Definitional Logic

Definitional logic is based strictly upon defined concepts and entities, void of presumed axiomatical truths. In the process of thinking and communicating, it is critical to maintain consistency in word-concept association.

Logic is a process wherein cross associations are discovered that must be true due simply because of the defined concept consistency involved. When the defined concepts are then firmly associated with physical reality, relevant “truth” is revealed.

An error in the use of logic or in a belief in a truth is discovered when there is a conflict, a disharmony, in the assigned concepts; when something has been inadvertently associated with its contradiction.

Above all else, Logic is defined by its lack of contradiction.

When the only axioms involved in an argument are definitions, all proper conclusions are true “by definition”. Usually such is a simple and obvious association, but sometimes the arguments, even though merely based on definitions, can become complex and surprisingly revealing.


A simple example would be the proposal that an infinite line has no end to it. If the word “infinite” has been defined to mean “no end associated”, then it can be stated with certainty that “by definition”, an infinite line has no end.. end of discussion. Whether that conclusion is significant or relevant to anyone is another matter.


Another simple example is the recent issue of whether “1+1 = 2”.

Since the symbol “1+1” represents the same conceptual definition as the symbol “2” and the symbol “=” is defined to mean “the same quantity as” (in this context), the statement of “1+1 = 2” is really saying that:

The definition of concept A is the same as the definition of concept A.

And thus the conclusion is true “by definition”:

“1+1 = 2” is true by definition (not by experiment or presumed axioms).

Definitional proofs are always merely about how the words have been defined to represent their associated concepts and maintaining consistency in those definitions.


In contrast a more common type of argument might be that “cars are manmade”. Typically, one would presume that any car would be made by man. But a car is not defined as an entity made by man, it is defined by its form and function. Thus the conclusion, whether true or not, is not the product of definitional logic, but rather axiomatical logic, requiring that all parties agree on the axioms involved.

In any one definitional logic argument, there can be no disagreement as to the definitions involved (assuming that they have been stated) although there can easily be dispute as to whether the definitions are meaningful or useful in common language.

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Using Definitional Logic is a means of absolutely knowing that ones conclusion are beyond doubt. The conclusions are not subject to misperceptions, relative measures, or presumptions.

Stemming from a more complex example of definitional logic is the revelation of exactly what causes all of the laws of physics to be what they are; why mass attracts, why particles form, why some particles are positive, neutral, or negative, why opposites attract, and why they don’t merely collapse into each other.

The results of the logic, once verified for properness, are incontrovertible as they are true “by definition”. Of course ensuring that such conclusions exactly relate to the physical world, not merely a conceptual architecture, is critical before issuing any conclusion concerning truth.

I'm not sure how fruitful the distinction is between axiomatic and definitional logic. You claim that an example of definitional logic is that "If the word “infinite” has been defined to mean “no end associated”, then it can be stated with certainty that “by definition”, an infinite line has no end.. end of discussion." Of course, the statement that "an infinite line has no end" then becomes an axiom. So, perhaps what you mean to say is that underlying axiomatic logic is a more fundamental definitional logic? But again, I'm not sure how fruitful a claim like that really is. I'm sure axiomatic logicians concede that their axioms work definitionally. Perhaps you'd like to elaborate...

The seed of doubt that is associated with logical conclusions is rooted mostly in the presumption of their axioms. No doubt many arguments used to begin with, "Since we all know the Earth is flat...". That is an example of an axiomatical argument, susceptible to error in truth merely due to presumed axioms, later found to be false.

Definitional logic allows for no presumed truths as axioms. In effect, there are no axioms at all. The beginning of every definitional argument is something like, "Because the conceptual definition of infinity forbids and end, then..."

No matter how many years later, no matter what is ever discovered, the argument remains sound because there can be no discovered error in the axioms. Of course, it might be discovered that such a paradigm of thought has become pointless or useless, or perhaps a mistake of logical fallacy can be discovered. But the most concerning issue of whether the fundamental axioms of the logic were discovered to be in error is removed.

