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 The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.

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PostSubject: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Sun Dec 18, 2011 8:42 pm

I was pointed to the following in the ILP thread on value ontology, but did not see it then. I retrieved it today.
On yahoo answers, JoeJoeRivers asked:

Quote :
Excluding food, water, shelter, or God. Do you think it should be self-sufficiency, self-confidence, family, friendship, virtue (if so, which ones?), a fun life, or...? Anything you think that we should value most. Thanks.
To which Sauwelios responded the following:

Quote :
They should value their capacity to make value judgments:

"Valuing is creating: hear it, ye creating ones! Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of the valued things.
Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones!"
(Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Of the Thousand and One Goals.)

By the way: this passage presents us with a problem, because it makes it seem that Nietzsche answered the Euthyphro-dilemma thus: "The valuable is valuable because it is valued by us." I don't think this is his answer, however.

The alternative according to Plato's Euthyphro dialogue would be: "The valuable is valued by us because it is valuable." How could this be Nietzsche's answer?

If we value valuation, i.e., if we consider valuation to be valuable, one could counter that that is merely a valuation, not a fact, and that valuation is therefore not valuable in itself. But consider the *alternative*: the valuation of valuation as worthless also rejects *itself* as worthless---it negates itself; whereas the valuation of valuation as valuable *affirms* itself.

And as all we know is valuation (what we see, what we focus on, is determined by valuation), we may suppose that all events are valuations: on a cosmic scale as well as on a subatomic scale, and everything in between. Valuation is then the fundamental fact. And even food, water, and shelter are only valuable for sustaining (or increasing) our capacity to make value judgments. And if there is a God, then the same goes for Him: He is Himself valuation and nothing besides. In other words:

"This world is the will to power, and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power, and nothing besides!"
(Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 1067.)

My answer to your question, then, is: I think people should value *valuation* as most important to them. And I don't just think they *should*, I think they always *do*---even the nihilist who considers everything, including her valuation, worthless. There is, then, no discrepancy between 'ought' and 'is': "this world [is] the actually-achieved highest possible ideal"! (ibid., section 1019.)
Earlier, in the Thousand and One Goals, Zarathustra says:

No people could live without first valuing; if a people will maintain itself, however, it must not value as its neighbour valueth.

The setup to what is then perhaps not the philosophy, but the science of value-ontology. N's value-valuation is not yet an explanation, it satisfies itself with observing what is, rather than what this means if we are to understand it as ourself in the world.

Here designated is the gap between Parodites' transcendental and its empirical countershore. The ocean in between is ruled by 2 things: the Daemonic and its natural enemy and habitat, entropy. The daemonic genius is the only thing capable of surviving the odds of existence versus no existence... because of what it empirically tolerates though fundamentally defying it, the deepest existence is satyrical. The grin on a primordial sailor, grim to all things human, his enjoyment in the uncertainty. He knows himself by this very factor. Valuing the uncertainty of the universe as an extension of oneself - this sailor is the primordial being.

If valuation is the primordial reality, and it is determined here by something (e.g. a people) maintaining itself, then what is the condition for valuation? A standard for valuation maintaining itself. What is a standard for valuation? A standard-value. How is this maintained, if the subject is valuing itself?

Ergo: self-valuing.

Quote :
Values did man only assign to things in order to maintain himself- he created only the significance of things, a human significance! Therefore, calleth he himself "man," that is, the valuator. Valuing is creating: hear it, ye creating ones! Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of the valued things. Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones! Change of values—that is, change of the creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Wed May 16, 2012 1:27 pm

This is science and not philosophy because it is not yet philosophy, not yet even a science. Value presupposes subject and object, that goes without saying. Each supposes the other, not factually, but in terms of valuation, either actual-expressed value or potential value. The mode of valuation, i.e. more or less actual or potential, determines the way in which subject and object of value express with each being a condition (and with respect to value in question, the condition, along with the presumed valuational context implicitly employed) of the other. Nietzsche noticed that people take their values for granted, and where they attempt to philosophize their values they take them as inherent or a part of exteriority, as factual. Nietzsche saw how this undercut the importance of the valuer, how it falsely ascribed objectivity to value.

Making this explicit, known, without caricaturization or dramatization requires elaborating the whole context and conscious host of facets of consciousness collaborative of valuing. Valuing emerges at the top of this consciousness, as one of its most superior effects. This is not to be confused with the fundamental nature of valuing to this consciousness, in terms of its survivability and self-objectification and maintenance. What is needed is a science of consciousness from which a philosophy of value might emerge. Nietzsche started out on this path but was unable to proceed toward this science, and thus his philosophy of value ends up being immature (but not absent).

We do not value value because it is valuable. Nor is the valuable valuable because we value it. Such "definitions" are merely circular renderings spinning their wheels at the base of the problem. The logic needs to be further elaborated.

The notion of self-valuing is an attempt toward elaborating upon a science of consciousness. The adequacy of this concept is in its ability to propel the analysis toward a philosophy of value, to act as part of a ground of this philosophy. Self-valuing understood in context of a science of consciousness, which science itself involves a whole host of prior philosophical and scientific conception and logic, becomes the sufficiency and sum of this science, becomes the bridge from it toward philosophy, toward comprehensive reason and telos.

 

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"Since the old God has abdicated, I shall rule the world from now on." --Nietzsche

"Do you hold out hope, then?" ... "I hold out dignity." ... "She will need opiates before long, for the pain. She will cease being who she is." ... "Then I will love who she becomes."  --Penny Dreadful
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Wed May 16, 2012 3:36 pm

Capable wrote:
This is science and not philosophy because it is not yet philosophy, not yet even a science. Value presupposes subject and object, that goes without saying. Each supposes the other, not factually, but in terms of valuation, either actual-expressed value or potential value. The mode of valuation, i.e. more or less actual or potential, determines the way in which subject and object of value express with each being a condition (and with respect to value in question, the condition, along with the presumed valuational context implicitly employed) of the other. Nietzsche noticed that people take their values for granted, and where they attempt to philosophize their values they take them as inherent or a part of exteriority, as factual. Nietzsche saw how this undercut the importance of the valuer, how it falsely ascribed objectivity to value.

Making this explicit, known, without caricaturization or dramatization requires elaborating the whole context and conscious host of facets of consciousness collaborative of valuing. Valuing emerges at the top of this consciousness, as one of its most superior effects. This is not to be confused with the fundamental nature of valuing to this consciousness, in terms of its survivability and self-objectification and maintenance. What is needed is a science of consciousness from which a philosophy of value might emerge. Nietzsche started out on this path but was unable to proceed toward this science, and thus his philosophy of value ends up being immature (but not absent).
Granted, it is not science, until proper definitions have been formulated, based on the axiomatic concept of self-valuing, in concrete terms.

It appears that you are saying the same thing here as James has been insisting on. I am afraid it is out of my reach at this point to shift from observing principles underlying manifest reality to defining the emerging 'apparatus' of reality in its components, which would mean for example mean defining subject and object in other terms than the purely abstract definition of both in terms of each other.

I've been trying to force my mind to make this step, without any success so far.

Quote :
We do not value value because it is valuable. Nor is the valuable valuable because we value it. Such "definitions" are merely circular renderings spinning their wheels at the base of the problem. The logic needs to be further elaborated.
I would love to proceed.

Quote :
The notion of self-valuing is an attempt toward elaborating upon a science of consciousness.
It did not originate, and does not find its justification as/in this attempt, but it can certainly be taken in this direction. With the notion that a science of consciousness would be bound to an analogously progressing science of being.

The crux of value ontology is where it removes the border between inanimate being and consciousness, and in that is not an attempt but a resolution, brings into focus the potential of thought itself. It can probably be picked up to become a science of consciousness, but I fear (or anticipate with joy) that this will prove to be quite revolutionary in terms of our conception of matter, and of physics. I've hinted at my ideas on this here and there over time and I notice that they fall sort of outside of the ballpark - for me value ontology is the death sentence to materialism. Value precedes matter, and what this value then means is precisely what precedes matter - nuclear force, EM force, gravity -- the concepts of attraction, perfectly unexplained, but required to sustain the notion of matter.

