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'Mortal as I am, I know that I am born for a day. But when I follow at my pleasure the serried multitude of the stars in their circular course, my feet no longer touch the earth.'
 
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 Self-valuing: a theoretical examination

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individualized
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PostSubject: Self-valuing: a theoretical examination    Self-valuing: a theoretical examination  Icon_minitimeWed Sep 28, 2016 9:26 am

The two main dialectical (expressed as two sides in contrast and conversation with each other) paradigms in philosophy at the metaphysical (onto-epistemological) level have for a long time been: being vs. becoming, and materialism vs. idealism. One great thing about the VO idea of self-valuing is that it jumps over both of these paradigms. It's like these paradigms break down completely under the assertions of VO. I want to create an analogy here to how edified logic breaks down typical paradoxes in philosophy of logic:

The Cretan paradox of speaking "All Cretans are liars" when one is a Cretan oneself. This is supposed to produce a paradox because if one is oneself a Cretan and proclaims honestly that all Cretans are liars then one has spoken a truth, thus refuting the original claim that is spoken, so that it becomes impossible to express the claim without refuting it. This is clearly among the more stupid things produced by philosophy. I only mention it because of how the supposed paradox literally dissolves when we push just a little deeper into it: what does "are liars" mean, that all Cretans never always only speak the truth, or that all Cretans are always lying? The latter of course is required for the paradox to even make sense, and yet as we move to this latter position on the meaning of "are liars" in equal measure the situation becomes literally meaningless: all Cretans are always lying? Everything spoken is a lie, no non-lies are ever spoken? Everything is supposedly a lie therefore nothing truthful can be said-- this is nonsense, more importantly it isn't a paradox at all, it is just a stupid way of constructing a thought experiment. If someone always lies then they cannot tell a truth, but then by some magic you say "A ha but here they may have said a truth!" you're just refuting your own premise that the person always lies. It's unfortunate that this sort of thing persists as "philosophy".

"A is never B
But some thing here of A looks like a B (because I subtly refuted my own principle of A in my formation of B)! Paradox!"

Idiotic.

So anyway, just as the paradox dissolves once we really examine what is meant by the terms in the premises, namely the paradox only exists because of a deliberately vague use of concepts, I think the typical dialectical paradigms in philosophy also dissolve once VO proposes its core idea of self-valuing. Self-valuing doesn't claim to know what a self is or what beings are, they could be "material" or they could be "ideal", they could be "being" or they could be "becoming" but in any case whatever they are they are always a self-valuing, something which holds itself in existence precisely because it "values" itself as itself, namely interprets interactions in such a way that it always holds itself as the standard for those interactions. The idea is deeper than the typical philosophical categories here; "what being really is" is suspended because we don't really care about that right now, we say that no matter whatever we might say being is, we already know that it is self-valuing. Although VO does not go the "extra" step and claim that being is self-valuing and nothing besides which is a huge strength on the part of VO, as I see it. The false metaphysical leap is avoided, suspension of judgment is imposed just so that a core truth can reign free regardless of however anyone wants to describe or define "what beings really are". We may not know what they are, but by strict logic we can know that regardless of what they are, they self-value. This is one reason why self-valuing is superior to N's will to power, because N makes that metaphysical leap when he doesn't need to (when it isn't justified to do so).

 

___________
“Be clever, Ariadne! ...
You have little ears; you have my ears:
Put a clever word in them! —
Must one not first hate oneself, in order to love oneself? ...
I am your labyrinth ...”.  -N

“A man is not great if he is not small, and he is not small if he is not great. Concepts flirt with the loss of their significance in the oscillation between ambiguous states, and this is in part the function and purpose of concepts.” -Primer on Meaning
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PostSubject: Re: Self-valuing: a theoretical examination    Self-valuing: a theoretical examination  Icon_minitimeWed Sep 28, 2016 10:20 am

Hegel's idealism is interesting, as far as I've been able to tell so far by reading him directly and going on Zizek's readings of Hegel, because of how material is governed by the ideal yet the ideal both rises out of the material and is not reducible to the material. As materials organize they become governed by ideal relations as the ideal is for the material its universality, but not just "its" universality, rather universality as such. The material becomes capable of expressing through itself something that is entirely non-material.

This is the essential contradiction. The original "split in being", because the material could never truly become ideal just as the ideal could never truly become material, although the idea acts as if it were material in so far as the ideal, by coming through the material, interacts directly with the material to organize it in new ways. Said in my terms, consciousness is literally its own contents but in such a way that consciousness cannot be reduced to those contents; the contents construct consciousness by filling it in but do not describe consciousness at the formal level, rather the filling in of consciousness, its reality, takes place within the bounds of the universal become "material" for being able to interact directly with material on the material level, through instantiating as materials.

Hegel says in PS that even if beings (human beings) work only at the level of the direct contents (materials) of their consciousness and deny their universality they are still in fidelity to that universality for the simple reason they their contents always already express that universal, and the universal is realized by realizing contents at the content level. The very fact that we are "interested in" some object or event that is not-us is the fact that this object or event has already been assumed in our own contents in sudh a way that universality is seen in it, and works itself through us in it or through it in us. But the truly moral dimension comes when this consciousness turns its always already realizing universal as its direct (universally denying) content-fidelity into a direct object itself, namely another content of consciousness; at this point consciousness gets a hold of itself within itself in a new way, grasping universals as such or "philosophic ideas" and the material of the contents of consciousness are now organized again in new ways. So the universal now can live through those contents in a wholly new and different way.

I'm not very far yet in my understanding of Hegel's system here, but what I see so far is powerful indeed. I am going to fathom these depths alongside Parodites' daemonic and Fixed's VO. Another interesting thing I notice is that people talk about how Hegel never really wrote about the dialectic for which he is so famous, yet when I read Hegel this dialectical logic can be seen everywhere in him; this must separate good from bad philosophers, true philosophers from mere scholars of philosophy since the latter point to the "mistake" that we credit to Hegel this idea of the dialectical development when in fact he never said that, yet the former such as Zizek and Marx are able to extract this critical logic from Hegel even as Hegel never explicitly lays it out-- Hegel lays it out indirectly, as if following his own logic of how the ideal universalized materials through those materials which can never become ideal themselves.

 

___________
“Be clever, Ariadne! ...
You have little ears; you have my ears:
Put a clever word in them! —
Must one not first hate oneself, in order to love oneself? ...
I am your labyrinth ...”.  -N

“A man is not great if he is not small, and he is not small if he is not great. Concepts flirt with the loss of their significance in the oscillation between ambiguous states, and this is in part the function and purpose of concepts.” -Primer on Meaning
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PostSubject: Re: Self-valuing: a theoretical examination    Self-valuing: a theoretical examination  Icon_minitimeThu Oct 27, 2016 11:59 am

This is extraordinary.


 

___________
" The strong do what they can do and the weak accept what they have to accept. "
- Thucydides
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