Thus what has been formed properly by definitional logic is immutable and if found to be usefully related to the physical world, provides a foundation for construction of more significant concerns and understandings perhaps pertaining to health, wealth, philosophies of life, religions, or government legal systems.

It is critical to ensure that the foundation of what you begin to build is as immutable as possible. Definitional logic can never be defeated, corrupted, or found to be in error, only forgotten. If it was true on any day, it will be true on every day.

I think you've missed the force of my response, James. The axiom "the earth is flat" is underlain by the definition of "earth" that makes possible the subsequent axiom. Just as the definition of infinity as a line without end makes possible the axiom that infinite lines are always endless. If an axiom is discovered to be erroneous, it is because of its foundational definitions -- the two are inseparable. I'm not sure how you can claim an immutability for the statements of definitional logic. Might we not at any time modify, re-write or reject wholesale the definitions we once took seriously? We are, to take an example close to yours, constantly re-defining the universe -- are we not?

without-music wrote:

I think you've missed the force of my response, James. The axiom "the earth is flat" is underlain by the definition of "earth" that makes possible the subsequent axiom. Just as the definition of infinity as a line without end makes possible the axiom that infinite lines are always endless. If an axiom is discovered to be erroneous, it is because of its foundational definitions -- the two are inseparable. I'm not sure how you can claim an immutability for the statements of definitional logic. Might we not at any time modify, re-write or reject wholesale the definitions we once took seriously? We are, to take an example close to yours, constantly re-defining the universe -- are we not?

Emm.. no, to each of the questions.

When someone claims the Earth to be flat, they are not defining the Earth as a flat thing, but presuming it to have the property of flatness, which it turned out to not have. The idea of flatness was never changed, nor can it ever be. The word "flat" can be redefined later in a new language to mean anything, but that is why the definitions are included in the argument. Words change, concepts merely get renamed. Concepts never change. A circle will always be a circle by any other name. If the 2 dimensional shape is outlined by a series of points that all have the same exact distance from a single point, it is a circle, or a fumajigy, or whatever you want to call it, but it is the same defined concept.

Stated definitions are not axioms, but declarations for the duration of the argument at hand. Much like saying;

"Given that I was traveling at 10 mps and I struck an oncoming car traveling at 20 mph, the energy of impact would be..."

It can easily be discovered that I was never traveling at 10 mps, but that has nothing to do with the argument presented. Granted in the game of semantics and mind control efforts, the "mps" could be skewed to mean something else or the word "travel" or any of the words. All written documents, Science included, can be misrepresented if allowed. by including the definitions involved as much as possible or merely having a standard lexicon for the project, it becomes much more difficult even to play semantic games. Do it well enough, and the trouble involved in trying to bend the meanings of all of the words becomes overwhelming.

But I'm not saying that anything written in definitional logic terms cannot be twisted. I am saying that if there is any effort at all to be honest by the reader, they will never be found to be incorrect or untrue (assuming truth was brought into).

Online, I have had someone argue that "2+2" does always equal 4. His argument was that if there are 2 people traveling of different speeds close to that of light, then the distance each traveled would be different and thus the total distance for the set of them would not be 4, therefore 2+2 does not always equal 4.

That is a case of equivocation fallacy, but his effort was to skew the meaning of "2" by using it to represent different things within the same argument. These games are more difficult to play when the words are already defined, such..

"1+1" == two individual entities
"2" == two individual entities.
"=" == the same as

Therefore,
"1+1 = 2" is correct.

It is no longer an issue of ether semantic manipulation nor of presumed and debatable axioms. Legal documents are often done in similar manners, much like the license agreements that people so often sign for software without reading.

Another outstanding example was that of Thomas Aquinas in his five proofs for God. In four of the five, he stated an axiom as an obvious truth, most of which turned out to not actually be true. He was not using definitional logic and thus failed in his effort to actually prove anything, whether it was true or not. Although at the time, he was very convincing.

This is interesting. The definitional logic seems largely to be tracings of necessity within language-logos/how we make use of the terms and meanings employed. When we define term A as meaning X, Y, Z, then wherever X, Y or Z are found we can make a logical reference back to A (to the extent that the definition involves necessity or otherwise incontrovertible logics, e.g. all X's are A, or every Y is an instance of A, etc).

