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PostSubject: Wittgenstein   Sat Mar 12, 2016 7:12 pm

I think I figured out where Wittgenstein went wrong. He basically fails to see that meaning itself is the substantive (I would say, existential or phenomenologically primary) reality to "being" (to for instance, human-like being). He wants to critique philosophy from the angle that philosophers assume the correlation of a word with a real object or something existent to which the word points; sentences then are simply stringing together things in relations or systems by way of organizing the signs (words) of things, under that view... W critiques this by saying words don't always have a concrete meaning (referring object) or that object can change or cease existing, therefore these language utterances in those cases ought to become nonsensical yet they do not. He therefore concludes that language has no "real meaning" other than itself and posits philosophy as 1) the traditional activity of assuming falsely the "representational" view outlined above, and 2) the proper overcoming of (1) by way of using language to break language down, to render exposed assumptions of representation and to close language in on itself through rigorous mathematical-analytical critique. W believes that philosophy should use language only to tell us what we shouldn't be doing, as we should rely on some sort of (philosophically-elucidated, but properly (negatively) so) non- or pre-linguistic form of apprehension, thinking and experience.

Bam. False. His mistake is the failure to understand that meaning itself is the primary reality, from which not only language utterances and "language meanings" (linguistically embedded or emergent meaning) comes but also the so-called object-itself or referent of the linguistic utterance. Meaning is primary, meaning exists before and logically more important to what emerges from meaning; what emerges from 'meaning' is basically everything, including language and human experience, including our experience of objects and things we refer to.

The logic of language is primary to language, as in causal to how language forms and is used; the meaning-world or what I might call "pure realm of Facts" or the pre-formative condition of the existentia is prior to human being as that in terms of which all beings and in particular human beings arise; the logic of language co-originates with the logic of human being, which is to say precedes both, which is also to say embeds deeply within the meaning-world as participation within various tiers or layers of the continuum of universal (self-valuing) truths. W never really critiqued philosophy, he obscured the question of philosophy by assuming away the very substance not just of philosophy but of everything else.

Life or existence isn't just some context-less void or pure meaningless relativity on which fleeting and illusory forms happen to appear to generate their false constructs. His view is simplistic in the extreme. W's claim that philosophy is grammar is bullshit, basically.

 

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"Since the old God has abdicated, I shall rule the world from now on." --Nietzsche

"Do you hold out hope, then?" ... "I hold out dignity." ... "She will need opiates before long, for the pain. She will cease being who she is." ... "Then I will love who she becomes."  --Penny Dreadful
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PostSubject: Re: Wittgenstein   Sat Mar 12, 2016 7:26 pm

To be more clear, I think he is trying to define meaning as a relationship between language and objects referred to by language, or as between language usage types, without realizing that meaning itself is as substantial and tectonically real, even more so, than the language we use to relate to it or the objects we posit. Language can and often does refer to meaning directly, it makes object of meaning and of meanings, just as it makes object of things and "objects themselves", and just as language can make object of itself (more accurately, meaning can be made to turn upon language-become-object and thereby analyze or deconstruct language itself or various of its parts, from the perspective of existing meanings either more or less "linguistically embedded" themselves). There is no contradiction in any of that.

 

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"Since the old God has abdicated, I shall rule the world from now on." --Nietzsche

"Do you hold out hope, then?" ... "I hold out dignity." ... "She will need opiates before long, for the pain. She will cease being who she is." ... "Then I will love who she becomes."  --Penny Dreadful
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PostSubject: Re: Wittgenstein   Sat Mar 12, 2016 8:43 pm

So I'm going to posit and defend my idea against Wittgenstein, which is what I called the pre-formative condition of the existentia. Breaking this down:

-The word "existentia" indicates the particular fact-realm that becomes causal-to or important-to beings in so far as beings are "for themselves" or Dasein-like in their "own being becomes an issue for itself", as in become onto-epistemologically complex and self-referential enough to actually have a domain of experiences and self-experiences possesses necessarily of substantive realities that act positivistically to 'pressure into existence' realms of subjective phenomenal accounting or "life", and which pure positives are absolutely associated to certain facts. Those facts are what become possible, given the becoming-complex and self-referential of being, to over-code and re-orient existing structures of being (for example, perception and instinct reactions) in new ways and in terms of an active as opposed to simply passively dependent relationship between being and its world/s. Beings like this make object of themselves and of their worlds (experiences, sense datums) and then push and project "themselves" (their categories of experience, their perceptions, instincts, ideas, sentiments) into both the image of Self and the image of World. Natural selection for a billion years took care of beings passively orienting themselves to the real (factually-accurate) conditions that were prescient to said being's survival methodologies, but now with the advent of substantially more complex self-referential being it becomes possible to respond not simply via passive route indirectly to facts but to actively make object of a fact itself, which is to say to have a true idea. Only humans have true ideas, other animals cannot.

A true idea, then, which is a positively- and actively-oriented response to a fact as such is the basic category of the pre-formative condition of the existentia. The existentia itself is the whole realm of actual meanings including images and response-tendencies as well as "information locales" (linguistic pre-usages, or datums of possible word-forming) that is produced into existence as a consequence of this kind of being's existence and living.

