Sawelios, Weltanschauungsphilosophie, and Automorphism

I believe now that Sawelios' criticism of Weltanschauungsphilosophie is not of it as opposed to universalism, but as opposed to what I also have to re-interpret: justice. If he can be said to be critizicing value ontology, it is to the extent that value ontology does not demand action. In this respect, I have always also seen this in it, the pure obvservationalism that seems inherent of it (but I have grown even dependent on its power). Weltanschauung does not itself explain this drive I have, Nietzsche's a priori.

Automorphism, for instance. Why would a being come up with such a thing? For to observe it and delight? There must, tells us Sawelios, be a reason of action. Automorphism is as much action itself, as much will to power, as that which it describes.

My experience so far is that value ontology has given will to power, will give it much more, the shadow it needs to do justice to the massive expansion of the world. Tectonics gives it effect (historical effect, effect upon effect).

But, yes, I agree with Sawelios. I never thought so but I do: politics is inherent in thought, and as such in philosophy.

Maybe Fixed Cross is right; nay, he is right: the birth of language is the evolution of lieing.

In any case this wholy does not invalidate anything. If anything, it gives existential ground for all of the work we have done. In a way, it strengthend Weltanschauungsphilosophie; all the progress I have made is there, like a rock, I cannot forget it or destroy it except by itself. I am, also, alowed to make any mistake I want: shame is also erased.

Please, correct me if I am wrong: Sawelios, Weltanschauungsphilosophie as power.

For now while we wait Id like to offer automorphism through VO, more conventionally were talking about "souls" or the organizing principle of souls; self-valuing S possesses a finite number of possible states alternate to its present state and in which such possibilities it nevertheless remains what it is, does not become not-S. In fact these other virtual states are not "above" S but are alongside and within it. They are invisible in so far as they exist virtually as pure logical space, as Platonic universality. But S is always only one 'moment' within that larger pure space; the principle of actualization of S over alternate S's hinges on how the world becomes formed internal to S in terms of that in S which is its self-valuing in so far as S remains S across all of its possibility-field of virtual alternate S's. Essentially, S is "some kind of thing" and the core is not singular but multiple, phased and very indeterminate-- the world is only that other continuum in which the lesser continuum of S sits, and there are multiplication principles between world and S, as in one relative small change in either can produce magnifies changes in the other.

Politics is like a shadow-domain seated exactly where those two continua overlap their strange multiplicative and gap-like beings, where S flows to world and world to S, what Parodites and I were calling a while ago the world-daemon, the triadicity of mutual emergence and limitation between man and world; if you 'add' man and world you cannot get a single answer, you get a kind of vague group of slightly different but also slightly similar things, and you get a kind of mass-movement, Gestalt and autogenerative sphere out of which lesser spheres coalesce, I think these lesser spheres are what Parodites calls the spheres of identity which are, in sum, responsible for what we experience as our consciousness and subjectivity.

Politics sinks lower or moves higher, since it is reflecting that continuum which is in fact reflecting the convergence-matrices of the two continua of man and world, individual and society. You can't have one without the other. I may isolate myself from the world entirely but the world still lives within me, I cannot get rid of it: take a dog, it is tying to play with this stick it found. The dog's foot happens to be on the stick as the dog had the other side of the stick in its mouth and is trying to move the stick to throw it. The dog can't figure out why the stick is stuck, as the dog struggles with its mouth to pull the stick up its foot is applying more pressure downward to hold the dog in place and that foot happens to be resting on top of the other end of the stick.

It isn't as if the dog is unaware that its foot is on the stick; the dog knows its foot is there, it feels it on the stick, but the dog is unable to make the conceptual connection between "foot on the stick" and "mouth pulling the stick". These two events are both undifferentiated in the dog's experience, so while the dog both feels that its foot is on the stick and also feels its pulling the stick and the resistance of the stick to move, and in some level the dog even knows its the same stick in both cases, the dog cannot mentally separate the one from the other in order to form a causal relation between them. The relation is a simple logical one, "I move my foot off the stick, then the stick can move". But this is impossible for the dog to know, because the dog cannot RESPOND to this FACT, which is a logical fact rooted in the abstracting of two aspects of the conscious experiential field from that field itself thus allowing for new kinds of relations between those aspects to appear.

