to remind me of the speech already mentioned, which begins thus:

"'Will to Truth' do ye call it, ye wisest ones, that which impelleth you and maketh you ardent?
Will for the thinkableness of all being: thus do I call your will!
All being would ye make thinkable: for ye doubt with good reason whether it be already thinkable.
But it shall accommodate and bend itself to you! So willeth your will. Smooth shall it become and subject to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection.
That is your entire will, ye wisest ones, as a Will to Power; and even when ye speak of good and evil, and of estimates of value.
Ye would still create a world before which ye can bow the knee: such is your ultimate hope and ecstasy." (Common trans., "Self-Surpassing".)


And ends thus:

"With your values and formulae of good and evil, ye exercise power, ye valuing ones: and that is your secret love, and the sparkling, trembling, and overflowing of your souls.
But a stronger power groweth out of your values, and a new surpassing: by it breaketh [zerbricht] egg and egg-shell.
And he who hath to be a creator in good and evil- verily, he hath first to be a destroyer, and break values in pieces [Werthe zerbrechen].
Thus doth the greatest evil pertain to the greatest good: that, however, is the creating good.--
Let us speak thereof, ye wisest ones, even though it be bad. To be silent is worse; all suppressed truths become poisonous.
And let everything break up [zerbrechen] which--can break up by our truths! Many a house is still to be built!
Thus spake Zarathustra." (ibid.)


I suspect that note from the Nachlass is, so to say, the seed out of which the whole speech grew. The first thing we notice is that "will to truth" and "ye wisest ones" replace "will to justice" and "ye just ones", respectively. That this is only a change in form and not in content can be appreciated from the following momentous passage:

"Truly, no one has a higher claim to our reverence than he who possesses the drive and the strength for justice. For the highest and rarest virtues unite and hide in it as in an unfathomable sea that swallows up the streams which it receives from all sides. The hand of the just man, who is entitled to sit in judgment, no longer trembles when it holds the scales; inexorably against himself he piles weight upon weight, his eyes are not dimmed as the balance rises and falls, and his voice is neither hard nor broken when he pronounces the sentence. Were he a cold demon of knowledge, he would cast round him the icy atmosphere of a superhumanly awful majesty which we should fear, not reverence: but that he is a human being and yet tries to rise from casual doubt to rigorous certainty, from tolerant mildness to the imperative 'thou must', from the rare virtue of magnanimity to the rarest, of justice, that he now resembles that demon, without being more than a poor mortal from the outset, and above all, that he in every moment has to atone to himself for his humanity and tragically consumes himself over an impossible virtue--all this places him on a lonely height as the most reverend example of the human race; for he wants truth, though not just in the form of cold, inconsequential knowledge, but in the form of a settling and punishing judge, truth not as the selfish possession of an individual, but as the sacred authorization to displace the boundary stones of all selfish possessions, truth, in a word, as the tribunal of the world and not in the least as the chance prey and pleasure of a single hunter. Only insofar as the truthful one has the unconditional will to be just does the striving for truth, which is everywhere so thoughtlessly glorified, have anything great about it[.]" (Nietzsche, On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life, chapter 6, eclectic translation.)

Surely this is already a description of Nietzsche's image of the Superman. Anyway, we notice an interesting difference between our note from the Nachlass and our Zarathustra speech: the former is about images of man, whereas the latter is about images of the world. I had resolved that difference earlier on in this thread by pointing out that man is a part of the world. But now, I'm impelled to the contrary and in my view more than merely complementary approach: by pointing out that man, or the philosopher, creates the world in his own image... (BGE 9, end.) The aphorism from which the following passage is taken has been staring me in the face (the end of this aphorism is actually an Ariadne passage...):

"Nothing is more conditional--or, let us say, narrower--than our feeling for beauty. Whoever would think of it apart from man's joy in man would immediately lose any foothold. 'Beautiful in itself' is a mere phrase, not even a concept. In the beautiful, man posits himself as the measure of perfection; in special cases he worships himself in it. A species cannot do otherwise but thus affirm itself alone. Its lowest instinct, that of self-preservation and self-expansion, still radiates in such sublimities. Man believes the world itself to be overloaded with beauty--and he forgets himself as the cause of this. He alone has presented the world with beauty--alas! only with a very human, all-too-human beauty.... At bottom, man mirrors himself in things; he considers everything beautiful that reflects his own image[.]" (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man", aphorism 19, Kaufmann translation.)

