The logical possibility of god/s

Pezer raises the idea that Nietzsche was a pagan, and at least in some minimal way believed in the idea of the gods. I personally do not get this from reading Nietzsche, but I can see where Pezer is coming from. I am not putting this post in reinterpretation because I am not concerned with how truly or untruly this captures Nietzsche's beliefs. Nietzsche's beliefs do not overly concern me at the moment. Rather I want it to explore the logical possibility of god, and the implications of this possibility, if there are any.



I argue that this possibility it entirely impotent. This possibility alone has been used by mankind to justify the whole host of religious, spiritual, metaphysical delusion. Granted these delusions have served to sustain human life, to buffer man against the truths of meaninglessness and oblivion. So one conclusion is that the logical possibility of god has led to the explosion of metaphysics among humanity, which is to say, all manner of delusions, for any and every conceivable end and social-psychological use-value.



I also argue that none of that is philosophy, it is properly speaking the childishness and immaturity of reason; psycho-logical (pathological) thinking, self-justification and socially-prescribed and conditioned utility. Philosophy begins where the need for metaphysical delusion ends, where our reason can objectify the metaphysical delusion in order to analyze and understand it -- as well as to separate ourselves from it.



In terms of philosophy, of reason, the logical possibility of gods is impotent and meaningless. Philosophy begins where god ends.

I have two lines along which I want to respond to this thesis.

First, on the issue of delusion. You mention, in my opinion quite accurately, that religion and Gods (they are really one and the same, but I separate them so that later I can indicate the difference between religion and cult) have been involved in all the worst delusions of mankind's history.

So what? This certainly does not disprove the hypothesis of religion and Gods, only the ease of manipulating them to make masses of people delusional.

I maintain that there is first a kind of naturally occurring religion, an almost physical feeling of an unseen yet powerful presence that is consistent in its relationship to the material world. This is obviously a powerful drive, and it is small wonder that skilled conmen and deluded Don Quixotes have been able to turn large masses of people delusional by manipulating it with, precisely, logic (where logic, as you point out, does not belong).

Just like communist theory cannot accurately be condemned by the actions of the USSR and its allies, so religious theory cannot accurately be condemned by the actions of the many churches we have had.

I'm not saying religious theory is thus proven right, I'm just saying that it is not thus proven wrong.

Secondly, I would argue that philosophy and religion have one important thing in common: neither is wholly dependent on logic. Logic leads to nothing unless it is pushed, like a ouija board.

Trully, there is much yet to be explored in philosophy. At least I think we can agree that we have no space at the moment for metaphysics, and by extention, this means that it is extremely unlikely for Gods to become relevant.

I just urge you not to trample the concept, if only because it was beautiful once and should be preserved as one of those examples of living human poetry.

Pezer wrote:

I have two lines along which I want to respond to this thesis.

First, on the issue of delusion. You mention, in my opinion quite accurately, that religion and Gods (they are really one and the same, but I separate them so that later I can indicate the difference between religion and cult) have been involved in all the worst delusions of mankind's history.

So what? This certainly does not disprove the hypothesis of religion and Gods, only the ease of manipulating them to make masses of people delusional.

I maintain that there is first a kind of naturally occurring religion, an almost physical feeling of an unseen yet powerful presence that is consistent in its relationship to the material world. This is obviously a powerful drive, and it is small wonder that skilled conmen and deluded Don Quixotes have been able to turn large masses of people delusional by manipulating it with, precisely, logic (where logic, as you point out, does not belong).

Just like communist theory cannot accurately be condemned by the actions of the USSR and its allies, so religious theory cannot accurately be condemned by the actions of the many churches we have had.

I'm not saying religious theory is thus proven right, I'm just saying that it is not thus proven wrong.

My only point is that the idea of god is not logically impossible; however, the idea of a single, one infinite God is logically impossible. Nothing can exist infinitely or without limit. So we abandon that idea from the beginning. So what I am focusing on is the logical possibility of "metaphysical beings" or "gods", beings that are "above" humans in scope, ability, scale, capacity, perception, however you want to define it.

I am not interested in proving or disproving religious ideas or theory. I could not care less. These ideas refute themselves. What I am interested in is properly identifying the logical possibility contained in the general notions of "God/gods" and then seeing if there are any philosophically interesting implications of this possibility.

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Secondly, I would argue that philosophy and religion have one important thing in common: neither is wholly dependent on logic. Logic leads to nothing unless it is pushed, like a ouija board.

Trully, there is much yet to be explored in philosophy. At least I think we can agree that we have no space at the moment for metaphysics, and by extention, this means that it is extremely unlikely for Gods to become relevant.

I just urge you not to trample the concept, if only because it was beautiful once and should be preserved as one of those examples of living human poetry.

The god-concept has direct usefulness for our ancestors. It did have philosophical use-value, but only because at that time philosophy was in its infancy. Man needed some way to objectify the facets of himself, to delve into his experiences and consciousness and form relations, create objects, construct definitions, posit and deduce and infer. Man needed a medium through which to objectify himself. Language needed to be adapted to this use, and at first myth, image and illusion were needed to this end.

We now have a philosophical language, we can now explicate the human entity and consciousness without appeal to god-concepts or arbitrary metaphysics. Philosophy has grown, it has no more use of god.