We are often fooled by the cleverness of animals; a monkey can dig out ants with a stick, a dog can figure out how to open a door, etc. These are like the mirror test in psychology, the risk is that we would attribute a different KIND of learning and responsiveness-capacity than is actually there. This gets right at triadic and dyadic logic: a monkey learns that trusting a stick into a hole causes bugs to come out, this is quite clever but in a dyadic sense, the relationship is 1:1 and linear, namely first cause and then effect. It just so happens that the monkey's neurology is sophisticated enough to take the kind of if->then logic such as was employed eons ago as "eat this, feel good" to over time develop what we would call an instinct to eat, which instinct is simply a relatively stabilized pattern across the neurology coordinating muscles in the hands and in the mouth/jaw, and expanding that a little bit to include "stick in hole, bugs". It's the same principle.

Same with the mirror test, or a dog learning to turn a door knob with its teeth. Cause, effect - 1:1, the brain is able to pair sensory cues to remembered events from the past and form a link to these in the neurons. Given enough tries the dog would be able to form that kind of link between "foot on stick" and "move stick with mouth", but that isn't how we humans learn. We actually subtract more individual aspects of our total experience by isolating these from the larger conscious-sensory field, we see individual things "right away" (because we were taught how to do this as we acquired language as infants) and don't need to rely on 1:1 learning over many trials. Even a baby can understand it needs to move its foot first and then it can move the stick-- this is a logical relation involving a third middle term, a "reason" between the two phenomena... the recognition of / responsiveness to a fact.

So we can learn things right away, immediately, by observing-responding to facts, which are inherently triadic.


Back to the automorph and VO, politics can rise or fall within its respective field, which means precisely that it can become either more dependent upon dyads or more dependent on triads; more animal or more human. This is why political-philosophical "might makes right" type views are so idiotic, regardless if these are idolizing Nietzsche, Ragnar or the joker from batman, just a kind of collapse into the lower pole of the daemon. I like the idea of self-valuing automorphism, I wrote a long time ago here about the isomorphism of self-valuing, that was a key development point for me. If two self-valuings share an automorph they can isomorph toward each other, allowing for more theoretical virtual space to be shared between them.

Pezer wrote:

I believe now that Sawelios' criticism of Weltanschauungsphilosophie is not of it as opposed to universalism, but as opposed to what I also have to re-interpret: justice. If he can be said to be critizicing value ontology, it is to the extent that value ontology does not demand action.

My first reaction when I read this was: Wait, I do oppose it to universalism! (or rather to a universal Weltanschauungsphilosophie, which however is a paradox to say the least.) But then Pezer's perspective opened my eyes, or rather my other eye, complementing and thereby clarifying the perspective I've had for the last few years. For it made me realize that there is a connection between universalism and politics--though there's also an opposition between the two. Let me try to explain.

The universalism to which the Sophists and the Socratics began to open people's minds--though one might say Socrates was sentenced to death or exile for doing so--is a kind of relativism. In looking for the true belief and the perfect regime, the philosophers relativized the beliefs and regimes of their cities; it's hard to say which is the chicken and which is the egg here. In any case, this desired universalism was at odds with the actually existing universalism of those cities: for every city or tribe had its own universalism, believing that all the other tribes were fundamentally stupid, lazy, wicked, mad, or a combination of such things. The philosopher basically disbelieved that the city in which he was born and raised possessed knowledge of the true belief and the perfect regime. Seeing everywhere only opinion, he sought knowledge; seeing everywhere only injustice, he sought justice.