The dividing line seems to be appeal to inherent logical modes without respect to the actual "soundness" of these where the "facts of the world" are concerned. As we all know, an argument can be valid but unsound, and this topic seems largely to be exploring this situation and the possible implications therein.

With respect to axioms, it seems that all definitions, once agreed upon or sufficiently stated, become immediately axiomatic in how they function within the larger language-logical system/s. Irreducible to anything other than their own self-necessity and obvious truthfulness, these definitional relations act as axiomatic for the system at large, even if this axiomatic nature obtains only because of an agreed-upon mutual definition between two or more terms or meanings.

Capable wrote:

This is interesting. The definitional logic seems largely to be tracings of necessity within language-logos/how we make use of the terms and meanings employed.

That was the exact intent of Aristotle's "Dialectics". He was not professing anything about reality, merely about proper language use.

Capable wrote:

The dividing line seems to be appeal to inherent logical modes without respect to the actual "validity" of these where the "facts of the world" are concerned. As we all know, an argument can be sound but invalid, and this topic seems largely to be exploring this situation and the possible implications therein.

I think you are misusing the word "valid" in that. Valid means that it is logically correct even if not true.
But yes, my point is to begin with definitional logic correctness, valid association of the terms. Later, those terms might or might not be suited for real world application or truth declarations.

First make sure we have our dialectics correct, THEN concern ourselves with applications.

Else we get nowhere due to constant doubt embedded in the very foundation of our reasoning.

Capable wrote:

With respect to axioms, it seems that all definitions, once agreed upon or sufficiently stated, become immediately axiomatic in how they function within the larger language-logical system/s. Irreducible to anything other than their own self-necessity and obvious truthfulness, these definitional relations act as axiomatic for the system at large, even if this axiomatic nature obtains only because of an agreed-upon mutual definition between two or more terms or meanings.

Realize that an axiom is a statement of truth. A definition is not. A definition is merely clarifying the concurrent language for the moment. Definitions are not true or untrue. They are declaration to be accepted for the duration. If they conflict with standard or common definitions, the arguments might be pointless, but not incorrect, or invalid, merely a wast of time.

Yes by valid I meant sound, see my edited post.

Regarding the distinction between axiom and definition, I agree, however it is still the case that definitions function axiomatically within their applicable logical-language field/s. The division between internal consistency/logic and actual applicability "in the world" is certainly useful. But we must also keep in mind how definitions function as axioms where that which rests upon them is reducible only to the (imposed and undeniable) definition/s in question.

Edit: an axiom is perhaps a statement of "truth", but so is a definition - a definition can be seen as a statement of a conditional and contingent truth imposed upon a certain linguistic-logical field/s.

Yes, the definitions in Definitional Logic function similar to axioms in axiomatic logic.

The significant difference is merely that a declared definition for the duration of the author's argument can't be disputed. If a thousand year old argument begins with, "since we define a circle as..., then... ", the argument cannot be defeated by the claim that "but that isn't what the word 'circle' means" or "but we have discovered that circles aren't really round in the physical universe." The conclusion made by the author might depend on his assumptions that his defined circles apply to a physical world in a manner that turned out to be incorrect, but that is another matter relating to extended axiomatic truth assumptions after the definitional argument.

James S Saint wrote:

Yes, the definitions in Definitional Logic function similar to axioms in axiomatic logic.

The significant difference is merely that a declared definition for the duration of the author's argument can't be disputed. If a thousand year old argument begins with, "since we define a circle as..., then... ", the argument cannot be defeated by the claim that "but that isn't what the word 'circle' means" or "but we have discovered that circles aren't really round in the physical universe." The conclusion made by the author might depend on his assumptions that his defined circles apply to a physical world in a manner that turned out to be incorrect, but that is another matter relating to extended axiomatic truth assumptions after the definitional argument.

Yes that is true. This is posit-ional logic, positing certain positions/assumptions with respect to each other in order to trace and extract the implications arising from it. This is useful because, while as you say it may not reveal truths about the world at large, it nonetheless reveals truths of language-logos itself. The inner logics and mechanisms of language and reason are disclosed in this manner of posit-ional, definitional logic.

