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 The Identity of Experience

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Fixed Cross
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PostSubject: The Identity of Experience   Wed Dec 07, 2011 6:44 pm

The science of being as a study in subjectivism, which has taken on fully logical form with value ontology, is approached on a higher level of organization, of more detail, of more possibility for contradiction, in the terms devised by the psychoanalytical schools. I believe all psychoanalysis revolves around the mutual requirement of the terms identity and experience.

As humans, most of our time we spend in avoiding experiences. In our seeking-out of what we aim to experience, we are shifting and sneaking along the invisible walls facing us from every direction but the one we seek to disclose - the walled off area of "the real" is however constantly accessible, these walls can be broken down with the force of intent. The lack of this intent is precisely what makes us effective as prolonged identities, which leads finally in complex beings to what we can begin to call experience.

The identity of experience is experience accepted into the being as its being. The same mechanisms that cause experience, also perform a lot of activity going on that is not 'owned' by the organism. Freud goes into this as a repressed - suggesting that the identity of this experience is already 'the name of the subject', but actively kept away from its consciousness. I would propose that we address this differently - as 'untranslated affect', affect not yet interpreted in terms of the particular self-valuing.

Psychoanalysis is not the art of retrieving experiences to consciousness, but to identify physical affect as experience. This is always done after the fact, also when there is no 'repression', or what I would call simply an insufficient power to identify in terms of self - the delicate dove-like beauty of the self to itself facing very dangerous and compromising affect, "raw" affect, which can not be specified, categorized in 'true terms' as Spinoza has it - pleasure or joy (laetitia), pain or sorrow (tristitia)and desire (cupiditas) or appetite. *

A manipulation is needed to incorporate the experience, to give it an identity, to add this experience to the identity of the being, to value it on terms of the beings valuing. Psychoanalysis is such a manipulation. Another one, much faster and therefore more dangerous and potentially destructive is Occult "pathworking". This is the business of setting up the conditions for translating raw affect into imagined sensory experience, by entering a state of lucid dreaming armed with the intention to disclose whatever formlessness is pressing on the walls of the being into apparitions, beings the being itself is able to face as itself - and proceeding to enter the dungeon of the unidentified with the clear aim of translating all that is into experience. And there are other manipulations.

In general, I would categorize all such manipulations as the Dionysian arts, to which possibility a systematic suspension of judgment is required, and the being comes into contact with its own boundaries - its walled-in-ness becomes its walled-ness, in other words, instead of the cells core, its membrane is the identity of experience. Such experience is not merely mortal but mortality itself.





* wikipedia: Affect (Latin affectus or adfectus) is a concept used in the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and elaborated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. For Spinoza, as discussed in Parts Two and Three of his Ethics, affects are states of mind and body related to (but not exactly synonymous with) feelings and emotions, of which he says there are three primary kinds: Subsequent philosophical usage by Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and their translator Brian Massumi, while derived explicitly from Spinoza, tends to distinguish more sharply than Spinoza does between affect and what are conventionally called emotions. Affects are difficult to grasp and conceptualize because, as Spinoza says, "an affect or passion of the mind [animi pathema] is a confused idea" which is only perceived by the increase or decrease it causes in the body's vital force.

 

___________
" The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. "
- Thucydides


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PostSubject: Re: The Identity of Experience   Wed Dec 07, 2011 7:10 pm

"When an inner process can not be integrated it is often projected outward. The notion of a materialized psychism opens a bottomless void beneath our feet."

Capable speaks here of unidentified affect, belonging to none of the three Spinozaean categories.
It appears logical that that raw affect, inner force which can not be identified in terms of the self-valuing, is projected (as a projectile) towards the Other - that which is explicitly unidentified -- or quasi-identified as the Other - that which has no right to exist.

Rights are an extension of identification.

It is a reality that people(s) are simple not able to bestow rights on those with whom they can not identify. Human rights is an invention of genius, a great artifice, worthy of my respect, although I respect that they can be logically refuted. The principle offers an identification based on a purely aesthetic identification -- the form of the human body, not its interior identity, i.e. the language it speaks/thinks, its ethics, its frame of action, its type.

A great assumption is made -- that all those organisms which can be identified as of the same "species" - a term, not a reality of experience/identification, communication -- are in fact "the same". In reality however, man A is more alike to dog A than man A to man B, and this expresses itself in identification. What is shared in identity is experience. Such has historically been the foundation of culture - a shared frame of experience equals a shared identity predicates lawmaking, which is consensus and trust.

Back at psychoanalysis - retroactively one learns to trust the affect that is 'repressed'... - to speak with the trauma in a common tongue, so that one can effectively agree that it exists. Agreement, this is what is created when a true Word appears. And this appearance is a physical act, a speaking.