Such injustice, unjustified belief, is typical of Weltanschauung. This is why I criticize Weltanschauungsphilosophie--philosophy reduced to a particular Weltanschauung. The death of God, the death of Platonism, means the death of pure universalism, that much is true; but precisely the insight that one cannot transcend Weltanschauung makes possible a universal Weltanschauung: the worldview that views the world as consisting solely of worldviews, of points-of-view, of perspectives.

::

In the meantime I've thought some more about this, especially in relation to what I wrote in my first Pentad post:

Sawelios wrote:

[T]he philosopher is indebted to his passion, philosophy, and thereby to the polity that has--wittingly and willingly or not--allowed it to arise in him and allowed him to pursue it. As Novalis said, philosophy is really homesickness--the drive to be at home everywhere--; but political philosophy is really reconciliation to the fact that there are but few places where philosophy could find shelter--the dedication to a polity nurturing philosophy.

If the philosopher, by being indebted to his passion, is indebted to the polity that has, however unwittingly and even unwillingly, allowed his passion to arise in him and allowed him to pursue it, then what about the rest of existence? Has not the rest of existence, however unwittingly and even unwillingly, allowed that polity to rise and persist? Well then, does this not mean that the philosopher, by being indebted to that polity, is also indebted to the rest of existence? To the entire cosmic process thus far? And thereby even to the great Unknown beyond it which, however unwittingly and even unwillingly, has allowed that process to start and go on?

Here's my inmediate reaction to what you just wrote: yes, but one step at a time.

On further reflection, I invite you to read my post in the religion forum.

All in all, yes. How do we give back to all of existence? First, by loving it from its shit to its crystal. Then, of course and as usual, by philosophizing it.

This includes any and all manner of time relations, death, and, as I think you helped us all see, politics.

In the paraphrased capable words of Capable, by valuing ourselves as what we are we hence value everything else, or gain the capacity to.

I am a philosopher because I love the world, not the other way around. Philosophy is a way of understanding how to act on that love. For that first we need to know what it is that action does, and that is what the world is.

Elsewhere, I wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:

What philosophy is is twofold. It is the love of two things. First, though not necessarily foremost, it is love of the pleasure of cruelty. Thus Leo Strauss says that cruelty, "as cruelty directed toward oneself, is effective in intellectual probity, in 'the intellectual conscience.'" With this cruelty the philosopher drives himself toward the truth, regardless of whether it be pleasant or unpleasant, edifying or depressing. But philosophy is also the love of the pleasure of seeing the truth, that it is edifying. Thus philosophy does two things: it seeks to discover more of the truth, regardless of whether it be edifying, and it enjoys the truth to the extent that it has discovered it--like a beatific vision!

These, I think are the nonteleological and the teleological grounds for philosophy. To be sure, "love of the pleasure of cruelty" is already kind of a teleological way of putting it, as the nonteleological ground for philosophy is really just cruelty, which is pleasurable in itself--and pleasure is lovable in itself. In any case, this ground for philosophy is nonteleological because one does not force oneself to see the truth in order to see the truth, for example because seeing the truth is pleasurable.

Now political philosophy also has nonteleological and teleological grounds. Its nonteleological ground I've exposed in my [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.] thread. In this nonteleological understanding, political philosophy is love of the pleasure of forcing man into a certain form. And the teleological counterpart to that ground is Mitfreudlosigkeit, the absence or lack of shared joy; in the complementary teleological understanding, political philosophy is love of shared joy in form-giving energies and an artist's conscience. It is the latter understanding which is found in my "Politics as Soulfulness" post on the Humanarchy site:

Sauwelios wrote:

Value ontology is, obviously, an ontology–that is, it claims knowledge of Being in some way. The knowledge it claims is that beings are self-valuings. This is to say that every being is a self-valuing. But it does not mean that every being values itself as a self-valuing. Only those who accept value ontology can value themselves as self-valuings, as opposed to simply as selves. For those who accept it, however, valuing themselves means valuing themselves as self-valuing-valuings…

One may distinguish between four basic levels of self-valuing.
1. Most of existence consists of self-valuings who, however, have no knowledge whatsoever of themselves. That is, they value all things in their grasp in terms of themselves, but that is all they do. They have no notion of themselves.
2. Some of existence consists of self-valuings who do have a notion of themselves. These are what may be called animate beings or the “souled”.
3. Among the latter, there are those who, at least in theory, can know themselves and thereby the whole of which they are parts. These are usually called human beings. (Note that a human being in this sense need in theory not be a member of the species homo sapiens sapiens.)
4. Among the latter, there are those who actually knows themselves (or at least can know themselves in practice). These are the ones who know that all beings are self-valuings.