Of course there is much beauty and aesthetic value to these ancient gods. But my placing the god-concept and all metaphysical delusion in its proper category and true place does not belie this. Rather, as I have always seen it, the aesthetics of these ideas is enhanced when we more accurately and honestly apprehend them.



As for philosophy and religion not depending on logic, this is true only of religion. Any philosophy that does not depend on logic is not worthy of the name, is something else but certainly not philosophy. Unless I miss your point here. Maybe you should clarify what you mean by this -- are you trying to make relevant here a distinction between logical thought and action/effect?

I'm satisfied by your reply, and I think it fits well with my current struggle not to make use of any metaphysics.


Now, about logic and philosophy: There is no such thing as logic itself, only logic applied. Insofar as we can agree with this, we can agree that all philosophy must depend on logic. For some reason I decided to go all proto-fascist there.

Anyway, my point that philosophy is not purely logical is very personal. Philosophy that does not acknowledge the observer as a modifying force is not my own, but I am open to hearing the conclusions of those who go that way. I was foolish to generalize what I myself recognize as a deeply subjective view.

Pezer wrote:

I'm satisfied by your reply, and I think it fits well with my current struggle not to make use of any metaphysics.


Now, about logic and philosophy: There is no such thing as logic itself, only logic applied. Insofar as we can agree with this, we can agree that all philosophy must depend on logic. For some reason I decided to go all proto-fascist there.

Anyway, my point that philosophy is not purely logical is very personal. Philosophy that does not acknowledge the observer as a modifying force is not my own, but I am open to hearing the conclusions of those who go that way. I was foolish to generalize what I myself recognize as a deeply subjective view.

I agree, philosophy must acknowledge the critical role of the observer, the thinker. Thinking changes reason, and reason changes thinking. Reason and logic are not universal axioms, they are elements of "human nature", of a human-like consciousness. Reason and logic (and thinking) emerged from the operations of a pre-cursor type of consciousness to this human-like consciousness, and in so doing eventually went on to re-make the entire conscious instinctual organism in a new, more self-reflective and self-responsive, inwardly differenced manner. Philosophy may treat reason and logic as axiomatic or universal, but this is only a method employed out of necessity, in order to cultivate a framework in which these may be best grasped and applied, which may require a certain degree of "naivete" with regard to the actual nature of the tools one wields; that would apply to philosophy which is still mired in so-called objectivism, realism, that still treats its objects as fixed definitive things with an absolute real external existence. It isn't that objects (of thought, of perception, of whatever) have no external reality, of course, but rather that this is not their total reality, nor even perhaps their most essential.

Philosophy ought to strive to better understand these complex relations between consciousness and its objects, between the objects of consciousness and consciousness itself, its processes, functionality, behavior and development, and of course the value of these.

Anyway, back to the question of god, god would be an example of an ideational object which allows consciousness to attain certain ends, to exist in a certain form or quality. There is utility to the god-idea, but it is a utility fitting for a pre-philosophic, pre-rational consciousness, for a consciousness without adequate strength and self-development, self-reflectivity to bear the image of its own truth without evoking necessary schemas of deceptions and delusions. This is why philosphy breaks away from the utility of the god-idea. It isn't that this idea has no usefulness, nor even that it is not a "good idea", whatever that may mean... it is that a certain kind of conscious being, the philosopher, the free thinker, the active, creative, self-reflective and productive consciousness seeking truth has no more use for the idea of god. To me, this expansion away from reliance on such delusional constructs fits with the development of a mind which moves away from the very sort of "objective realism", the "Philosophy that does not acknowledge the observer as a modifying force" which you also seem to resist.

hmmm... It does seem that the idea of a God or Gods is irrelevant unless somehow the knowledge of that God serves those who know of it somehow..

In the case of Christianity there are tennets to follow but i see that these tennets could be followed without knowledge of God, this seems to be the case in many religions.

I would say that perhaps the exception would be in a religion where in the goal of say human life is to unify with God whatever God may be as in that case one would likely need to understand what God is in order to become one with or like unto that God.
Oneness with God means literally to be God.

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hmmm... It does seem that the idea of a God or Gods is irrelevant unless somehow the knowledge of that God serves those who know of it somehow..

Yes. The assumption of Spinoza is that ultimate knowledge of God is necessary moral knowledge, i.e. knowledge that causes the experience of goodness.

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In the case of Christianity there are tennets to follow but i see that these tennets could be followed without knowledge of God, this seems to be the case in many religions.

A set of tenets is used to establish an order, on top of which is a dominating drive.
The dominating drive is unknown to all followers of the religion except to the one with the thought that created the context.
The vision of God is the powerful realization of the current situation, implicit in which is the vision of the greatest possible influence one can exert in that situation.
The moral nature of the influence is dependent on the materials (people) to be influenced and the character of the visionary.
The former can change over time, the latter can not.
A religion has a definite character - if it is to be successful at all, it will come to many different manifestations.
Once the code of a religion, the thought behind it, has been cracked, the religion loses it's coercive power.
God is no longer Great.
A greater possibility than the one that was possible from that once primordial perspective, is now imaginable.
Weak souls search for nothingness (superficiality), vital souls for experience, being - new depths.

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I would say that perhaps the exception would be in a religion where in the goal of say human life is to unify with God whatever God may be as in that case one would likely need to understand what God is in order to become one with or like unto that God.

Oneness with God means of course to equal God.
One can be 'in the Lord' , but this does not make one Lord.