All this now impels me to the contention that political philosophy is prior to any other philosophy. It certainly explains why Nietzsche tends to conceive philosophers as above all political philosophers. The philosopher (the wise man, the just man) is in the first place concerned with his image of man--with his ideal of man--, often enough even to the point of conceiving the (true) world as an idealized man (a god: for example, Vishnu).

But what is the meaning of the fact that our note from the Nachlass is about the Superman whereas our Zarathustra speech is about the world as will to power? The above suggests that the view of the world as will to power is the universalisation of the image of man as the Superman. Compare:

"And this secret spake Life herself unto me. '[...]
He certainly did not hit the truth who shot at it the formula: "Will to existence": that will--doth not exist!
For what is not, cannot will; that, however, which is in existence--how could it still strive for existence!
Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to Life, but--so teach I thee--Will to Power![']" (TSZ "Self-Surpassing".)


With:

"We opposite ones, we who have opened our eyes and our consciences to the question where and how the plant 'man' has hitherto grown up most vigorously into the heights, are of the opinion that this has happened under the opposite conditions [to what so-called "free-thinkers" consider ideal conditions] every time, that to that end the dangerousness of his situation first had to grow to monstrous proportions, his inventive and dissimulatory strength (his 'spirit') had to develop under a long pressure and compulsion into the subtle and the daring, and his life-will had to be boosted to an unconditional power-will[.]" (BGE 44, my translation. Cf. WP 957.)

Perhaps it is only to a man with such a boosted life-will that the world will appear as will to power and nothing besides. But this is not to say that this is only appearance:

"This kind of man [the superman] that he [Zarathustra] conceives conceives reality as it is: it is strong enough for that--, it is not estranged from it, not carried away from it, it is reality itself, it includes even all its terrifyingness and questionableness, only with that can man have greatness..." (EH "Destiny" 5, my translation.)

In Zarathustra, "the concept 'Superman' became supreme reality"; this is "the concept of Dionysus himself" (EH "TSZ" 6); Zarathustra is "a Dionysus" (section 7, 8). For Nietzsche/Zarathustra, man is an Ariadne whom he will transform into a Dionysus, a Superman (section 8); and even the world as will to power is still an Ariadne for him: he transfigures it into a Dionysus, "my Dionysian world", by conceiving it as eternally recurring will to power (WP 1067).

When Zarathustra tells the wisest ones that "a stronger power groweth out of your values, and a new surpassing: by it breaketh egg and egg-shell", he's talking about "[t]he self-overcoming of morality out of truthfulness" [EH "Destiny" 3): for the "valuations" that the wisest ones of the past "put on the river of becoming" and were then "believed by the people as good and evil" (TSZ "Self-Surpassing") included the valuation of truth. Those wisest ones were men such as Socrates and Plato. And the new valuation put on the river of becoming by Nietzsche/Zarathustra, the new "greatest good", is "the creating good", the will to power itself--"the unexhausted, procreating life-will" (ibid.).
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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Fri Oct 09, 2015 11:30 am

In this context, I'd like to present my introduction to the philosophical politics we are concretely conjuring in this forum.


 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Fri Oct 16, 2015 6:20 pm

Pretty good, I like it. For the record, though, I don't think physical strength determines everything; I think I agree about the extended phenotype. And first of all, I'm driven by the will to understand what drives a philosopher to become political. I think I've really been coming to a good understanding in Nietzsche: thus I found a third alternative passage to BGE 44 and WP 257 a few days ago, which connects them directly to BGE 295 by the words "stronger [more evil] and more profound"; and its penultimate sentence reads:

"This whole way of thinking I called in myself the philosophy of Dionysos: a view which recognises in the creating/reshaping of man as well as of things the highest enjoyment of existence, and in 'morality' merely a means to give the ruling will such strength and flexibility as to impress itself onto mankind like that." (Nietzsche, Nachlass 1884-1885 34 [176], my translation.)