If the self one values is a self-valuing, then one’s self-valuing is self-valuing-valuing; and as all selves are self-valuings, all beings are self-valuing-valuings. But in most beings this is unconscious. That is, most beings are unaware of just how alike they are to others. The vehemence of the adversity springing from this ignorance may even be proportionate to how close one is to enlightenment in this regard! Is there greater adversity than among so-called “human” beings, whether they have different skin colours or be fans of different football clubs or belong to different sects? And in fact, they are not wrong, as far as their self-knowledge is concerned; they cannot value the other, because he does not match what they hold to be their defining characteristics (note how football fanatics tend to be much less intolerant, in fact often do not even notice, those who do not care about football at all). An enlightened football fan would be one who realised that fans of the rival club love the same sport, and that that love is what makes one a football fan. Well then! An enlightened self-valuing is one who realises that all other beings value the same thing, namely self-valuing! This however means that the peak of self-valuing is to value all beings, to value the whole, to value Being itself. Nay more, it means that this is what all self-valuing is. But there is conscious and unconscious self-valuing. An enlightened self-valuing would value enlightened self-valuing the most, would value self-valuing more the more conscious it is. And this leads naturally to the preference of the souled above the soulless, the human above the non-human, the enlightened above the unenlightened. It leads naturally to a politics of soulfulness, of humanity, of enlightenment.

Consider the Ents in The Lord of the Rings: they were trees (1, or at most 2) who were raised to a higher level of mortality (3, or even 4) by the Elves (4), who gave them the faculty of speech or reason (logos) by talking to them. Compare Bacon's Orpheus:

Francis Bacon wrote:

[By the] sweetness of his harp and voice, [Orpheus] first drew the wild beasts of all sorts about him; so that, forgetting their natures, they were neither actuated by revenge, cruelty, lust, hunger, or the desire of prey, but stood gazing about him, in a tame and gentle manner, listening attentively to his music. Nay, so great was the power and efficacy of his harmony, that it even caused the trees and stones to remove, and place themselves in a regular manner about him. [...] The music of Orpheus is of two kinds; one that appeases the infernal powers, and the other that draws together the wild beasts and trees. The former properly relates to natural, and the latter to moral philosophy, or civil society. [... Moral philosophy] betakes itself to human affairs, insinuating into men's minds the love of virtue, equity, and peace, by means of eloquence and persuasion; thus forming men into societies; bringing them under laws and regulations; and making them forget their unbridled passions and affections, so long as they hearken to precepts and submit to discipline. And thus they soon after build themselves habitations, form cities, cultivate lands, plant orchards, gardens, &c. So that they may not improperly be said to remove and call the trees and stones together.

"Moral philosophy" is Bacon's term for political philosophy.

Humbly, or with some fear of the Gods,

"Virtue, stability, collective war and recognition."

Then we'd be closer, perhaps, to getting trees and stones to be moved.

Don't think I don't see the Nazi trap there. Collective war is not collective war outside the polity, but within the individual work and polity. To be genuine about one's instincts in all their historical evolution alongside "nature."

This is incomplete...

I se where you want to go. What is moral philosophy today?

Read the Dionysa thread. This political philosophy thing, which I still don't see as philosophy (I don't think the superman is a philosopher, I do think he would love philosophers), is complicated and almost boring.

How
The fuck
Do we build superman a house?

As I said before, I do think we first and more importantly build the philosopher a house. As you also said.

