The future of concepts

Value ontology has rediscovered the logic of the monad, whereby the inner construction of being is a model for that which is beyond it, and that which is beyond models the inner as well. Leibniz posited that every thing is built with monadological structure, that it represented God as the whole-all and that every possible existence is contained in and even compossible with everything else; without this latter assumption in particular God would not be possible, or at least the God for whom those such as Leibniz burned. Thus the idea of the possibility of divergence becomes the infinite limit of the monadological system, whereas the represented modeling or comparison-architectures between monads of varying sizes, types, scope and intensities becomes the finite limit of the system. This is not unlike value ontology which posits that all things which exist do so as a form of self-valuing logic-structure, in so far as they act and direct their effects toward the need of their own being-existing, which is to say nothing can exist without either self-valuing or becoming valued by other self-valuings. Upon this is built the grander notion of interpretation-as-ontoepistemology, not the other way around-- i.e. the nature of beings-interactions with Self and Other is the nature of the ontoepistemic, whereas ontoepistemology itself cannot be reduced merely to operations of interpretation but contains its own excessive logic which cannot be fully incorporated by the movement.

Here tectonics enters, for tectonics is and represents this excess. This is the 'objective' measure across systems whose own self-valuing necessity cannot mediate encounters with what must appear non-entity before its own representational and interpretational capacities. Being more of a ground, this tectonic level allows frameworks to be built, and we have two varying level of reality: that which is shared, essentially, within the inner construction and thus what resonates and seeks to harmonize itself with whatever bounds it, and that which is not shared, essentially, and is rather an outer construction of disharmony and 'accident'. Of course "not shared essentially" means a kind of sharing, but one done on a submerged level that cannot be grasped by a thing's own faculties or powers. Yet in man-like consciousness, by virtue of language and a whole host of other technologies of psyche and substantiation, this essence is for the first time grasped by being and becomes, like Heidegger noted, Dasein. Yet because the whole host of faculties and technologies available to Dasein still reek of the old being, of the mediated nature of automatism and merely ex post facto organizing powers, this essence can only be approached through the denial of the will, or rather through the irresponsibility of reason. This is the orgiastic toward which organic being bends, as Deleuze noticed. This is the possibility of the monad to construct its own "self-repeating monological architecture" internal to itself, to model the model, to "real the reality" as it were, or hermetically speaking, the "as above, so below" itself, factually, and not merely actually.

Dasein has not yet conceived the power to will this facticity its own monad, has not the powers yet to model and to conceive models for that which is to be the new substance upon which consciousness proceeds in itself. But philosophy moves in this direction, with tectonics being one step along the way. In tectonics we trace backward toward the teleological and arrive at the principle of the relation between tecton and telos: the principle that ideation completes action, and even perhaps that ideation is the completion of action and nothing besides. Herein the ex ante, which hounds former consciousness and is the very upper limit of representational, synthesizing reason becomes the bare sense upon which for the first time the highest echelons of conscious powers are able to feel themselves as within a new kind of reason, something for which the ex post facto becomes as that which the ex ante is for the ex post facto under the old systems. Tecton replaces telos as the implicit framework for the explication of differences and divergences whose nature is already the excessiveness of self-valuings which act like synecdoches, like strange reflections and potentiating relationalities for those which condition them and which they, indirectly, condition.

Nietzsche's will to power attempts to do what Plato's whole system of Ideas did, namely birth a metaphysics, but Nietzsche's strength and even caprice was to attempt to push the limits of such a system infinitely in all directions, to over-determine and even prescribe its own bounds, to make it eternal. Hegel attempted a similar thing, of course, through the finite syntheses of dialectical reasoning which ultimate links man to God as God is approached through higher concourses of conceptualizations, as concepts are abstracted further from their human gestation and thus are, supposedly, made to come closer to their real and divine substance-cause. Yet the will to power posits the essence of movement as a fundamentally negative thing, constructed out of the void and need which is always the specter of the will's own possible action before itself, before whatever limits and seeks to limit it. Schopenhauer's striving-suffering will to life principle is hidden inside Nietzsche's will to power, for having stripped all obtuse moralism from the idea it takes on a kind of "pure" form and rawness yet does not lose the essential nature of being at heart a thing opposed to that which it is and that which is not-it. If a will to power could ever be not-opposed to what it is, surely it would vanish immediately, just as, as Nietzsche himself noted, those wills to power which attempt to become not-opposed to what they are-not take on the nihilistic tones seen in the Buddhist or the Christian psychologies.