That is how the science of consciousness will aid the science of physics -- in terms of consciousness, it is easier to understand what value means, and thereby the "mechanics" or "cause" of nuclear force, etc, may come within reach of analysis. Such analysis will, so it seems, not be exact in the tradition, abstract terms, but rather comprehensive, "daemonic".

Quote :
The adequacy of this concept is in its ability to propel the analysis toward a philosophy of value, to act as part of a ground of this philosophy. Self-valuing understood in context of a science of consciousness, which science itself involves a whole host of prior philosophical and scientific conception and logic, becomes the sufficiency and sum of this science, becomes the bridge from it toward philosophy, toward comprehensive reason and telos.
It seems to me that the adequacy is in its power to integrate any given understanding of a model into a general context, where laws can be observed to be working. (the law of self-valuing / valuing in terms of self-value). It already is the philosophy of value - what it is not yet is a science, we have no definitions separate from the axiom, haven't modeled empirical reality in such terms (only made a few steps in a few directions). Neither is it an philosophy of ethics. These two fields I see as the primary directions departing from the self-valuing concept.

 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Wed May 16, 2012 6:18 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:
Capable wrote:
This is science and not philosophy because it is not yet philosophy, not yet even a science. Value presupposes subject and object, that goes without saying. Each supposes the other, not factually, but in terms of valuation, either actual-expressed value or potential value. The mode of valuation, i.e. more or less actual or potential, determines the way in which subject and object of value express with each being a condition (and with respect to value in question, the condition, along with the presumed valuational context implicitly employed) of the other. Nietzsche noticed that people take their values for granted, and where they attempt to philosophize their values they take them as inherent or a part of exteriority, as factual. Nietzsche saw how this undercut the importance of the valuer, how it falsely ascribed objectivity to value.

Making this explicit, known, without caricaturization or dramatization requires elaborating the whole context and conscious host of facets of consciousness collaborative of valuing. Valuing emerges at the top of this consciousness, as one of its most superior effects. This is not to be confused with the fundamental nature of valuing to this consciousness, in terms of its survivability and self-objectification and maintenance. What is needed is a science of consciousness from which a philosophy of value might emerge. Nietzsche started out on this path but was unable to proceed toward this science, and thus his philosophy of value ends up being immature (but not absent).
Granted, it is not science, until proper definitions have been formulated, based on the axiomatic concept of self-valuing, in concrete terms.

It appears that you are saying the same thing here as James has been insisting on. I am afraid it is out of my reach at this point to shift from observing principles underlying manifest reality to defining the emerging 'apparatus' of reality in its components, which would mean for example mean defining subject and object in other terms than the purely abstract definition of both in terms of each other.

I don't think subject and object can or need to be defined in "other terms than the purely abstract definition of both in terms of each other". This is what it means to be subject and object, it is a way of understanding the most basic sort of relationality. I think this, "subject in terms of object, object in terms of subject" is the strict, literal and "scientific" definiton of these. I think we already have the proper definitions of these terms. We call them subject or object based on how we perceive or intent to perceive the interactivity, but in reality everything is both a subject and an object at all times, and it is never neither.

I am not sure what James thinks on this, I do not remember agreeing with him on anything... maybe he has said something since leaving here which I am not aware of. But read my point on science of consciousness in the general sense of the meaning of consciousness: not our consciousness, not the consciousness of mammals, not the consciousness of other or all living things, not consciousness "itself" but rather consciousness-as-entity, consciousness-as-relationality, as-sensation. To exist at all is to be a consciousness, a conscious process, a process of "subjective" "objectifying/interpretation" as interactivity and relationality, embedded in time and space and subject to constraint and chaos/entropy. One of the strengths of value ontology is that it is able to show how consciousness in itself is a condition of all things, not in some weird new-age or mystical way but in a very literal, logical and scientific manner. As Parodites said, consciousness equates to sensation; to sense, to be affected, to be able to be affected-by, this is what consciousness means, consciousness is the store and structurality and possibility of sensations-in-relation. In this way the science of consciousness means the science of existence, or of being, but I prefer to call it a science of consciousness because this places the emphasis most precisely where I think it belongs, on the inherent structurality and logic of being, of what we have called valuing.

How this affects our human consciousness is certainly also very important and powerful here too, but technically even this is secondary to the fundamental "logic of being" if you would prefer to call it that.

Quote :
I've been trying to force my mind to make this step, without any success so far.

How do you conceive this as differently from how I outline above, and what/why have you had no success in making this step?

Quote :
Quote :
We do not value value because it is valuable. Nor is the valuable valuable because we value it. Such "definitions" are merely circular renderings spinning their wheels at the base of the problem. The logic needs to be further elaborated.
I would love to proceed.

I think that is precisely what we are doing. This is value ontology, explication and description of value logic, the logic of being. This applies eminently to human consciousness, just as it applies to everything else.

Quote :
Quote :
The notion of self-valuing is an attempt toward elaborating upon a science of consciousness.
It did not originate, and does not find its justification as/in this attempt, but it can certainly be taken in this direction. With the notion that a science of consciousness would be bound to an analogously progressing science of being.

I see them as one and the same science. How could they be different? What is the meaning of being absent consciousness, broadly defined as I use it here (to mean sensation, interactivity, valuing-relating via a certain logical 'setup' of structures-in-relation-to-each-other)?

Quote :
The crux of value ontology is where it removes the border between inanimate being and consciousness, and in that is not an attempt but a resolution, brings into focus the potential of thought itself. It can probably be picked up to become a science of consciousness, but I fear (or anticipate with joy) that this will prove to be quite revolutionary in terms of our conception of matter, and of physics. I've hinted at my ideas on this here and there over time and I notice that they fall sort of outside of the ballpark - for me value ontology is the death sentence to materialism. Value precedes matter, and what this value then means is precisely what precedes matter - nuclear force, EM force, gravity -- the concepts of attraction, perfectly unexplained, but required to sustain the notion of matter.

That is how the science of consciousness will aid the science of physics -- in terms of consciousness, it is easier to understand what value means, and thereby the "mechanics" or "cause" of nuclear force, etc, may come within reach of analysis. Such analysis will, so it seems, not be exact in the tradition, abstract terms, but rather comprehensive, "daemonic".

Yes, this is precisely the merger of consciousness and physics, valuing and "reality" (another kind of valuing, or our valuing vs. other valuings which are for us context or condition/s or interference/s). Mankind has largely developed the scientific knowledge and tools to aid this sort of eventual understanding; what is needed now is to develop the tools and knowledge on the side of philosophy/logos.

I think we are in complete agreement here.

Quote :
Quote :
The adequacy of this concept is in its ability to propel the analysis toward a philosophy of value, to act as part of a ground of this philosophy. Self-valuing understood in context of a science of consciousness, which science itself involves a whole host of prior philosophical and scientific conception and logic, becomes the sufficiency and sum of this science, becomes the bridge from it toward philosophy, toward comprehensive reason and telos.
It seems to me that the adequacy is in its power to integrate any given understanding of a model into a general context, where laws can be observed to be working. (the law of self-valuing / valuing in terms of self-value). It already is the philosophy of value - what it is not yet is a science, we have no definitions separate from the axiom, haven't modeled empirical reality in such terms (only made a few steps in a few directions). Neither is it an philosophy of ethics. These two fields I see as the primary directions departing from the self-valuing concept.