And here's note [179] in its entirety:

"That there be a development of the whole of mankind is nonsense: nor is it at all to be desired. The manifold shaping of man, bringing out the kind of manikindedness of man, shattering him when a kind of type has had its high point--in short, being creating and destroying--seems to me the highest enjoyment that men can have."

The highest enjoyment men can have, the highest enjoyment of existence--and here's the beginning of WP 257 (1885):

"Law-giving moralities are the principal means of fashioning man according to the pleasure of a creative and profound will, provided that such an artist's will of the first rank has the power in its hands and can make its creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs. Such men of great creativity [are] the really great men according to my understanding[.]" (Kaufmann translation.)

So the Superman is, not so much the philosopher as such, as the political philosopher--whom Nietzsche in BGE 211 calls the philosopher proper (a.k.a. the genuine philosopher). But due to automorphism, all philosophy is political philosophy in a sense: all philosophy is at bottom concerned with the philosopher's higher or heightened self. And what heightens, what boosts the self more, than the attraction exerted by an image or reflection of one's higher self? And yet this image or reflection must be different from the heightened self's self-image... For the image of one's boosted self cannot be the image striving for which one feels oneself boosted! Consider the following:

"'Ego,' sayest thou, and art proud of that word. But the greater thing--in which thou art unwilling to believe--is thy body with its big sagacity; it saith not 'ego,' but doeth it.
[...]
Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is a mighty lord, an unknown sage--it is called Self; it dwelleth in thy body, it is thy body.
There is more sagacity in thy body than in thy best wisdom. And who then knoweth why thy body requireth just thy best wisdom?
Thy Self laugheth at thine ego, and its proud prancings. 'What are these prancings and flights of thought unto me?' it saith to itself. 'A by-way to my purpose. I am the leading-string of the ego, and the prompter of its notions.'
The Self saith unto the ego: 'Feel pain!' And thereupon it suffereth, and thinketh how it may put an end thereto--and for that very purpose it is meant to think.
The Self saith unto the ego: 'Feel pleasure!' Thereupon it rejoiceth, and thinketh how it may ofttimes rejoice--and for that very purpose it is meant to think." (TSZ "Despisers of the Body".)


If the personality center is shifted from the ego to the Self, as I said in my "Dionysa" thread, then one identifies with that which says "feel pain/pleasure", not with that which suffers/rejoices; one's pleasure is then the Self's meta-pleasure, its pleasure in saying that, in leading the ego by a string and prompting its notions. The ego's pleasure cannot be the pleasure of seeing itself strive for pleasure--of seeing itself suffer. I think this is akin to being a proud heterosexual: one takes pride and joy in knowing oneself to be a masculine man precisely in pursuing, or at least conquering, feminine women. But in saying this I should not again make the same mistake I've made time and again, and which I already realised over eight years ago! I will quote, in full, the form in which I posted it on my old blog two years later (and which should be quite authentic):

I wrote:
I have long been intrigued by the relation between the anima and the child archetype. I think I have finally solved it, and want to present my solution for scrutiny and inspiration. Let me start with my first proposition (which I call "mine" because I have not found it explicitly in Jung's writings). The child archetype is a symbol of the Self. It is a symbol of wholeness, of the union of opposites.

My second proposition is that Jung defined the anima (at times) as the male human being's personified unconscious, which has a feminine character (cf. Zur Psychologie des Kindarchetypus, "Towards a Psychology of the Child Archetype", section 3C). Likewise, the animus is supposed to be the female human being's personified unconscious, which has a masculine character (I cannot corroborate this, as I am a guy, but an allegory of this might be Pallas Athena's birth from the head of Zeus, even as the ego or conscious self originates in the unconscious).