Words point downward, toward what gives that word its meaningfulness, and meaning is always the product of a set of relations, of situational embeddedness upon which meaning arises and is contingent. When we find irrefutable logics of relational implication through the use of positional/definitional logic we are coming closer to understanding the 'being of language', its more universal essential nature, which is certainly very close to "pure logic" itself. Interestingly enough is how the meaningfulness of language also depends upon world-application, upon extracted experiential meaningfulness that language tends to appropriate unto itself. This sort of 'hermaneutic circle' makes it very difficult to disclose language in a way that does not already suppose certain experientially meaningful (shall we say, arbitrary or situationally contingent) pre-requisite conditions. Which is to say, even when we use "strict" definitional logic we nonetheless cannot help but smuggle in a good deal of "non-definitional" implied meaning and context.

This topic and its issues are particularly relevant to me because I have managed (finally) to get my single-bit-processor and PC to prove out my Unified Field Theory based on my Rational Metaphysics.

I begin the proof merely with defined common concepts which lead to incontrovertible conclusions. But because the defined concepts are merely that, and not necessarily associated with the physical, I eventually managed to teach the principle of "afflate engagement" to my computers and then had them display for me what absolutely must take place under such a fundamental principle of interaction. Given 200,000 data points to treat identically with only that principle, the end result was that gradually particles formed with all of the properties known to physics and in the right relation/proportion and interactions.

The fact that the definitional logic dictates that any proposed universe absolutely must obey the principle plus the computers conclusion that particles exactly like those witnessed by contemporary physics form without further incentive, constitutes a valid proof for a truth model for the construction of the universe.. and it is incontrovertible, without having to buy into super electron microscopes, particle accelerators, or years of experiments.

But the added payoff is that because I can sit back and watch how it all plays together, I can see exactly why the "strong and weak forces" do what they do and exactly of what they are made. I now KNOW why it is that electrons don't fall into protons and the architecture of any subatomic particle, for examples. It is not a matter of speculation or theory. The definitional logic dictates that the electron cannot ever merely be attracted into the positive particle and for exact reasons that could be directly measured from my program if I had the time to make it as precise as I would like.

A proof is only a proof when all alternatives are validly discredited. Definitional logic allows for such.

James S Saint wrote:

This topic and its issues are particularly relevant to me because I have managed (finally) to get my single-bit-processor and PC to prove out my Unified Field Theory based on my Rational Metaphysics.

I begin the proof merely with defined common concepts which lead to incontrovertible conclusions. But because the defined concepts are merely that, and not necessarily associated with the physical, I eventually managed to teach the principle of "afflate engagement" to my computers and then had them display for me what absolutely must take place under such a fundamental principle of interaction. Given 200,000 data points to treat identically with only that principle, the end result was that gradually particles formed with all of the properties known to physics and in the right relation/proportion and interactions.

The fact that the definitional logic dictates that any proposed universe absolutely must obey the principle plus the computers conclusion that particles exactly like those witnessed by contemporary physics form without further incentive, constitutes a valid proof for a truth model for the construction of the universe.. and it is incontrovertible, without having to buy into super electron microscopes, particle accelerators, or years of experiments.

But the added payoff is that because I can sit back and watch how it all plays together, I can see exactly why the "strong and weak forces" do what they do and exactly of what they are made. I now KNOW why it is that electrons don't fall into protons and the architecture of any subatomic particle, for examples. It is not a matter of speculation or theory. The definitional logic dictates that the electron cannot ever merely be attracted into the positive particle and for exact reasons that could be directly measured from my program if I had the time to make it as precise as I would like.

A proof is only a proof when all alternatives are validly discredited. Definitional logic allows for such.

Of course you would expect that your claim would be met with the reasonable request that you provide some sort of evidence-based explanation or demonstration. If this is not possible, if you have not demonstrated your results in a manner that is able to be shared with others, at least break down the results of your findings in a rational, step-by-step manner.