What I mean by a philosophy of value is a culmination of philosophy, a fully articulated and developed philosophical system of understanding and utility from which "new kinds of truth" might emerge. I see it as somewhat of a progression of development: 1. animal consciousness ==> 2. "normal" human-ape consciousness ==> 3. basic philosophy/logic/empiricism ==> 4. science and scientific method/theory ==> 5. comprehensive philosophy, or analogously: 1. naive-natural self-valuing ==> 2. moderately self-conscious self-valuing (basic telos expressed under natural-naive formalism, first injection of logos into instinctuality) ==> 3. self-conscious self-valuing (teleological self-valuing, self-referential structurality of consciousness, capacity for higher future anticipation and planning) ==> 4. moderately self-conscious self-conscious self-valuing (the beginning of directly objectifying self-conscious self-valuing), disclosing valuing-logic ==> 5. self-conscious self-conscious self-valuing (fully articulated and developed inward science/objectification of "consciousness" via value-logic pushed to its furthest-yet extreme of teleological self-referential potentiality).

I think the basic concept of self-valuing serves as a ground for a further ethical philosophy as well as a further "science of consciousness" because it is getting us right to the heart of "what is actually happening" in terms of being and the logic of being, on any and all levels. This is "universal truth" if such a notion can mean anything at all.

 

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"Do you hold out hope, then?" ... "I hold out dignity." ... "She will need opiates before long, for the pain. She will cease being who she is." ... "Then I will love who she becomes."  --Penny Dreadful
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Wed May 16, 2012 6:42 pm

I am also not sure I can agree that the notion of self-valuing is axiomatic; to me it seems that we can posit the axiom "things exist" and, in combination with an assumption of finitude (a further axiom based on the logical impossibility of infinitude/boundless space), self-valuing or value-logic is able to be derived. Self-valuing is the necessary way things interact, indeed must interact; from the end of the spectrum of least-sufficient interactivity to "total interactivity" and subsequent destructivity of one thing by another. To me, value logic and the notion of self-valuing are (necessary) derivative notions based on the congruence of the dual axioms "things exist" and "things exist finitely/subject to limitation".

This would be an interesting point to pursue further. Is valuing logic, self-valuing really the logically necessary way things must interact? Is there any other possible form or means of interactivity/conditional existence?

 

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"Do you hold out hope, then?" ... "I hold out dignity." ... "She will need opiates before long, for the pain. She will cease being who she is." ... "Then I will love who she becomes."  --Penny Dreadful
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Fri May 18, 2012 8:19 am

Capable wrote:

I don't think subject and object can or need to be defined in "other terms than the purely abstract definition of both in terms of each other". This is what it means to be subject and object, it is a way of understanding the most basic sort of relationality. I think this, "subject in terms of object, object in terms of subject" is the strict, literal and "scientific" definiton of these. I think we already have the proper definitions of these terms. We call them subject or object based on how we perceive or intent to perceive the interactivity, but in reality everything is both a subject and an object at all times, and it is never neither.
We can make a distinction between beings and things, as atoms/organisms/etc and tools/fabricated objects/objects existing because of a purpose belonging to a being. Such things are not subjects, as they do not self-value. Of course their particles do, but that doesn't make them do it.

Quote :
I am not sure what James thinks on this, I do not remember agreeing with him on anything... maybe he has said something since leaving here which I am not aware of.
I think now that I largely misinterpreted your earlier post.

Quote :
But read my point on science of consciousness in the general sense of the meaning of consciousness: not our consciousness, not the consciousness of mammals, not the consciousness of other or all living things, not consciousness "itself" but rather consciousness-as-entity, consciousness-as-relationality, as-sensation. To exist at all is to be a consciousness, a conscious process, a process of "subjective" "objectifying/interpretation" as interactivity and relationality, embedded in time and space and subject to constraint and chaos/entropy. One of the strengths of value ontology is that it is able to show how consciousness in itself is a condition of all things, not in some weird new-age or mystical way but in a very literal, logical and scientific manner. As Parodites said, consciousness equates to sensation; to sense, to be affected, to be able to be affected-by, this is what consciousness means, consciousness is the store and structurality and possibility of sensations-in-relation. In this way the science of consciousness means the science of existence, or of being, but I prefer to call it a science of consciousness because this places the emphasis most precisely where I think it belongs, on the inherent structurality and logic of being, of what we have called valuing.

How this affects our human consciousness is certainly also very important and powerful here too, but technically even this is secondary to the fundamental "logic of being" if you would prefer to call it that.
I have been reluctant to see it this way but yes, a case can be made, on the ground of value ontology, for the idea that consciousness is equatable to being. I am reluctant to equate valuing to an act of consciousness, but on the other hand, value ontology forces me to see human consciousness as a result of a perfect continuity of principle in development from the selection of subatomic self valuing onward.

We can observe two big transformations within the continuity - life and reason/abstraction.

Could life perhaps be seen as an "abstraction" of inanimate self-valuing?

Quote :
Quote :
I've been trying to force my mind to make this step, without any success so far.

How do you conceive this as differently from how I outline above, and what/why have you had no success in making this step?
So now I still don't know if this step is ueberhaupt possible. I mean the step of identifying "what value is" in other terms than the ones implicit in value logic - I mean defining in a non-mathematical, non-hermetic way. This is what James has been pushing for, it seems to me. But we have been doing the reverse - defining every other thing in terms of this one, perfectly empirical-logical and in this sense "universal" notion of (self-)value. In this way we expand the mathematics of value, and indeed there is perhaps no actual reason to leave this domain of abstract clarity.

I wonder if you see any sense in my attempts at formulating ethical principles based on negativity.

Quote :
Quote :
Quote :
The notion of self-valuing is an attempt toward elaborating upon a science of consciousness.
It did not originate, and does not find its justification as/in this attempt, but it can certainly be taken in this direction. With the notion that a science of consciousness would be bound to an analogously progressing science of being.

I see them as one and the same science. How could they be different? What is the meaning of being absent consciousness, broadly defined as I use it here (to mean sensation, interactivity, valuing-relating via a certain logical 'setup' of structures-in-relation-to-each-other)?
Quote :
Quote :
The crux of value ontology is where it removes the border between inanimate being and consciousness, and in that is not an attempt but a resolution, brings into focus the potential of thought itself. It can probably be picked up to become a science of consciousness, but I fear (or anticipate with joy) that this will prove to be quite revolutionary in terms of our conception of matter, and of physics. I've hinted at my ideas on this here and there over time and I notice that they fall sort of outside of the ballpark - for me value ontology is the death sentence to materialism. Value precedes matter, and what this value then means is precisely what precedes matter - nuclear force, EM force, gravity -- the concepts of attraction, perfectly unexplained, but required to sustain the notion of matter.

That is how the science of consciousness will aid the science of physics -- in terms of consciousness, it is easier to understand what value means, and thereby the "mechanics" or "cause" of nuclear force, etc, may come within reach of analysis. Such analysis will, so it seems, not be exact in the tradition, abstract terms, but rather comprehensive, "daemonic".

Yes, this is precisely the merger of consciousness and physics, valuing and "reality" (another kind of valuing, or our valuing vs. other valuings which are for us context or condition/s or interference/s). Mankind has largely developed the scientific knowledge and tools to aid this sort of eventual understanding; what is needed now is to develop the tools and knowledge on the side of philosophy/logos.

I think we are in complete agreement here.
Yes, we are.

Quote :
Quote :
Quote :
The adequacy of this concept is in its ability to propel the analysis toward a philosophy of value, to act as part of a ground of this philosophy. Self-valuing understood in context of a science of consciousness, which science itself involves a whole host of prior philosophical and scientific conception and logic, becomes the sufficiency and sum of this science, becomes the bridge from it toward philosophy, toward comprehensive reason and telos.
It seems to me that the adequacy is in its power to integrate any given understanding of a model into a general context, where laws can be observed to be working. (the law of self-valuing / valuing in terms of self-value). It already is the philosophy of value - what it is not yet is a science, we have no definitions separate from the axiom, haven't modeled empirical reality in such terms (only made a few steps in a few directions). Neither is it an philosophy of ethics. These two fields I see as the primary directions departing from the self-valuing concept.