The child archetype is a symbol of the integrated Self, i.e., of a synthesis of consciousness and the unconscious. It anticipates the synthesis of the Self, which is the goal of the individuation process. It is an image of the result of the union between the masculine and the feminine, namely between consciousness and the unconscious (respectively, in the case of the male). Thus the anima or animus is indeed intimately related to the child archetype. But confusing them is detrimental: for by meditating on the anima or animus, the distinction between that and one's conscious self becomes ever starker, whereas meditation on the child archetype has the effect of a harmonization of the two. The anima should not be the object of contemplation; it should be part of the subject. The task is "the shifting of the personality center from the ego to the Self", as Jung puts it in the concluding section of said essay.

EDIT: I forgot to mention, in the second section, that the male ego has a masculine character and the female a feminine one. This is implied in the third section, though.

In my "Love my creation" thread, I linked to this very blog entry to elucidate the following passage:

I wrote:
While reading a book titled The Sword and the Flute recently, it struck me how much of a Dionysus figure Krishna really is. And a child figure, too. To use the symbolism of Savitri Devi's The Lightning and the Sun, the rage of Shiva is the thunderstorm that clears my sky from the clouds that make it gray; whereas Krishna is the object of my beatific vision [i.e., my sun, or perhaps my blue sky]. In fact, it's only the vision of Krishna that makes my Shiva shiva, "auspicious"; before that, he is Rudra, "the Roarer". Thus Rudra points to Krishna, the barbaric or Titanic Dionysus points to the Apollinian Dionysus. And when the former sees the latter, this apollinises the former, turning Rudra into Shiva. So in my view, Shiva and Krishna are both Apollinian Dionysuses: Shiva symbolises my Apollinian-Dionysian "I", whereas Krishna symbolises my Apollinian-Dionysian "You"; both however are symbols of the Self, symbols of wholeness.

These may be Dionysus and Ariadne in their full form. The male ego is then Rudra, whereas the male Self is Shiva, i.e., Mitra-Rudra (in the sense that Mitra and Varuna are the two poles of Brahma: see Chalier, "Mitra-Varuna and the niravasita-Bhairava"). The female ego is then Vishnu (or Parvati: compare Harihara with Ardhanarishvara), whereas the female Self is Krishna, i.e., Vishnu-Varuna. While striving blindly, the male is Rudra: thus I've told Lampert that I was basically a fanatic before I found the rationale for Nietzsche's philosophy in his Leo Strauss and Nietzsche (it was also Lampert who referred me to Nachlass 1884-1885 34 [176]: in his Nietzsche's Task, in a footnote to the following passage, which confirms what I've said about the boosted life-will in my previous post: "The history of our species shows that enormous danger has enhanced two aspects of humanity: mind and will. Mind, humanity's 'strength of invention and strength of alteration,' developed under prolonged pressure and compulsion into something 'refined and daring.' Will intensified itself under such conditions from 'life-will' into 'power-will.' The latter term emends the term used in this sentence in the drafts: will to power; 'life-will' is itself already a will to power. Will to power as human life-will expands beyond mere survival in ages of greatest danger and ascends to human power-will." (page 98.) It is only when a man's life-will is thus boosted that he's strong enough to see reality as it is, will to power and nothing besides.)

Shiva is the male Self which leads Rudra, the male ego, on a string by prompting it with the notions of pleasure and suffering. Shiva only becomes self-aware when he becomes aware of Krishna; Vishu does not suffice. In other words, "Ariadnus" only realises himself as Dionysus when he envisions Dionysa slumbering within Ariadne; a man only becomes a Superman when he envisions the Superman slumbering within man:

"[T]o man doth it ever impel me anew, my fervent creative will; thus impelleth it the hammer to the stone.
Ah, ye men, within the stone slumbereth an image for me, the image of my visions! Ah, that it should slumber in the hardest, ugliest stone!
Now rageth my hammer ruthlessly against its prison. From the stone fly the fragments: what's that to me?
I will complete it: for a shadow came unto me--the stillest and lightest of all things once came unto me!
The beauty of the Superman came unto me as a shadow." (TSZ "Happy Isles".)