Thus, the discovery of both self-valuing and tecton allow for Nietzsche's metaphysics to finally be supplanted by the next stage of thought, as ultimately occurs when the positive emerges as not just the formality but also the very nature of the negative, of negativity multiplied by the pure negative object and become formative of new kinds of powers of positivity, and it is already within this stage that Parodites' daemon takes shape. The limit of the old philosophy looks back in wonder at itself, and at its supreme conditions; the new philosophy looks from its limit, posits limitation as its ground, and looks with wonder and tyranny toward its future, toward the not-itself which it does not arrest either through categories of affirmation or of denial. This is man that is the carrier of the highest kinds of creativities and faculties, of abstract needs and powers, of manipulations of more absolute differences and repetitions which bear their effect into the absconded heart of more complete and insanized reality. Here the teleological is replaced as the limit of rational consciousness with the tectonic, from which now new kinds of potentials, eruptions, excesses and defaults emerge, these containing the former logics of telos but now having succeeded in deriving this logic non-teleologically, which is to say, rationally and with appeal to the actual delimitation by which force the ex ante and ex post facto can be said to converge. Finally, I see how tectonics, which emerged from a radical and "random" departure with the already-given self-valuing logic, is in fact not opposed to self-valuing at all, but is rather opposed to the teleological. Whereas the old philosophy can be correctly characterized by its direct opposition to the theological, the new philosophy is characterized by its direct opposition to the teleological; new linguistic and conceptual technologies give access to new powers and possible actions, and we are thrust upwards into the more infinite spaces of absolute discernment and total judgment, which is of course to say in fact that reason becomes the purview of greater tectonics, and reality itself has become something more than what a moment before it had been. Or, to speak again with Deleuze, we can say that difference is being thought in so far as that reality to which differences of a particular kind cohere is made not only infinitely extensive under the auspices of an absolute synthesis of identities or representations but, in direct contradistinction to this movement is also made inwardly contemplative and rich enough to contain expressions of what Leibniz called the true nature of God; thought becomes not only able to think its own thinking or the nature of that thinking but becomes also able to think the un-thought, and to posit the thinker itself without appeal to the merely thought-of rather teleological or otherwise. What has in the past emerged only as a form of impossiblility-as-such, irrationality-as-such, as the orgiastic desire-lust, Eros and Thanatos and that which has fueled willings to power as every manner of novel fidelity and betrayal becomes for the first time something of its own constitution and essential character, something yet vague and less distinct for, as consciousness calls its own possibility-for-the-conscious into its existence it must retreat from the horizon of representative logics and synthetic perceptions, choosing only a more analytic framework with which to perceive and affect this emerging, if consciousness is to avoid the same mistakes as have plagued the old philosophies from Plato to Leibniz to Hegel to Schopenhauer, to Nietzsche who in the last of this movement finally exposed the secret nature of things only to speak of it in the language of old and dead things. This framework has taken form  across Parodites' philosophy, across value ontology and now across tectonics. It is at the point of intersection of this tripartite construction, a fully three-dimensional thought system, that the future of man and world begins to fully take shape.

As Tectonics doesn't replace Value Ontology in an operation that is no longer teleological, I don't see it replacing the Will to Power. Tectonically, the Will to Power is a description of how it is, even why it is we perceive the tectonic operations of monads. Nietzsche was responsible for bringing philosophy right up to that which it wanted to grapple with, the strict central pillar that united all perception (God's kingdom). Tectonics is the action following the smirk of understanding, not overcoming, the truth of the Will to Power. It is a black hole summoned by philosophy: now we must learn to work with its gravity if we are to afford these new tools of understanding their proper self-understanding genealogical weight. If this weren't enough, we have the eternal recurrence, a description which synechdochytally incorporates tectonics. The so-called metaphysics of Nietzsche have weight, not because they are metaphysichal, but because they finally answer the questions that gave rise to the whole field of metaphysics. Philosophising with a hammer... Tell me, how much power or sophistication do metaphysitians wield today? People cower away from the will to power answer, but they certainly believe it enough instinctively to ignore the area it covers in a display that is often called cinicism or lack of spiritual imagination carachteristic of modernity.

Tectonics is an answer, a yes. Nietzsche burned all the maps, even the understanding on how we made maps. Tectonics is a fuck you, and a thank you, and a you're welcome.

Tectonics no more replaces VO than Nietzsche's system, but exists in a state of tension, sustained dimensionalism. There are continua, judged not only by strength but by subordination, "strength" as derivative prescription and comprehensivity. it is nonsensical to read the will to power in and as all things, and the term was never even meant by Nietzsche like this, we find the experimentation of the limits of the idea's potential in his private notebooks. Rather eternal return gives the better formulation of the essence of his approach, namely the appearance of a specter of pure affirmation (which arises not from the negative, not even from the negative 'consequence' of the master moralist) as well as the universal using movement to close the physical by preparing causality for the eternal form of time; "the same" is the becoming-power to which only pure affirmation pays respect, and the effect of ER is entirely teleological itself, being psychologically driven toward that which follows from ends and that which tends most in its nature to ward off such ends. This is why Nietzsche's will is fundamentally no different from Schopenhauer's will (the extreme usefulness of both psychological systems, Nietzsche's in particular, notwithstanding). Both are reactive forces and seek to enclose activity within the reaction, not directly, but through assuming as departure-points those which tend in their necessary consequence to undermine all routes of deterritorializations of and escape-vectors from activity. Neither ever really deals with suffering, not really, but nonetheless believes it is doing just that.