What I mean by a philosophy of value is a culmination of philosophy, a fully articulated and developed philosophical system of understanding and utility from which "new kinds of truth" might emerge. I see it as somewhat of a progression of development: 1. animal consciousness ==> 2. "normal" human-ape consciousness ==> 3. basic philosophy/logic/empiricism ==> 4. science and scientific method/theory ==> 5. comprehensive philosophy, or analogously: 1. naive-natural self-valuing ==> 2. moderately self-conscious self-valuing (basic telos expressed under natural-naive formalism, first injection of logos into instinctuality) ==> 3. self-conscious self-valuing (teleological self-valuing, self-referential structurality of consciousness, capacity for higher future anticipation and planning) ==> 4. moderately self-conscious self-conscious self-valuing (the beginning of directly objectifying self-conscious self-valuing), disclosing valuing-logic ==> 5. self-conscious self-conscious self-valuing (fully articulated and developed inward science/objectification of "consciousness" via value-logic pushed to its furthest-yet extreme of teleological self-referential potentiality).
And stage 5 indeed implies an ontological teleology - before this stage, no telos could exist outside of the inner peerpatually self setting goal of persistence that is being selected. With the attainment of this stage, it seems impossible for a telos to remain absent. Because it seems a the logical consequence of the subject becoming aware of the valuing mechanism in itself that he adapt his reason to disclose this subjects particular self-valuing, that he explicates it, which can, seemingly, only be done in terms of how it ultimately wishes to interpret/experience itself. Because with the advent of reason the possibility of "ultimate" was born - reason compels to ultimate conclusions. Now that reason is set aflame by valuing logic, it is, in each subject experiencing this reaction, forged into an arrow.

This forging an arrow is of course at the same time a forging a telos - and perhaps this is the need for de-abstracting that I sometimes do perceive - perhaps this telos can not be articulated in general terms, perhaps it must, in each value ontologist, also become a personal, particular aim/projection.

This would make sense in terms of doing away with objectivity and ceasing the attempts to detach knowledge from self-valuing.



 

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- Thucydides


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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Fri May 18, 2012 8:29 am

Capable wrote:
I am also not sure I can agree that the notion of self-valuing is axiomatic; to me it seems that we can posit the axiom "things exist" and, in combination with an assumption of finitude (a further axiom based on the logical impossibility of infinitude/boundless space), self-valuing or value-logic is able to be derived. Self-valuing is the necessary way things interact, indeed must interact; from the end of the spectrum of least-sufficient interactivity to "total interactivity" and subsequent destructivity of one thing by another. To me, value logic and the notion of self-valuing are (necessary) derivative notions based on the congruence of the dual axioms "things exist" and "things exist finitely/subject to limitation".
That seems right.
The idea of limitation is as crucial as the idea of existing...
and the progression of being is also the progression of limiation. Life is more limited than inanimate being, reasoning being is more limited than life --
we could attempt to project the next stage of limitation.

Quote :
This would be an interesting point to pursue further. Is valuing logic, self-valuing really the logically necessary way things must interact? Is there any other possible form or means of interactivity/conditional existence?
Indeed this must be asked continuously. The only other possibility I can think of is that things are "given", which was indeed the premise for a long time. But this requires a giver.
Without an cause "ex-machina", things have to be self-given, that is, given by a condition that is part of what they are, in combination with the lack of their impossibility... and this gives reason to equate the condition of things that gives them and is part of them to their essence, nature-of-being.

Within this definition there is indeed the entire spectrum between things that are stable and active as self-valuing, and instable and giving way to other valuings drawing them apart into resources.




 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Sun Jul 22, 2012 2:32 pm

Lyssa wrote:
Fixed Cross wrote:

Here designated is the gap between Parodites' transcendental and its empirical countershore. The ocean in between is ruled by 2 things: the Daemonic and its natural enemy and habitat, entropy. The daemonic genius is the only thing capable of surviving the odds of existence versus no existence... because of what it empirically tolerates though fundamentally defying it, the deepest existence is satyrical. The grin on a primordial sailor, grim to all things human, his enjoyment in the uncertainty. He knows himself by this very factor. Valuing the uncertainty of the universe as an extension of oneself - this sailor is the primordial being.
If valuation is the primordial reality, and it is determined here by something (e.g. a people) maintaining itself, then what is the condition for valuation? A standard for valuation maintaining itself. What is a standard for valuation? A standard-value. How is this maintained, if the subject is valuing itself?
Ergo: self-valuing.


Could you say more on what you mean by the 'daemonic genius' or 'daemonic consciousness'?
Why do you call the more Tolerant-consciousness a daimon?
The Daemonic is a term coined by Parodites, describing the state of consciousness that effectively deals with the contradicting conditions that sustain a being. He has written extensively on the subject, for example, here:

http://beforethelight.forumotion.com/t41-the-daemonic

I'm afraid I don't understand what you mean with the Tolerant-consciousness. Could you explain?

[edit]
While I was responding, the post I was responding to mysteriously disappeared.

 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Sun Jul 22, 2012 2:41 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:
He has written extensively on the subject, for example, here:

http://beforethelight.forumotion.com/t41-the-daemonic

I'm afraid I don't understand what you mean with the Tolerant-consciousness. Could you explain?


Thanks, I landed on that link just now before you posted; its why I deleted mine.

If the daimonic refers to the transformative power [as mentioned in the above link], I was wondering why you say it tolerates the satire of existence by fundamentally 'defying' it? Did you mean this in the sense of an overcoming that is inherent in all things?
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Sun Jul 22, 2012 2:57 pm

Lyssa wrote:
Fixed Cross wrote:
He has written extensively on the subject, for example, here:

http://beforethelight.forumotion.com/t41-the-daemonic

I'm afraid I don't understand what you mean with the Tolerant-consciousness. Could you explain?


Thanks, I landed on that link just now before you posted; its why I deleted mine.

If the daimonic refers to the transformative power [as mentioned in the above link], I was wondering why you say it tolerates the satire of existence by fundamentally 'defying' it? Did you mean this in the sense of an overcoming that is inherent in all things?
I mean that the tolerance is Satirical because the being, as a self-valuing ( http://beforethelight.forumotion.com/t130-summary-of-value-ontology ) has to tolerate it because it exists (therefore, empirically) but can not do so without defying what it represents 'objectively' - death. Remaining subjective in the face of the objectifying force of entropy/death requires something of the mind - a certain 'humor', or temperament - playfully cruel with itself.

Awakeness to this conflict between life and death, tolerantly accepting an aspect of reality, as wellas the necessity of having to fight that reality perpetually, this state has a Satyrical 'spirit'. At least, this is how I understand the Satirical, as the reflective mindset of Dionysos.

 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Sun Jul 22, 2012 9:39 pm

One can not be aware of the satyrical at the depths of the soul, unless it is deliberately sought out - scepsis hand in hand with exploration bring no fruit until a stupid joy is found in the concept of suffering. All cultures becomes sick who forget the joy in their own suffering, their identity as a whole.

The whole suffers its parts - parts in balance of stifled conflict and opportune politics, - the part is content in itself, knowing its power to stifle the whole by withdrawing from it into itself. This is the congested egoism that is bred by exposing humble souls to the lure of magnificent treasure.

The part knowing itself in giving of its time to the other side, the unexpected, the society that holds ones fears and hopes, vitalizes the whole, and places itself before circumstances that it can use to grow in scope and presence, experience.

The part knowing the whole to be like itself, is a king among parts and regulates to its (exalted, intelligent, bountiful) pleasing the parts around it. It draws out of the zero sum sea the greater parts, and places them in positions of learning and attributes specific authorities.