Now according to Chalier, "Vishnu embod[ies] the vector uniting the profane kshatriya (‘warrior’) with the pure pole of Brahmâ [i.e., Mitra] to generate the religious image of the king as the protector and even pivot of the socio-religious order (dharma), and Rudra incarnat[es] the vector linking him with the transgressive pole of Brahmâ [i.e., Varuna] to generate the equally religious image of the king as the savage destroyer in the impurity of the hunt and the violence of battle." (Chalier, op.cit.) This may contain the solution to the problem I mentioned in my second post under the name "Sauwelios" in this thread. Shiva is Rudra who has found inner peace within the war, in the eye of the storm so to say: for he now knows that the peace for which he wars is a peace that contains an inner war. Compare:

I wrote:
The gist here is that, where there are multiple states (or cities: Greek poleis), states tend to wage war among one another from time to time, but when they are not at war, they tend to turn their energies inward, to conflicts between factions, for instance, or--and this is what Nietzsche alludes to here--to contests between individuals, like those competitions in which both Aeschylus and Sophocles took part. It was their mutual jealousy, their urge to excell, which drove Aeschylus and Sophocles to surpass themselves and write those plays with which their names will forever be associated. ["Nietzsche's 'The Greek State' revisited", paragraphs 10-11.]

The Shaivic state is what Nietzsche there, in paragraph 13, called the "martial society"; the Krishnaic state is what we might call the "venereal society", of which Nietzsche there says:

"This bloody jealousy of city against city, of party against party, this murderous greed [Gier] of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse of the slain enemy, in short, the incessant renewal of those Trojan scenes of struggle and horror, in the spectacle of which Homer, as a genuine Hellene, stands before us absorbed with delight--whither does this naive barbarism of the Greek state point? What is its excuse before the tribunal of eternal justice? Proud and calm the state steps before this tribunal, and by the hand it leads the flower of blossoming womanhood: Greek society. For this Helena the state waged those wars--and what gray-bearded judge could here condemn?--"

There is of course a significant connection between Venus (Aphrodite) and Helena.

The victorious peace for which we shall strive is a Classical peace, in the literal sense of the word--a varna-dharmic peace.--

"[O]ne will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a paean on war. Horribly clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes along like the night, war is nevertheless Apollo, the right god for consecrating and purifying the state. First of all, however, as is said in the beginning of the Iliad, he lets his arrow fly on the mules and dogs. Then he strikes the men themselves, and everywhere funeral pyres blaze. Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the state as the slave is for society; and who can avoid these insights if he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equaled Greek art-perfection?" (Nietzsche, op.cit., paragraph 12.)

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Fri Oct 16, 2015 10:09 pm

I cannot accept Helena as our goal. Consider this passage from La Vida Boheme's album Sera, Viernes Negro/Helena song: "Don't return Helena, if thou even still lovest me, when thou left, I dreamt thou with white in thyne hair." You will have to go farther in your conclusion. We seek Ariadne now. From the same album, Ariadne song: "how am i not to wait? How am i not to wait for you? How am I not to wait for you, Hope? How am i not to wait, how am I not to wait for you, How am I not to wait for you, if you leave?" That was some years ago. I think, now, she is back.

Ariadne

So much, so much I was going to do,
And i stayed in a singing,
Singing and i don't know,
If I will die waiting your return or li-
Ve to greet you with some coffee.

Cry(ing) go corrode,
Another because I,
Do not plan to move,
Let them bury me in asphalt, i'll be right here,
The day this singing be more than faith.

How am i not to wait,
How am I not to wait for you?
How am I not to wait for you?
Wait for you,
Hope (esperar: wait esperanza: hope)

How will I not wait?
How will I not wait?
How am I not to wait,
If you go?

http://youtu.be/cXvZOhUqbW4

I heard you were called a thinly veiled neonazi spiritualist! Ha! If people where so malicious here, this band would stand accused of the same.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Fri Oct 16, 2015 11:32 pm

"Helena" here just means "very beautiful woman". Also, Nietzsche does not literally write "martial society" but rather "warlike society"; I just liked the fact that that translation allowed me to invoke Venus, whom Fixed Cross had suggested as a simpler alternative for Ariadne (and Mars for Dionysus). Our goal shall indeed be Ariadne, or Dionysa; not Helena. Helena is boring, like the green pasture happiness of the herd. But as for Venus, according to Wikipedia "[a]n ancient cult of Aphrodite-Ariadne was observed at Amathus, Cyprus, according to the obscure Hellenistic mythographer Paeon of Amathus [...]" (Wiki, "Ariadne").