I've been thinking about Fixed Cross' Academy. Been wikipediaing the Library and Museaum of Alexandria.

My first and still tentative question is this: how do we get the ressources to build the Museaum? First the library, I guess, of course, with the walking ways and gardens.

Pezer wrote:

Read the Dionysa thread. This political philosophy thing, which I still don't see as philosophy (I don't think the superman is a philosopher, I do think he would love philosophers), is complicated and almost boring.

In my last email to Laurence Lampert, of October 14, 2013, I wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:

[Your latest book] arrived on my birthday [August 12], and catalysed that already on the next day, I finally found a solution to the problem that had been occupying me for three years: my problem with political philosophy. As you may recall, my problem was the question as to a rationale for it: "Why must the philosopher care?" The rationale I found is, as you've always indicated, and as in the case of philosophy proper, rather a "passionale". [...] In the course of reading the section titled "Nature" [in the chapter on Seth Benardete's The Bow and the Lyre], I was prompted to reread the eponymous section from Benardete's book, and then I felt I finally understood the significance of something you had pointed out to me before: "Odysseus's discovery of nature comes as a direct consequence of 'the mighty necessity' that moves him to rescue his men from Circe's charm. That places the love of the human just prior to the discovery of the nature of the human as its precondition. So perhaps that form of the love of the human that impels the philosopher to go down to share the teaching attained is internal to the passion that drives him to understand."

What I realised then was that in my own case the love of the human was prior to the love of wisdom as its precondition. I mean "human" here in an uncommon sense, though. [...] "The human in its highest reach": it was the love of that that was prior to my own attempts at philosophy as their precondition--namely, my love of the manifestation of the human in its highest reach called Nietzsche. And Nietzsche, long before using the word "Superman", in his typical sense at least, said that the philosopher, the artist and the saint were the only "veritable human beings". As Strauss indicates in paragraph 33 of his Nietzsche essay, the philosopher is the nature of man. The rationale I think I've found is a com-passion, a fellow feeling, a concern for one's present and future fellow philosophers--and indeed for all beings insofar as they are veritably human, for example even for the merely moral man inasmuch as "a lofty spirituality itself exists only as the final product of moral qualities".

One might think that I should wish to have realised this three years earlier; but I am grateful for having been seeking for so long. For that has led me to a different insight, the insight I told you so enthusiastically about before: my temporary disagreement with you. Most recently I have expressed that insight as follows: "I think Lampert has failed to see that in Nietzsche political philosophy is reduced to philosophy proper, and thereby the latter's coming out into the open is a commanding and legislating of future such cataclysms of grace." Though my new realisation reconciles me with you again on the highest level, I still think philosophy's coming out into the open is its best political strategy in this phase of its history.

I think the philosopher is a superman, if not the superman. I'm currently considering whether, though all things are lovable for having allowed the superman to exist, they may be lovable for their own sake only insofar as they partake in supermanhood. And I see philosophy, in this phase of its history, as political philosophy.

You hinted at this in your letter, and I will ask it explicitly:

How can politics precede the very consciousness of change (not conscious of change, but change conscious)?

To be change conscious, it cannot effect change. It can invite it, want it. But change must be before it can be conscious to the glorious level of philosophy.

Pezer wrote:

You hinted at this in your letter, and I will ask it explicitly:

How can politics precede the very consciousness of change (not conscious of change, but change conscious)?

To be change conscious, it cannot effect change. It can invite it, want it. But change must be before it can be conscious to the glorious level of philosophy.

Before I answer, can you please explain the difference between "conscious of change" and "change conscious" in some detail? All I can think of now is this:

In the ''Nature'' section of his _The Bow and the Lyre_, Seth Benardete wrote:

Menelaus's encounter with constant becoming, in which there are no natures, must[, considering Odysseus's discovery,] have been an illusion.

Menelaus wants to be change. Odyseus respects change.

You cannot be conscious of change itself, of all change. Change can become conscious as a human can: incompletely, selectively, and ever increasingly.

So: can change be conscious before it is?