 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Mon Jul 23, 2012 1:54 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:
Awakeness to this conflict between life and death, tolerantly accepting an aspect of reality, as wellas the necessity of having to fight that reality perpetually, this state has a Satyrical 'spirit'. At least, this is how I understand the Satirical, as the reflective mindset of Dionysos.
One can not be aware of the satyrical at the depths of the soul, unless it is deliberately sought out - scepsis hand in hand with exploration bring no fruit until a stupid joy is found in the concept of suffering. All cultures becomes sick who forget the joy in their own suffering, their identity as a whole.

I haven't had the chance to read the whole of that link yet, but to me, there are different levels/kinds of the Dionysian.
The way you define the Satirical as above is not how Nietzsche defined the Dionysian.
The Dionysian doesn't just 'tolerantly accept' the painful and terrifying sides of existence but affirms it 'daringly' - "how much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?... It is part of this state to perceive not merely the necessity of those sides of existence hitherto denied, but their desirability; and not their desirability merely in relation to the sides hitherto affirmed (perhaps as their complement or precondition), but for their own sake, as the more powerful, more fruitful, truer sides of existence, in which its will finds clearer expression." [WTP, 1041]

In BOT, N. contrasts the dreadful laughter of Silenus to the Olympian laughter of the Apollonian Greeks; characterizing the latter in WTP, as the 'laughter of the deeply wounded' and in TSZ as the 'golden laughter'... its why I wondered why the Tolerant-consciousness [the heavy black wisdom of Silenus that existence has no meaning at all] is attributed to the Daimon, when in Joyful Wisdom [383], for instance, the Dionysian [Apolline-sublimated-Dionysian] is characterized as a wicked, "koboldish laughter" and "sanguine joy" and contrasted against "all raven-black"ness... In TSZ, recall, the passage on the kind of laughter that ensues after the black-serpent head is bitten off...
If the Daimonic refers to the Transformative consciousness, doesn't it refer to the Dionysian than the Satirical?

"Maintaining cheerfulness in the midst of a gloomy affair, fraught with immeasurable responsibility, is no small feat; and yet what is needed more than cheerfulness? Nothing succeeds if prankishness has no part in it. Excess of strength alone is the proof of strength.
A revaluation of all values, this question mark, so black, so tremendous that it casts shadows upon the man who puts it down-such a destiny of a task compels one to run into the sun every moment to shake off a heavy, all-too-heavy seriousness. Every means is proper for this; every "case" a case of luck. Especially, war. War has always been the great wisdom of all spirits who have become too inward, too profound; even in a wound there is the power to heal. A maxim, the origin of which I withhold from scholarly curiosity, has long been my motto: Increscunt animi, virescit volnere virtus." [N., TOI, Preface]

For me, the Dionysian represents/is an 'aggressive' joy.

Btw., is the figure of the 'sailor' you use just incidental; if not, could you explain why you chose the sailor?

Has Harmatia been published?

Has anyone here read this work - politics as the sovereignty of joy...?
http://www.amazon.com/The-Sovereignty-Joy-Nietzsches-Philosophy/dp/0802041108


Fixed Cross wrote:
The whole suffers its parts - parts in balance of stifled conflict and opportune politics, - the part is content in itself, knowing its power to stifle the whole by withdrawing from it into itself. This is the congested egoism that is bred by exposing humble souls to the lure of magnificent treasure.

The part knowing itself in giving of its time to the other side, the unexpected, the society that holds ones fears and hopes, vitalizes the whole, and places itself before circumstances that it can use to grow in scope and presence, experience.

The part knowing the whole to be like itself, is a king among parts and regulates to its (exalted, intelligent, bountiful) pleasing the parts around it. It draws out of the zero sum sea the greater parts, and places them in positions of learning and attributes specific authorities.


Yes, I see how you mean. We could also speak of it in terms of the Dionysian [whole] and the Apollonian [part];

"It is Apollo who tranquilizes the individual by drawing boundary lines, and who, by enjoining again and again the practice of self-knowledge, reminds him of the holy, universal norms. But lest the Apollinian tendency freeze all form into Egyptian rigidity, and in attempting to prescribe its orbit to each particular wave inhibit the movement of the lake, the Dionysian flood tide periodically destroys all the little circles in which the Apollinian will would confine Hellenism. The swiftly rising Dionysian tide then shoulders all the small individual wave crests, even as Prometheus' brother, the Titan Atlas, shouldered the world. This titanic urge to be the Atlas of all individuals, to bear them on broad shoulders ever farther and higher, is the common bond between the Promethean and the Dionysian forces." [BOT, 9]

and,

"We have here an indication that dismemberment--the truly Dionysian suffering--was like a separation into air, water, earth, and fire, and that individuation should be regarded as the source of all suffering, and rejected. The smile of this Dionysus has given birth to the Olympian gods, his tears have given birth to men. In his existence as a dismembered god, Dionysus shows the double nature of a cruel, savage daemon and a mild, gentle ruler. Every hope of the Eleusinian initiates pointed to a rebirth of Dionysus, which we can now interpret as meaning the end of individuation; the thundering paean of the adepts addressed itself to the coming of the third Dionysus." [BOT, 10]
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Wed Jul 25, 2012 6:53 pm

Lyssa wrote:

I haven't had the chance to read the whole of that link yet, but to me, there are different levels/kinds of the Dionysian.
The way you define the Satirical as above is not how Nietzsche defined the Dionysian.
I know. And this is not what I intend to describe. Certainly a reminder of what in fact the Dionysian of Nietzsche is, is in place and very welcome. I will explain.

Quote :
The Dionysian doesn't just 'tolerantly accept' the painful and terrifying sides of existence but affirms it 'daringly' - "how much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?... It is part of this state to perceive not merely the necessity of those sides of existence hitherto denied, but their desirability; and not their desirability merely in relation to the sides hitherto affirmed (perhaps as their complement or precondition), but for their own sake, as the more powerful, more fruitful, truer sides of existence, in which its will finds clearer expression." [WTP, 1041]
This is the basis, indeed, for the consciousness that wants to transcend nihilism. The pain has to be embraced as a part of the desired, the to be conquered. But once one has arrived there (on whatever level), the thinking does not stop. It did for Nietzsche, he fulfilled his historical task. But for us, the quest goes on and subtler divisions within the Dionysian mindset are made apparent.

Quote :
In BOT, N. contrasts the dreadful laughter of Silenus to the Olympian laughter of the Apollonian Greeks; characterizing the latter in WTP, as the 'laughter of the deeply wounded' and in TSZ as the 'golden laughter'... its why I wondered why the Tolerant-consciousness [the heavy black wisdom of Silenus that existence has no meaning at all] is attributed to the Daimon, when in Joyful Wisdom [383], for instance, the Dionysian [Apolline-sublimated-Dionysian] is characterized as a wicked, "koboldish laughter" and "sanguine joy" and contrasted against "all raven-black"ness... In TSZ, recall, the passage on the kind of laughter that ensues after the black-serpent head is bitten off...
If the Daimonic refers to the Transformative consciousness, doesn't it refer to the Dionysian than the Satirical?
You would have to ask Parodites that. It is his term. But what I mean with Satyrical is part of the Dionysian. One can not always be in a Dionysian rapture, but a philosopher must always be in touch with the horned Gods spirit, of he is to remain honest and challenging to himself.

Quote :
"Maintaining cheerfulness in the midst of a gloomy affair, fraught with immeasurable responsibility, is no small feat; and yet what is needed more than cheerfulness? Nothing succeeds if prankishness has no part in it. Excess of strength alone is the proof of strength.
A revaluation of all values, this question mark, so black, so tremendous that it casts shadows upon the man who puts it down-such a destiny of a task compels one to run into the sun every moment to shake off a heavy, all-too-heavy seriousness. Every means is proper for this; every "case" a case of luck. Especially, war. War has always been the great wisdom of all spirits who have become too inward, too profound; even in a wound there is the power to heal. A maxim, the origin of which I withhold from scholarly curiosity, has long been my motto: Increscunt animi, virescit volnere virtus." [N., TOI, Preface]

For me, the Dionysian represents/is an 'aggressive' joy.
It certainly does, that is what it is.
Satyrical is not completely passive - it is a defiant, spiritually aggressive form of reflection.
Dionysos in full activity does not reflect. But the philosopher must reflect when he does not create or destroy.