-Pre-formation of conditions: this indicates that even the existentia, which is properly the realm of meaning as such that Wittgenstein fails to notice, is not primary and has a causal-for realm. The causal-for realm or sustaining and necessary condition for existentia is simple the possession of beings' "onto-epistemological" and therefore also social-historical context and structure sustaining modes of encounter, objectification and response which become automatic upon human beings learning how to image and respond to their perceptive experiences, which is simply the shaping of recurring sense data under models of image-forms in mentality parallel to those recurring sensations and which we call "concepts" or perhap the mind's eye. This stage is not yet rational or linguistic, but it arguably requires some exposure to language in order to form properly. Therefore this pre-condition of language is the exposure to language itself, which later goes on to allow being to learn how to use language (model language-objects and uses within itself in order to be capable of projecting those forms and usages upon raw experiences). Meaning is essentially "the existentia", and the pre-condition of meaning is the logical possibility for existentia to develop, which means is the whole extended structure of (human-like, historical) being.

When anyone makes a language utterance like "see that car there?" they are not merely representing a supposed external object in a representational relation but are actually always-already embedded within a meaning-world; part of that meaning world includes "cars" and therefore it becomes possible to talk about cars. Cars have within the meaning-world a pre-existent meaning and so make themselves available to be spoken of, but the point is how the meaning itself pre-exists both the object-forming of the car in real-time as well as the possibly speaking to that object. The language utterance is a sign of meanings, meanings exist prior to and independent of the language utterances which speak them; language does not merely indicate objects, as if language itself were distant from the object, but instead language itself is a system that emerges as a consequence of the general condition of "what meaning means", and individual instances of language use always refer back a little bit of that condition implicitly in their usage. It is impossible to speak meaningfully about something that does not reside in the meaning-world, in the existentia already (which is why people talking about God often make little sense, because the actual substance within the existentia to which their utterances about God are connected or externalizing in language is a largely undeveloped collection of vague intuitions, half-formed ideas and barely-remembered past experiences, etc.) If Wittgenstein made any clear point worth taking away it is that we should try to know clearly that about which we are speaking, but not in any kind of Kantian demand for certainty, and instead in a kind of openness to our own meaning-experiences that allows more of the existentia to break through.

What is the relationship between my existentia and that of another person? Is there individualized meaning-spaces or one large one, how do parts participate in the "whole"? The answer isn't as difficult as it might seem: the extent to which 1) two or more beings share onto-epistemological structure which includes DNA and neurological structure and specific environments and 2) they share a collective body of experiences and types of experiences, is the extent to which one person's meaning-space will align or overlap with that of another person. Each space of meaning, each individualized existentia is simply a region carved out of the larger totality of all possible and actual meanings to which said being could be or is constituted, namely the totality of Facts possibly apprehendable given the actual reality of that which being is, qua being and qua itself, which therefore also represents a different order of facts that integrates possibly to the larger order new phenomenal experiential possibilities. The fact that man is such-and-such a being becomes relatable to the broader range of facts, each progressively informing the other and deepening orders of being.

Meaning is independent of words, concepts and objects, and theoretically includes everything including those words, concepts and objects. The only thing prior to meaning is the actual (onto-)logical structures that within the genesis of beings gives rise to the possibility for beings to begin forming for themselves an actual meaning-space; but the actual meaning-space formed is independent of the prior existence of the infinitely extending order of Facts either possible to or impossible to become formative objects within a given meaning-space or "existentia". Life carves itself into this order of facts, first blindly and passively, then in human being more and more directly, intentionally and actively; being ultimate transforms into the image of its existentia even as it molds and feeds and prunes that existentia; being itself is also one moment within the larger order of facts and possible existentialities.

 

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"Since the old God has abdicated, I shall rule the world from now on." --Nietzsche

"Do you hold out hope, then?" ... "I hold out dignity." ... "She will need opiates before long, for the pain. She will cease being who she is." ... "Then I will love who she becomes."  --Penny Dreadful
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PostSubject: Re: Wittgenstein   Tue Jan 17, 2017 11:44 am

Good stuff.

I especially like this conception of meaning.

How to we go about indicating meaning? That is itself an absurdity. It would at least bring meaning to the second power, or rather the square root - yes, meaning is diminished by directly indicating it - it is after all the primordial indication it-self -well indeed, the it, the self.

Meaning is the apex of valuing. Valuing comes in vectors from self-valuings, meaning is where these vectors converge; and so each individual or entity, each self-valuing crux at the center of apprehending forces, is meaning itself.





 

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PostSubject: Re: Wittgenstein   Tue Jan 17, 2017 11:47 am

The flock of birds waving into my field of vision as I leaned back from that post, its patternequals my thought of it and the space in my heart upon sight and thought,

that is meaning - and now as they settle down on a pole I derive its square root - as best as I can.

Poetry is the full square root of meaning, philosophy is the open ended approximation of full being.

Poetic philosophy can even surpass being in reality - draw it to itself in an upward motion.
In as far as there is a God, he is what we know as philosophy.

And as Mohamed said it, the ink of the wise man is worth more than the blood of the martyr. Primordially, there are two types of gods: those of the envious, and those of the magnanimous. They are always, or almost always united under one name, and invariably, the more mass-oriented the society upholding that name is, the more the envious nature prevails. And so it went with all but the Greek schools.

The void -
there is a great meaning to this.

What is a god but a color of the void


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