Can politics be philosophized before it occurs?

And my personal question: can politics cater to the taste change finds in itself? While catering to human needs?

In the Homeric story which Sauwelios just explained to me again there is the encounter with Hermes, which occurs on the way to what Odysseus knows will be a fateful encounter either way. He knows that he needs to come up with a solution before he gets there. This political pressure is nothing other than necessity, which works on the man with the heroic heart and inquisitive mind and produces insight into nature, into the nature of being, which is that all beings have natures, and that where there is the body of a pig there is also the mind of a pig, and thus that his friends can not actually have become pigs. This indeed is philosophy, and it became political in the moment that it was required; it was required because there was a situation created by laws of which the man had no understanding. Philosophy here is discerning the laws of the situation before discerning the situation.

This is one level the same as science, on a deeper level the opposite of the scientific method; it is proper metaphysics - derived from looking at a plant!

Illumination; The difference between physics and metaphysics discerned in the way Odysseus observes the root of a plant; metaphysics walks before physics in engaging the earth. Only a philosophical perspective, 'things have natures' can have a scientific perspective; nature a = such, nature b = such, in act what Odysseus discovers here is the law of identity.  But he learns it as wisdom, which is to say that the identity per definition belongs to something non-abstract; it's being natural, growing deep in the ground, this is what gives it its identity and what makes it possible to use the plant as a standard that also applies to his friends. Physics is too specific to discern the shared property physis. Philosophy is the decision to think. The decision can not be arrived at rationally, of course, only by pressure of necessity and the right co-incidence of qualities.  

The notion of the Big Bang seems to echo birth of thought.

This relationship between politics and philosophy is simple enough to define in a phrase; the truer the philosophy, the more political its effect, and the more political a situation, the stronger the call to philosophy. Politics is necessity, philosophy is its resolution according to 'truth', which pertains at once morally and practically. And philosophy and politics meet at that same juncture whenever they meet, in truth; which has the most bloodthirsty as well as angelic countenances but always imprint being on becoming.

Whether the philosopher himself engages in this aspect of his philosophy depends on whom we regard as a philosopher; if we consider Odysseus as one then the answer is that philosophy serves (the) politics (of loyalty); that the philosopher is born out of political pressure. The same goes for the widely differing thinkers Jesus and Archimedes - it is a quite common form. Socrates too can be said to be formed by political pressure; but in him it was rather the pressure of politics as such that incited him to become political against politics; with this he completely exploded the scope of politics and brought it to the metaphysical realm, where the two politics and philosophy, necessity and wisdom, are inspired to couple - a union to which the entire history of philosophy from then on is foreplay.

Necessity, then philosophy, then politics.

We agree.

But we would not call an architect an investor because a family needs a house.

Philosophy is not political. What if the necessity is the possibility of philosophy?

Philosophy, then necessity, then politics, then philosophy, then new necessity, then new politics, then better philosophy.

They all intermingle, the separation with "then" is anything but pure... But that they mingle doesn't mean they are the same. And this matters, it is at the heart of the present necessity.

Pezer wrote:

Necessity, then philosophy, then politics.

We agree.

But we would not call an architect an investor because a family needs a house.

Philosophy is not political. What if the necessity is the possibility of philosophy?

Politics also create necessity; necessity can be seen as a political situation. Odysseus friends in captivity are a political circumstance, 'the god comes to the man' driven to him by politics... Athena as politician deity birthed out of the Devouring God ; is politics the liberation of man from god!

I now believe to have understood Leo Strauss. God is the necessarily irrational explanation of man of himself. Politics is the realization that there is unfortunately no explanation, only explication, by force and cunning, murder and religion.

Quote :

You know the day destroys the night
Night divides the day
Tried to run
Tried to hide

Break on through to the other side, yeah

Thus spake the politician of the superman.

Quote :

Philosophy, then necessity, then politics, then philosophy, then new necessity, then new politics, then better philosophy.