Quote :
Btw., is the figure of the 'sailor' you use just incidental; if not, could you explain why you chose the sailor?
It refers to the reference of Schopenhauers principium individuationis in the BOT.

Quote :
Has Harmatia been published?
I think not, not yet.

Quote :
Has anyone here read this work - politics as the sovereignty of joy...?
http://www.amazon.com/The-Sovereignty-Joy-Nietzsches-Philosophy/dp/0802041108
Not read it. The title is certainly promising. Is this a recommendation? If so, what is it about, what does it have to offer on top of Nietzsche?

Quote :
Fixed Cross wrote:
The whole suffers its parts - parts in balance of stifled conflict and opportune politics, - the part is content in itself, knowing its power to stifle the whole by withdrawing from it into itself. This is the congested egoism that is bred by exposing humble souls to the lure of magnificent treasure.

The part knowing itself in giving of its time to the other side, the unexpected, the society that holds ones fears and hopes, vitalizes the whole, and places itself before circumstances that it can use to grow in scope and presence, experience.

The part knowing the whole to be like itself, is a king among parts and regulates to its (exalted, intelligent, bountiful) pleasing the parts around it. It draws out of the zero sum sea the greater parts, and places them in positions of learning and attributes specific authorities.

Yes, I see how you mean. We could also speak of it in terms of the Dionysian [whole] and the Apollonian [part];

"It is Apollo who tranquilizes the individual by drawing boundary lines, and who, by enjoining again and again the practice of self-knowledge, reminds him of the holy, universal norms. But lest the Apollinian tendency freeze all form into Egyptian rigidity, and in attempting to prescribe its orbit to each particular wave inhibit the movement of the lake, the Dionysian flood tide periodically destroys all the little circles in which the Apollinian will would confine Hellenism. The swiftly rising Dionysian tide then shoulders all the small individual wave crests, even as Prometheus' brother, the Titan Atlas, shouldered the world. This titanic urge to be the Atlas of all individuals, to bear them on broad shoulders ever farther and higher, is the common bond between the Promethean and the Dionysian forces." [BOT, 9]
Yes, exactly.

Quote :
"We have here an indication that dismemberment--the truly Dionysian suffering--was like a separation into air, water, earth, and fire, and that individuation should be regarded as the source of all suffering, and rejected. The smile of this Dionysus has given birth to the Olympian gods, his tears have given birth to men. In his existence as a dismembered god, Dionysus shows the double nature of a cruel, savage daemon and a mild, gentle ruler. Every hope of the Eleusinian initiates pointed to a rebirth of Dionysus, which we can now interpret as meaning the end of individuation; the thundering paean of the adepts addressed itself to the coming of the third Dionysus." [BOT, 10]
Fascinating, because this seems antithetical to the politics that would follow from value ontology. (Not necessarily as I would understand from the philosophy of the Daemonic). Value ontology is the science of individuation. I can only salvage this conflict by observing here that the art of individuation has not yet in human history been a science - it has always attained to a notional self, instead of a dynamic, nameless force.

 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Wed Jul 25, 2012 8:57 pm

Nietzsche was the main iconoclast, who brought us back to the statues even he could not destroy. When I say statues I mean spiritual substance - art as politics. Or politics as the Form in which man is made art. Nietzsche shows in his writing the perpetual rediscovery of greatness. But this is the beginning of a philosophy of the future; the aim is a final spiritual politics whereby a subset of the human species grows worthy of governing the Earth.

 

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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Fri Jul 27, 2012 7:02 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:

This is the basis, indeed, for the consciousness that wants to transcend nihilism. The pain has to be embraced as a part of the desired, the to be conquered. But once one has arrived there (on whatever level), the thinking does not stop. It did for Nietzsche, he fulfilled his historical task. But for us, the quest goes on and subtler divisions within the Dionysian mindset are made apparent.

Indeed.


Quote :
But what I mean with Satyrical is part of the Dionysian. One can not always be in a Dionysian rapture, but a philosopher must always be in touch with the horned Gods spirit, of he is to remain honest and challenging to himself. Satyrical is not completely passive - it is a defiant, spiritually aggressive form of reflection.
Dionysos in full activity does not reflect. But the philosopher must reflect when he does not create or destroy.

Then, I'd call this Daimonic a "joyful-wisdom". In terms of an excess, the Satirical would denote the excess vision into the abyss, and the Dionysian, the transformative/excess joy needed to dance with that wisdom or make that wisdom dance, either way...
Reflection and the Olympian laughter would be the realm of the Apollonian.


Quote :
Not read it. The title is certainly promising. Is this a recommendation? If so, what is it about, what does it have to offer on top of Nietzsche?

No; I haven't read it, was hoping for reviews myself.

p.s. I wonder if you could continue on that translation work of his aphorisms a day in another thread you had started, as and when chance permits. Thanks.
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Sun Aug 05, 2012 10:07 am

"If the Daimonic refers to the Transformative consciousness, doesn't it refer to the Dionysian than the Satirical?"

------------
A nice, brief image of the daemonic I give in this post:

http://beforethelight.forumotion.com/t147-ethos-anthropos-daimon

I'll be quoting my own books a lot in this post.

The Dionysian of Nietzsche is a pure excess, in which tragedy is dissolved into comedy, and comedy absorbed in tragedy. The Daemonic is a psychological phenomenon whereby that excess is articulated through what I call "conceptual opposition," a non-dialectical process. Nietzsche only figured out the logic of the excess itself, he did not (to my mind) make it to the logic of the daemonic, and consequently misunderstood a great deal about the Greeks, the religion of Abraham, and the struggle between those two conceptions of world/man. He was only able to oppose to the Dionysian the idea of the Apollonian, the idea of the creative will imposed upon the excess in order to shape it, as a piece of clay. This stunted perspective locks Nietzsche into a continuous formation of identity, by way of the Apollonian, and consequent dissolution of that identity in the Dionysian excess. He later grasps this process under the catch-all term Will to Power, which necessitates his view that all values are expressions of a particular quanta of strength. In my philosophy however values are re-realized as "ethical ideas," ideas in the Platonic sense, objectifications of the excess attained by daemonic philosophy, that is, conceptual oppositions:


"The empirical consciousness is essentially an incomplete consciousness, the basic human experience is one of finitude and limitation, and to preserve itself in face of this the empirical consciousness asserts a transcendental object toward which it directs itself. It thereby preserves itself as a process, which is nonetheless incomplete and in such a way as it must remain incomplete. A new ethics could appear that attempts to find out these points at which the empirical consciousness asserts from out of its own incomplete and limited nature the very transcendental object or aim which preserves and holds it in existence, and to also trace these transcendental objects, these ideas, in the language of Plato, back into the finite, limited, and lived conditions of subjectivity from out of which they emerged. Traditional ethical philosophy and morality have phrased the Good in a language quite distinct from the language that traditional philosophy uses to phrase the True. The true has always been purely representative. The truth, in the old Platonic sense, as the Ideas, are not positive specifications of knowledge. They are conditions of possibility of knowledge, like the law of identity: a thing is what it is and no other thing. That is not itself a positive piece of knowledge, but is rather a representative kind of knowledge: it merely represents the transcendental object by which the empirical consciousness holds itself in existence and sustains the process of thought. I want to begin a new ethical philosophy that treats the Good in just this way, as purely representative, as a condition of possibility for the empirical, lived, finite, meaning-seeking consciousness. Our morals do not accomplish such a representative act, they do not represent to us a transcendental object. Our moral and ethical philosophies have tried to be merely positive designations of knowledge. Do this or do not do this. This is a virtue, that is a vice, etc. This owes itself to the primal error by Plato, who spoke of the good in a different language than he used to speak of the true. The true was spoken of as a representative idea, whereas the good was discovered within Eros' loving gaze, was born of this gaze, and because it was related only to Eros, only to the lover and not the beloved object itself, not the transcendental order to which truth belonged, which truth represented, this "good" served for Eros as a merely positive objectification of knowledge rather than as a representative of the transcendental. The foremost goal of a new ethical philosophy must be to re-imagine "ethical ideas," that is, purely representative goods. In the way in which the idea sustains the process of thought and holds the empirical consciousness in existence, "ethical ideas" must sustain a process that will be later referred to as the "erotic-daemonic," and that new ethical philosophy which engenders them must hold the transcendental objects and those truths which represent these objects in existence, must hold the "heroic" philosophy in existence, by continually recovering those conditions of limitation within the empirical consciousness from which such truths were born. "