I would like to point out that, computers being constructs based in a human logical frame-system and understanding, it is not necessarily remarkable that a model built upon this frame would arrive at postulated conclusions in sync with man's physical theoretical speculations, also of course built upon the very same logical architecture. That being said, you would certainly have a task ahead of you in order to demonstrate that you have not merely re-created the physical theoretical "findings" in a parallel computational model built upon the very same human mathematical-logical structures that led to the physical theoretical perspective itself. In other words, what makes you able to be certain or even confident that your model is not merely re-creating, based on the same theoretical postulations, a merely human theory that may have little or nothing to do with the actual workings/causes of the "material reality" itself?

There is little doubt that scientists and philosophers of ages past were able to develop complex mathematical and theoretical models for why, for example, the sun revolved around the earth, or why the "aether" was the universal mediumistic field to which all material ultimately referred. Certainly these models cannot be taken as "true" merely because they end up re-affirming the very same premises and assumptions which went into forming the model in the first place...

Capable wrote:

Of course you would expect that your claim would be met with the reasonable request that you provide some sort of evidence-based explanation or demonstration. If this is not possible, if you have not demonstrated your results in a manner that is able to be shared with others, at least break down the results of your findings in a rational, step-by-step manner.

Of course.. and the first step was to explain Definitional Logic.

Capable wrote:

I would like to point out that, computers being constructs based in a human logical frame-system and understanding, it is not necessarily remarkable that a model built upon this frame would arrive at postulated conclusions in sync with man's physical theoretical speculations, also of course built upon the very same logical architecture. That being said, you would certainly have a task ahead of you in order to demonstrate that you have not merely re-created the physical theoretical "findings" in a parallel computational model built upon the very same human mathematical-logical structures that led to the physical theoretical perspective itself. In other words, what makes you able to be certain or even confident that your model is not merely re-creating, based on the same theoretical postulations, a merely human theory that may have little or nothing to do with the actual workings/causes of the "material reality" itself?

There is little doubt that scientists and philosophers of ages past were able to develop complex mathematical and theoretical models for why, for example, the sun revolved around the earth, or why the "aether" was the universal mediumistic field to which all material ultimately referred. Certainly these models cannot be taken as "true" merely because they end up re-affirming the very same premises and assumptions which went into forming the model in the first place...

All of that makes for a good socio-political argument, but if you intend a legitimate concern about validity, could you make perhaps a realistic example from which I might be able to point out the differences in what I am proposing verses what I suspect you are suggesting..?

James S Saint wrote:

Emm.. no, to each of the questions.

We can't rework, refine, or reject the definitions we once took seriously? Do you presume the potential for us to capture perfectly the Real with the Symbolic? If this is the basis for a metaphysic, count me out...

I'm still not sure I'm following you when you make a distinction between the definition of the earth and the corresponding presumption of its flatness and the definition of the earth as a flat thing. In short: I still don't see the distinction between axiom and definition.

without-music wrote:

James S Saint wrote:

Emm.. no, to each of the questions.

We can't rework, refine, or reject the definitions we once took seriously? If this is the basis for a metaphysic, count me out...

I'm still not sure I'm following you when you make a distinction between the definition of the earth and the corresponding presumption of its flatness and the definition of the earth as a flat thing. In short: I still don't see the distinction between axiom and definition.

Well there is a giant step backwards..

..sigh...

A) the definitions in a Definitional argument are for sake of the concurrent argument only. If they happen to also apply in general life, all the better (such as "given that A == B" verses "given that Apple == a fruit").

B) the Earth has never, to my knowledge been defined as "the flat thing we are standing on". But rather it is more often defined as "the culmination of soil, rocks, mountains, and vegetation upon which we stand."

-------

A) Earth == the flat thing that you are standing on.
B) Earth == the planet that you are living on.

Using (A) the Earth is defined to be flat and thus directly infers that if you are not standing on anything flat, then you cannot be standing on Earth, whereas (B) does not specify that to be called "Earth", the object must be flat.

Any argument that requires that Earth is flat such as to make its claim, cannot use (B) as a definition without proposing an axiom that the Earth must be flat. The axiom is an agreed upon truth statement regarding the nature of reality, but is not the definition but rather merely an assumption concerning the defined object.