Here has been a flaw in philosophy hitherto -- being must be interpreted as given. But what, in such a case, does "given" mean? Certainly not the predicate of something else, which gives. At best, it gives itself. But to what? To what but to itself?
Does this make sense? Not much - what is more sensible is to say that I give it, as itself, to itself, which is what I amount to.

Arrangement of potentiality --
life is largely strategy, being is observingness, intelligence, rising to the occasion, seizing opportunity - it is not an objective fact - it is the bold activity of which only the very few are capable of embodying entirely. These are the agents of evolution - in every species these arise.

 

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" The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. "
- Thucydides
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PostSubject: Re: The Identity of Experience   Thu Dec 08, 2011 4:37 am

Quote:
Does this make sense? Not much - what is more sensible is to say that I give it, as itself, to itself, which is what I amount to.


Identity, in a sense incorporatingness-as-such, a certain agglomeration of force/s-relations attaining in the being of this agglomeration [possible architecture: a/the most sufficiency of the widest necessity of its conditionality?] a 'center of force' or intertial gravity. This characteristic of the quality of the "degree of unification" serves to indicate the potency-vitality of identity, but not the being of it, which rather is the "root" incorporatingness that (emergently) attains and then reciprocally-reflexively begins to re-define and re-shape that from which it arose, begins to work on itself by taking into itself, changing as it changes.

"What I amount to" as "that I give it, as itself, to itself": this formulation of identity (human - but also not only human?) as a phenomenon which is a giving of the very given itself, that by which given is given or known/asserted in its givenness. Are we only an "amounts to something" in the sense that we take, are able to take ourselves, this amounts to, as given, as a givenness-as-such which is also a givingness? Could this be why/how we give the given of the given/s around us, or at least construe otherness essentially ("correctly" or otherwise) under an image of a being-given?

We are philosophical beings, humans, all of us engaged with/in processes of cross-territorial re/interpretation and re/incorporation -- integration and extagration. That by which this takes place (i.e. the "world") might be said to be our being. This "takes place" itself might be said to be our identity. The being of this "takes place" itself might be said to be, perhaps, givenness-as-such. Or at least it is possible that thus far this is the only/best way for us to understand/conceptualize this being.

Quote:
Arrangement of potentiality --
life is largely strategy, being is observingness, intelligence, rising to the occasion, seizing opportunity - it is not an objective fact - it is the bold activity of which only the very few are capable of embodying entirely. These are the agents of evolution - in every species these arise.


Being then as potentiality and thus that which conditions this potentiality as the being of this being. What is that by which this conditionality, abstracted from its embedded situatedness, is conditioned? We might understand this as givenness, as the very possibility for and of being from within being itself. This becomes feasible in the sense that this being reciprocally participates in its own existence-creating: through the simplest fact of its existence (as a being, as being) is another being or perhaps another "level of this already being" called also into existence, the existence of which hinges upon - and ONLY upon (?) - the simple fact of its "parent" "being's" being existing. What might this reciprocality, reflexivity, relatedness-as-such (abstracted out from its embedded situatednesses) be understood as, other than as a givenness which is also then and therefore a givingness?

Here we come face-to-face with identity [id-entity], with the unifying "principle" (frame, ground) of experiencing (which also then serves as a principle of differentiation from within experience/s). Interesting how this identity itself has its own being, and yet this being is to some extent irrelevant from the perspective of that which is experientially forged through and by the existence of this identity! In this 'to some extent irrelevant' we see the function of givenness, being given. And in the relatedness of this being to (the being/s of) what it experiences - deeper more genuine contact, powerful consciousness, imagination, creation, envisioning, knowing - we can see how this relatedness/experiencing occurs more essentially as under a form of a givenness, of a giving of that which is already itself a being-given to/for/by itself alone (even if only "by us" is this realized/known or "made real"/attaining to a relevancy).

[Further questioning then: to what extent are the differences here, between the implications arising from either being itself as a being-given or those arising from a being-given as only a being of certain beings (us) which structurally attain certain configurations of relatednesses and embedded situatednesses, meaningful, relevant? What are the various utilities to positing either ex ante or ex post facto here? Maybe more importantly, can we yet effect a possible synthesis even here, on this now higher level? (Edit: answer: yes, through the use of value-ontology we seem able to formulate these principles and elements conceptually-logically).]




Edit: additionally, to give credit where it is due, this intriguing "When an inner process can not be integrated it is often projected outward. The notion of a materialized psychism opens a bottomless void beneath our feet" is a line by Carl Jung, from his Flying Saucers, I believe.

 

___________
'To live means to finesse the processes to which one is subjugated.'
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