Now, to speak of the daemonic itself:




"The Greeks thought of the self as an antagonism, not as contradiction, between empirical reality, time, desire, and the eternal, and therefor as an excess which could not be contained by either term in this struggle. This excess is named by them Eros, love. Eros can fall into matter, sensuality, and physical beauty, but it can also ascend the ladder of being and attain to philosophy. It thus constitutes an excess, which by its very nature cannot be absorbed in a dialectical synthesis. The Greeks made the self livable by exploding it into a series of conceptual oppositions, time and eternity, form and matter, etc. Each of these oppositions provided a vantage in which the self could orient itself within its own excess, each provided a ruling passion, a new pathos, a new mode of life, a particular kind of "subjectivity." The excess does not signify noumenal reality, does not signify the ontic reality, the ousia or being which cannot be comprehended by thought, but rather does the excess signify the inexhaustible mental component of the human intellect which is constitutive of that intellect and of our consciousness. The capacity to differentiate and articulate the excess through conceptual oppositions I have named the daemonic. "


"These conceptual oppositions are not exclusive, and are potentially infinite. Kierkegaard's project must here be abandoned, which relied on the exhaustibility of the epistemic subject and the construction of several definite stages or conceptual oppositions and an either/or choice between them. That element of volition, of having to make a choice, a leap of faith, made the ontic subject once again the first order or primordial subject, as the will is a being and not an epistemic entity. Each of the conceptual oppositions created daemonically constitute a different mode of life. The mode and its quality depends on the opposition, one example of a mode is the aesthetic mode of life. The number of these different modes of life that a particular individual can produce depends on the power of his daemonism. Not all individuals are capable of living the same modes of life or living the same number of modes. A transcendental good is an ideal that roots the individual in that opposition wherein his daemon comes to a rest, is exhausted. Most men are not rooted in this way, and so we have the daemonic frenzy, the repetition of the same modes of life, a kind of psychological stunting. Their self is fragmented in this way throughout the modes and they must continually re-orient themselves within the conceptual oppositions which it has created. Philosophy endows us with the concepts with which to exhaust our daemonic nature. A speculative ethics as a particular way of philosophizing would aid one in finding out the ideal by which to comprehend the final orientation of one's daemonism, namely by comparing and clearly differentiating the different modes one has lived through, becoming more conscious of them."


Philosophy, in my view, is precisely the act of constructing these conceptual oppositions in which the excess is articulated. While the excess cannot, by its very nature, be resolved, the daemonic can, and the exhaustion of one's daemonism constitutes the ethical vision, the ideal, the virtue, which is philosophy's ultimate goal.




However, the "daemonic philosophy" of the early Greeks has been eclipsed by Abrahamic philosophy. As I put it:




"The Judaeo-Christians had a whole new conception of the self. To them the contradiction which constituted the self signified not an excess, but a fundamental lack, an abyss. Why is man such a grotesque synthesis of conflicting powers, of the finite and the infinite? How is he even possible? It is because, all the way down, man is missing something. It is not the things of the earth he misses, for he is equally a temporal and earthly thing, nor the things of heaven, for he can indeed philosophize, practice justice, and achieve virtue.... No, no, he is missing God. Thus they psychologically figured out a way to cohere the self. Kierkegaard is all about this, for him this "God" provides the self a leap of faith by which to cohere and bring into unity its despairing relation of the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite. He himself could not figure out how exactly the religious life, how God, cohered the two parts, but I have, and I just explained why it works psychologically. The reinterpretation of the excess as a lack allows the two parts to be cohered when they are brought into a unified longing and desire for this missing thing, "God." "






Nietzsche located the excess, but without a logic of the daemonic he was forced to position it within the ontic sphere, within being itself, and named it the will to power. I have been able, with my conception of the daemonic, to place it within the epistemic sphere, wholly confined to the subject.



" Heidegger rejected Sartre on the basis that a reversal of a metaphysical claim (which is what his philosophy amounts to) is nonetheless metaphysical, and this point is very true. Heidegger however locates the excess in the ontic sphere, as I have said before, and like Nietzsche he uses the strength of the ontic subject (Will for Nietzsche, Dasein for Heidegger) to break completely through the epistemic, that is, the metaphysical. That rendered Heidegger basically philosophically impotent in the remotest extreme of his thought, and all he can do there is silently point to the truth of being. Perhaps, as he says, it can be found in music or poetry. At any rate he abandons philosophy at the extremity of philosophy. I have rather located the excess within the epistemic sphere, elaborating it phenomenologically, that is, in the way in which it structures human consciousness, as well as philosophically, with the concept of the daemonic. "


" .... In my philosophy there is a monism of the human subject as an excess underlying all consciousness, as well as a philosophical dualism because it is through conceptual oppositions that the excess is reflected in consciousness, and at every step of the way the dualism can be dissolved or the monism expanded dualistically: that is the strength of it. These conceptual oppositions represent not synthesized polarities on the part of a Hegelian self-consciousness as they do in Kierkegaard, as between the eternal and temporal, but rather an immanent division of the human consciousness in an effort to reflect itself daemonically in the mirror of philosophical ideas as that excess which cannot be resolved into any conceivable polarity expressed by them. Philosophy, then, is essentially the stimulation of the real ego, the synthesizing and creative self, the self that lives, desires, and dies, which is worn away in the struggle of eternity and time, love and desire, by the ideal ego; that self which disunites, polarizes, and reflects, and the difficulty of philosophy is the seeming inability to relate the two, it is the fact that no eternity is able to express the beauty and the languishing of time, nor is time, in its last bitter extremity, able to express the absolution of the eternal, for the human self intuits within both terms some substance after its own nature, and which belongs to a still higher order of things in which the meaning of time stands of itself, and the meaning of the eternal is untouched by the walks of time. The real ego experiences the fullness of its life and will only in fleeting moments throughout the course of its existence, and it is this ideal ego which is the heart into which it lays this fullness. Nietzsche comes beautifully close to my conception in the thought of the eternal recurrence, yet he fails to draw out the excess inherent in the conceptions of time and the eternal and, thereby unable to transfer it to a higher field of discourse, he only succeeds in equating the two concepts. His thought perhaps succeeds in inducing a stimulation of the real by the ideal ego, but does not satisfy the real demand of genuine morality."