About two weeks ago, an old contact of mine, whom in my more fanatic period I happened to make quite enthusiastic about "neonazi spiritualism", asked me what I thought about Hitler--if I thought he was a Nietzschean of some sort or at least thought he was, or if I thought he was gravely mistaken--, and I answered:

I wrote:
I find it interesting that you should ask me about Hitler today, as the last thing I did before going to bed last night was look up a passage mentioning him. (Of course, this may not be entirely coincidental, considering that my last post on Facebook was already pointing in that general direction.) Here's the passage in question:

"Neumann's Verdun essay seems to imply that anything for which one fights to the death is worthwhile, or that fighting to the death is the most worthwhile thing one can do. Aristotle's great souled man will not count the cost of his own life, when called upon to make the supreme sacrifice for a noble cause. But he must believe in the nobility of his cause. He cannot be stirred to action, even by the promise of gaining great honor--since he sets no great store by honor, considered in itself--unless he thinks that the honor is matched by the intrinsic excellence of the cause in which he fights. Nor is it likely to be true that any soldier who actually fought at Verdun [during the First World War] did so without believing that the sacred fatherland represented a universal purpose whose triumph deserved his sacrifice. It was the Romantic nationalism of the 19th century--not purposeless politics--which flowered--and died--at Verdun. Purposeless politics is a human impossibility. All human beings act for the sake of ends. Action not for the sake of ends--what Heidegger, according to Neumann, demanded from Hitler--is not possible. Only a being--God--whose end is intrinsic to its action could act without acting for an end distinct from the action itself. [...] Heidegger's call for a politics free from the fishing in the murky waters of universal causes is a call for a politics free from purpose--a politics based upon the hypothesis that man can act without acting for the sake of an end--a possibility dependent upon every man being God. If any man would have adopted such a 'politics' it would have been Hitler. That he did not proves that no one can." (Harry Jaffa, "Neumann or Nihilism", in: Harry Neumann, Liberalism.)

I think it more probable that Hitler thought he was Nietzschean than that he actually was, but I find the latter more interesting. His eugenics are superficially Nietzschean, but I'm more interested in the other side of the coin. Consider the quotes in my last Facebook post, which I think you've read (also the opening post in that thread, about Nietzsche's kind of pity) [https://www.facebook.com/Sauwelios/posts/879753192077956]. Did Hitler oppress and persecute so many groups of people in order to drive them to greatness? Did he wage war, not so much for a cause, as for the greatness to which the dangers, suffering, and inequality of war might drive the warring and war-torn peoples? I think it's probably rather unlikely, but as a philosopher I'm concerned not so much with the actuality as with the theory. It was the theoretical problem inherent in such "purposeless politics" that made me look up the above passage. For I think nothing is as conducive to supermanhood, in the Nietzschean sense, as the striving for it (with the intended suggestion of "strife"). But this means that the end is best attained in the very means to that end; that the cause is best served in the very fight for that cause. If the Superman is best found in the fight, then the cause of that fight cannot be the Superman, for then the Superman is in the fight rather than beyond it, at the end of it. This is the philosophical problem I'm reflecting on these days.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Fri Oct 16, 2015 11:53 pm

Good, yes, your fanaticism was only to confuse the universal with wisdom. For, why can't society eventually be made up of godlike creatures? The essence of genealogy as philosophy is that it allows for time to obliterate impossibility of desire. Man is not godlike, not because he cannot be, but because it is not yet wise to be.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sat Oct 17, 2015 9:43 am

Pezer wrote:
Man is not godlike, not because he cannot be, but because it is not yet wise to be.

Am I mistaken or is there agreement here?



No, I am not mistaken.

These recent efforts of 'deciphering our aim' have been quite fruitful.

(Pezer - I showed your dragon-video to S)

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sat Oct 17, 2015 5:49 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:
Pezer wrote:
Man is not godlike, not because he cannot be, but because it is not yet wise to be.