The idea does not emerge from reality, as Nietzsche thought, reality emerges from the idea, from ideal movements of self-valuing subjects whose own condition is only the very tectonic potentials that provide the adequate difference, the objectivity-field for excessive constructions (space and time coordinates, movements of pure virtual non-force realizations) beyond the ever-defaulting shared values of self-valuings-in-relation. Tectonics here becomes analogous to the pure image of thought, and tends toward enunciation of the different-in-itself that Deleuze saw as the condition of all differences and, therefore, all identities as well. It is not true that it is impossible to speak the un-speakable; one merely needs wholly unearthly tongues.

There is no absolute uniform or uni-temporal continuity on which pure affirmation could base it's eternally-recurring will; the fact that such an implicit continuity is needed is hidden within the tyranny of the thought. Going beyond all former idealism and falsification Nietzsche returns the purer forms of these atavisms as the tools with which to conquer them, but in so doing succeeds only in the sense that a similarly Hegelian total-closure within the universal-identical replaces a more radical, insane divestment of the given/historical narrative. Nietzsche, however, at least has the 'good conscience' to avoid idealizing this necessity. Yet the mere fact that questions like ressentiment and "to bear vs. to affirm" occur so forcefully within his thought attests to that which he struggled with a great deal, which is to say, reveals certain qualities of his own nature as a thinker, and of course of his thought-systems, as well.

Neither tectonics nor VO are directed at replacing Nietzsche, but have as a consequence of themselves a new and more dynamic, and accurate, reading of Nietzsche which is only possible because they speak a language of concepts that moves in and out of the shadows of Nietzsche's own logics. The revaluation of all values is his supreme insight into the future of philosophy, and he was well aware that his own project achieved only a pointing toward, a what Heidegger called calling forth and an asking.

Replacement and overcoming are as little the issue and concern as are fidelity and worship. Things exist in stasis to each other and the high compliment is when a thing is able to be opposed at all, to generate from itself new kinds of differentials and derivations, extra-dimensional(-izing) potencies-to-oppose.

There is no place for dogma in truth, even in the implicit of truths.

As to the question of metaphysics and power, yes these falsities have given cause for many great new powers among men, by virtue of their psychologic affinities, of the fact that lies more easily disclose real powers than do truths. Yet this only holds most true on realms inadequate to the particular causalities on which such powers rest, of course.

The difference between the will as world and representation and the will to power is the death of the will, more or less. The first is possited as the answer to what is all? The second is posited as the answer to what is the thing in itself? Using the same word, and indicating that the will to power only wills will to power implodes solipcism and gives birth to the world as it always was, also the space for mapping it without the confusions we needed to get to this point. The quest for the soul, God, the Holy Grail, the Ultimate Woman, the Heart of All Things, this is the quest Schopenhauer side-stepped with the will as world and representation, tried to kill it from ressentiment and triend to name all things "all things, thus will." Nietzsche said: the Holy Grail is found, it is all else that must now be reconcidered. Will what? Will is the soul, schoppenhauer got htat right, but what is the soul? What wills? Will to power. What does it will? Will to power. Will you gravitate for ever around this black hole, or fall into it? This is narcissism. Your philosophy is the opposite, which simply indicates a certain relation of distance in tectonic terms.

Will to Power is ultimately propped by evolutionary theory, it exists because it is what can exist in reaction to what allows it to. We are. That there is no God means we have a power so previously unimagined, we must re-evaluate all values. Traditon was to think of things as they were not, for they were God's. Now we think of them as they are, and what are they? Tectonics determines the undeniable intelligence we have acquired, will to power the method of slaying all else that hung on and was detrimental to this intelligence, precicely because it is three things: real (not metaphysichal), an idea before real (got through evolutionary trial and error sophistication), emotionally true (it speaks to that which speaks originally).

Perhaps I am reaching for what you call psychologically important, but then the unifying power of the will to power eliminates any important distinctions between philosophy and psychology, the questionings of reality and the mind. Tectonics can be arrived at without this insight, but this insight reveals the importance of the valuing identity "human." We are, not instead of all things or in spite of them, but beside them with intermingling borders.