" Philosophers have proved incapable of conceiving of good and evil, freedom and necessity, the finite will and infinite creative power invested to man at the same level of moral reality, although Spinoza should be commended for making a brilliant attempt at doing so; one is always the negative expression, or lack, of the other. The fact that the empirical, lived self-consciousness can only preserve itself as an incomplete process, with no final synthesis of its contents which would allow it to grasp its freedom, not as the disparate extension through various transformations in life, but as a singular will and imperative, a categorical determination of its character, in the language of Kant- that is the source of "evil," that is, what the Platonists formulated in the proto-moral conception "akrasia," acting against ones own ethical and rational principle. Insofar as man's fundamental experience as an ethical, moral, or meaning-seeking being is one of limitation and finitude, his fundamental experience as a free being in possession of a will must be one of "sin," of corruption. In the first case man takes freedom as a representative idea, as a representation of the transcendental self-consciousness and ideal ego, but in the second case he must realize this "ethical idea" in some objective specification of knowledge, in order to exercise his will and moral potency; he must realize it in a particular canon of virtues and vices. But as was shown in the previous essay, his moral potency does not truly belong to the will, to his free agency, but rather to his capacity, as an empirical or lived ego, as a daemonic being, to be stimulated by the transcendental ego, that is, to preserve himself as an empirical self-consciousness, as a living ego and in the spirit of daemonism, by positing an ideal representative of the transcendental, toward which he must direct himself, even though the preservation afforded to him in this process is a preservation, a being held in existence, as only an incomplete being, a sinful being, a corrupted and limited being. "







" The philosophy of Kant assumes that it is possible to make use of the philosophical categories to proceed with successive syntheses of the ego and non-ego all the way up to some final synthesis, that between freedom and necessity, the moral will and amoral existence, so that the self may be at last grasped in its perfection and completeness, as a concrete and unified being in that act of will which the categorical imperative necessitates. This unity is called by Kant, transcendental apperception. In truth it is through the coextension of the ego and non-ego that the 'self,' as something more than a mere principle and abstraction, but rather as a living consciousness, lives: thought, which is the form of this reconciliation, cannot complete and finally unite them, unless it aims to annihilate itself. This 'self,' the true and living being of the ego, can appear to thought only as that concept in which ego and non-ego are grasped, not in their antithetic duality, nor in their synthetic union, but in a kind of structural relation exactly the opposite of the one implied by the Kantian apperception: it can appear to thought only as a disunion within the egoic consciousness which expresses itself, not through successive syntheses of its subjective content, as though the disunion were imposed upon the consciousness by some limitation of its power, but through successive divisions of this content into objective forms, as though the disunion lived from within the consciousness itself and through its own power, divisions which render the ego and non ego, freedom and necessity, infinite and finite in a structural relationship developed within the thousand-fold forms of the human experience, be these forms aesthetic, religious, historical, psychological, philosophical, sane, or insane.


Tout homme a vu le mur qui borne son esprit, speaks the poet Alfred de Vigny: every man has seen the abyss beyond which his spirit cannot venture. In accordance with that wall, that obscurity, the primal darkness which it is beyond all consciousness to grasp, in which the first stirring of the self arises as in the waters upon which Narcissus directed his gaze, there is conceived within the self an inner representation or image, a reflexive representation of itself, which because it can take as its object nothing other than itself, remains a mere image or eidolon, a thing of smoke, impenetrable and ungraspable. How then does this mere image come to form the absolute basis of the self? How does our sense of self, matured and grasped at the point of living and wakeful consciousness, draw the strength adequate for life and continuance from this representation? It is conceivable only insofar as the self cleaves from itself something to oppose it, and is divided into two eternal, infinite objects; an ego and a non-ego, a self and a world, for in this way the image becomes something more, namely a symbol, by turns the living intimation of the ego and non-ego. This is the mystery of the self: it lives, it comes into being, by resolving into unity that duality which it itself creates; like love, it recognizes the abyss by which it is separated from its object and at the very same time recognizes the abyss which it itself actually is, so that "abyss might call unto abyss,' and in this way it dissolves this separation, and through this dissolution draws forth its own being. But this being, this self, is only that upon which its living intimation, the 'image become symbol,' which we call thought, (the reconciliation of ego and non-ego) is eternally focused and eternally designates. Though the life of man embodies the perpetual reconciliation of the ego and non-ego, the self in its actual and true being stands forever outside their relation as the designation of thought which thought cannot attain, which no dialectical system can absorb.


The expectant disquietude of self-consciousness articulates itself through the co-extension of these two principles, establishing first a relationship between the ego and the world, (the condition of original tragic man) then a relationship by which the ego aims to confront and affirm itself in face of the world, (which is the condition of Hamlet, of modern tragic man) then a relationship by which the ego, affirmed, grasping itself as absolute, longs for an absolute, (religious suffering) and finally the relationship between real and ideal ego, out of which philosophy is born. The life of the self is a continual ascent and descent through these different modes of existence, a continuous articulation between these two different spheres. Giordano Bruno regarded the self in this way, namely as a kind of expectant disquietude which must continuously articulate itself amidst opposing forces; between the ego and non-ego, freedom and necessity, spirit and flesh, in his concept of love. In love's attempt to spiritualize itself, to overcome finitude, the limitation of bodily existence, mortality, and necessity, it is deceived by the image of beauty and falls only into sensuousness, in which its spiritual ecstasy is annihilated. Thus love is committed to a cyclic process of ascent toward the spiritual and descent into sensuality, which Bruno calls the heroic frenzies. Through love, it is as though the seed of the eternal takes root in time, the seed of the spirit takes root in flesh; the attempt love makes to make itself spirit is not paired to a desire, for desire is already directed toward beauty, nor to a state of inebriation, but rather to the disunion within the lover himself, which expresses itself not through a synthesis of the contrary forces which war within him, but through a continual division of these forces into objective relations between freedom and necessity, truth and beauty, spirit and flesh. "






Ultimately, a new morality, the defense of the category of the Absolute, a defense of the category of truth, a re-imagination of Plato, the overcoming of Nietzsche, a non-religious answer to Kierkegaard's problem of despair- these are among my central goals.









"... the philosophical ideas are so many symbols of human incomprehension, exiguity, and fault, and to think, which means to take living consciousness of an idea, represents of itself an atonement and confession. Protracted thought has as its end the kenotic, complete division of the inner life of the individual into respective ideas. The point of departure which genius therefor claims for itself is quite irrelevant: in actuality every passion is the prophet of a more general humanity, and thought will reach its end regardless of its beginning, so long as that beginning is firm. At bottom, both the philosopher and the poet do no more than cry out to the wilderness- though, while the poet deplores the fact that the wilderness provides no answer to him, for the philosopher it is not what the wilderness says that holds any meaning, but rather the wilderness itself. The same vain and bestial cry then, which in the mouth of the poet becomes the accusation of temporality, death, and falsity, becomes in the mouth of the philosopher the very qualification of truth."

 

___________
A sik þau trûðu


Nisus ait, "Dine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,
Euryale, an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?"

Have the gods set this ruling passion in my heart,
or does each man's furious passion become his god?
- Virgil.


It is not opium which makes me work but its absence, and in order for me to feel its absence it must
from time to time be present.-- Antonin Artaud
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PostSubject: Re: The shift from Nietzschean value-philosophy to value-ontology.   Thu Aug 09, 2012 4:52 am

Lyssa wrote:

Then, I'd call this Daimonic a "joyful-wisdom". In terms of an excess, the Satirical would denote the excess vision into the abyss, and the Dionysian, the transformative/excess joy needed to dance with that wisdom or make that wisdom dance, either way...
But the vision comes after the dance. The Dionysian is the dancing (excess-form) needed to stare into the abyss without it making an anyss of oneself -
joy needs to be given a form if it is to be effective in empowering - in raw, it is also a form of suffering, of attack on ones 'peace'.

Quote :
Reflection and the Olympian laughter would be the realm of the Apollonian.
Yes, as laughter is itself already a reflection. It seems to me that the Dionysian trance does not produce laughter, but rather a roaring and weeping, in which also excess of joy is expelled.

"Excess of sorrow laughs, excess of joy weeps.” (Blake)

Quote :
p.s. I wonder if you could continue on that translation work of his aphorisms a day in another thread you had started, as and when chance permits. Thanks.
You must be referring to the text about the "inhuman hero" -
I might at one point start a thread of translations of his unpublished aphorisms - that is a good idea.

 

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" The strong do what they can do and the weak accept what they have to accept. "
- Thucydides
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