Am I mistaken or is there agreement here?

A God or a godlike being in this context would be a being who engages in his every activity for its own sake, or (in other words) for the sake of his enjoyment thereof. But how could it be not wise to be like that? Wouldn't it be unwise only if behaving like that should have bad consequences for oneself? One's untimely death, caused by acting wholly on impulse, for example? But if this is an issue for one, is one not still thinking teleologically? And thereby not godlike in this sense at all?

If we approach this from the perspective of Nietzsche's early artist-metaphysics, then we can say that, as Jaffa actually puts it, every man is indeed God (note: not "each man is a God"!), namely the Primordial One, Which enjoys all activities of all (human) beings for their own sake; whereas those (human) beings themselves are suffering, striving for something beyond their striving--namely, something Apollinian, an illusion of Being; whereas they themselves are transient. Likewise with self-valuing: the valuing of valuing presupposes the valuing of something that is not valuing, for example a self (very Apollinian!).
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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sat Oct 17, 2015 7:24 pm

Not wise because of the lack you mentioned... Not wise because he sees that only HIM turning teleological can assure one like him can be godlike to an extent he knows is possible but not yet extant. Genealogy is the tool for creating the circumstances, teleologically, for extrateleological godlike enjoyment of the fact of being Human. This is what Shoguns strove for in their striving, why they changed so much from their warrior to their dictator selves. They did the best they could with what they had, which was the best anyone had at the time. Now, via WWII we have incorporated enough from all genealogies to see more clearly, and strive for the highest lack of teleology. In the way of the shoguns: everybody in their place,having peace in the right places to allow for strife in the right places and, most of all, true enjoyment and fullfillment of human nature: godlike. Humans have the privilege of being able to see far and wide, enjoting thus, most in most dense, which dencity has to be designed by the most human of genealogical teleology.

 

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PostSubject: Re: Lampertian Nietzscheanism and related matters.   Sun Nov 22, 2015 1:19 am

I wrote:
I wrote:
While reading a book titled The Sword and the Flute recently, it struck me how much of a Dionysus figure Krishna really is. And a child figure, too. To use the symbolism of Savitri Devi's The Lightning and the Sun, the rage of Shiva is the thunderstorm that clears my sky from the clouds that make it gray; whereas Krishna is the object of my beatific vision [i.e., my sun, or perhaps my blue sky]. In fact, it's only the vision of Krishna that makes my Shiva shiva, "auspicious"; before that, he is Rudra, "the Roarer". Thus Rudra points to Krishna, the barbaric or Titanic Dionysus points to the Apollinian Dionysus. And when the former sees the latter, this apollinises the former, turning Rudra into Shiva. So in my view, Shiva and Krishna are both Apollinian Dionysuses: Shiva symbolises my Apollinian-Dionysian "I", whereas Krishna symbolises my Apollinian-Dionysian "You"; both however are symbols of the Self, symbols of wholeness.

These may be Dionysus and Ariadne in their full form. The male ego is then Rudra, whereas the male Self is Shiva, i.e., Mitra-Rudra (in the sense that Mitra and Varuna are the two poles of Brahma: see Chalier, "Mitra-Varuna and the niravasita-Bhairava"). The female ego is then Vishnu (or Parvati: compare Harihara with Ardhanarishvara), whereas the female Self is Krishna, i.e., Vishnu-Varuna. While striving blindly, the male is Rudra: thus I've told Lampert that I was basically a fanatic before I found the rationale for Nietzsche's philosophy in his Leo Strauss and Nietzsche [...]. Shiva is Rudra who has found inner peace within the war, in the eye of the storm so to say: for he now knows that the peace for which he wars is a peace that contains an inner war.

Thus we may paraphrase Klages' aphorism as follows:

Ludwig Klages wrote:
Eros and Chaos. Eros without chaos: humanitarianism. Chaos without Eros: demonic devastation. Eros within chaos: Dionysus.

Chaos and Eros. Chaos without Eros: demonic devastation. Eros without chaos: humanitarianism. Chaos within Eros: Ariadne.

 

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