I'm never fond of such orders as I prefer to be in the state between two of these particulars and touch the void (the primordial funk) which supports all cycles. Let's say politics suffers and pushes forth necessity, and philosophy simply breaking out of it like Athena from Zeus' head; - the irresistible future overcomes the primordial madness of the blood-devourer.

I believe these myths can cause heart-attacks if you understand them too well. Because they can guide you to understanding light the world guides lightning to the tree; as soon as you understand you are somewhere very far far away and all around you is flame and ash. The philosopher is the one who likes the smell of rotten eggs, so to speak, but still vomits at rotting meat; - who can discern between a rotten present and a rotten future.

Quote :

They all intermingle, the separation with "then" is anything but pure... But that they mingle doesn't mean they are the same. And this matters, it is at the heart of the present necessity.

Only if we hold them in our minds separately and properly discerned can we unite them in a final blow. Will and Imagination is a math problem; we need to find a way to add them up.

So, one thing maybe we can readily discern, these people must not feel the need to bleed, but they cannot keep confusing happiness with funklessness.

Humbleness with pointlessness.

Blood and funk -
blood and soil...


where have we ended up?

Same place as Heidegger, only we've out endured the brownshirts.

There is no question to my mind however that if philosophy is to become political in the sense I understand politics, it will involve wielding the word in Germany. It is a country still pining for its proper logos. It is in forging the logos of Europe by brutality and mistakes, and at one point so many failures have been experienced that the suggestion of a philosophical lesson may find greedy clients. As philosophy is air in a vacuum to us in life, so its conclusions will be the axe that breaks the cage of the european, the very easily understandable path to a health that matches the health of its founding splendors, the Greeks, Romans, Celts, Visigoths, Norse, all those strange tribes that invented the language of their inner birds. From the southern rocky shores through the mountains in the center to the northern pastures dunes and the endless white beaches at the green-black north sea; a distance I drove this summer in one day; the secret to Europe is its modest size and great detail. Many contrast allow many kinds of riches to exist in each others proximity. And so this poem by Hölderlin that Heidegger favored so much already discloses the destiny that lay ahead then and that is now coming to a head now. Hölderlin called his poem Mnemosyne, but all words and all combinations of words from this poem would make more beautiful titles. I call it simply

From there on out I can understand how the destinies of other worlds cross the path of mine - Europe is by no means the only center of the world; each continent must in fact flower for political philosophy to truly prosper, the point is simply that Germany controls the flow of value in the western world more than any country (America is rather antithetical to control in the limiting sense, it expands, 'bloats' but can not cut off in an organized fashion - Germany is all about 'closing doors'.), and the only resolution to this problem is to give the German will "Lebensraum" - to acknowledge finally that there is such a thing as non teleological will.

I realize perfectly now that this represents the emotional politics of Europe - it can not be logically guided, it is only a hope rippling through and a magical web of traditions. Sauwelios has talked to me about a very different center of Europe, which would rely on very different standards, and in the last instance on emotions.

Well, if America is not Europe, I will be goddamned. If the god that wounded me yesterday was not Jupiter himself, I will be hot diggity danged. I will be fucked sideways if I did not encounter the Nordic gods of fire and deep woods in Vermont, if the Chirst that tyrannized and tyrannizes us is not the same that pillaged the pillagers.

I will be knocked down and beat to a pulp if EUROPA does not mean simply what the word conveys. If we are not west of the west.

But yes, time will tell.

Politics, as I understand it, at the head of the barbarian invasion, is first to breathe, as people breathe now, as I know as I breathe with them. It is to let philosophy breathe, understand itself clearly, and then understand what it needs to understand to overthrow the decepticons, embrace Europe as her son, Babilon as her nephews and the rest as her brothers.

A line in the sand?

Phah! Time laughs at such lines.

And love? What of love? It is here, in the coarce yell of a half black, half indian, half roman and half arab maid, laughing at the troubles that rain brings.

Yes, let Germany close doors.

WHEN IT HAS BREATHED.

We mean the same thing.

It just happens that magic is inescapably local.