Any argument specifying the definition (A) might be valid, but the usefulness or truthfulness of any conclusion is restricted to circumstances which would negate the concern that what has been called "Earth" in the argument is not the actual planet upon which you live.

A common example is used in metaphor, "He is very down to Earth". The use of the word "Earth" obviously (I hope), isn't referring to the planet, but actually referring to being solidly founded in the person's decisions. The statement uses an implied local definition (a metaphor). The statement can be accepted as true even though the definition is not the standard definition for "Earth".

And perhaps I should mention that ALL mathematics is Definitional Logic (although all definitional logic is not mathematics).

Logic ≡ the recognition of association between definitions and/or axioms such as to reveal an associated truth.
Definitional Logic ≡ the recognition of association between definitions such as to reveal an associated definitional truth.
Definitional Truth ≡ a statement wherein a portion or portions of reality have been identified by definition as that portion of reality.

James S Saint wrote:

Definitional Truth ≡ a statement wherein a portion or portions of reality have been identified by definition as that portion of reality.

This seems strange. It also recalls Aristotle's old correspondence theory of truth: that truth is to say of what is that it is. On its strangeness: by capturing portions of reality within definitions, do we not fix those portions -- do our definitions not themselves abstract from those portions? If yes: then truth is a word-game. If no: then you presume that logic, fixity and reason precede existence. Such is not the case: we project reason onto the chaos of the world. Logic is a human affair.

without-music wrote:

James S Saint wrote:

Definitional Truth ≡ a statement wherein a portion or portions of reality have been identified by definition as that portion of reality.

This seems strange. It also recalls Aristotle's old correspondence theory of truth: that truth is to say of what is that it is. On its strangeness: by capturing portions of reality within definitions, do we not fix those portions -- do our definitions not themselves abstract from those portions?

The portions are merely portions that are distinctive in some way of interest to you. Labeling them has nothing to do with affixing anything but the language. A rose is still a rose by any other name. It doesn't change what it is merely because you define it differently. A different definition would merely mean that you are talking about or labeling something different than before or perhaps merely using different words to say the same as before. The construct of language and use of thoughts is all that is being structured.

without-music wrote:

If yes: then truth is a word-game.

Some people define "truth" to be the actual words themselves rather than the concepts or reality that those words represent. If you define truth as the words, of course changing the words changes what you have called truth, but reality doesn't change or care what you have called its portions. Some people use the word "truth" to represent the reality itself, not the words used to describe it, in which case, the words obviously are subservient to the reality.

without-music wrote:

If no: then you presume that logic, fixity and reason precede existence. Such is not the case: we project reason onto the chaos of the world. Logic is a human affair.

First there is no "preceding existence".
But logic, as mentioned above, is a recognition process carried out by humans. That process isn't something humans invented any more than they invented DNA replication.

Quote :

A rose is still a rose by any other name. It doesn't change what it is merely because you define it differently.

If we define the rose in a certain way, and build upon it a system of what you call "definitional" logic, including the attempt to get at some underlying truth of the Real -- if this is to be our task, then of course we're changing the objects we endeavor to define. Which is why I'm concerned with how you seem to pass over without blinking this facet of your "system."

Quote :

Some people define "truth" to be the actual words themselves rather than the concepts or reality that those words represent. If you define truth as the words, of course changing the words changes what you have called truth, but reality doesn't change or care what you have called its portions. Some people use the word "truth" to represent the reality itself, not the words used to describe it, in which case, the words obviously are subservient to the reality.

Yes, obviously. I'm asking which side you lean toward.

Quote :

But logic, as mentioned above, is a recognition process carried out by humans. That process isn't something humans invented any more than they invented DNA replication.

Where do you think logic came from? Surely, you don't presume to claim that the universe is inherently logical, that it obeys the rules of logic and that our recognition of this underlying rationality is what we call truth...
Please correct me if I've read you wrong. Because this is a painfully superficial and outdated worldview.

without-music wrote:

Quote :

A rose is still a rose by any other name. It doesn't change what it is merely because you define it differently.

If we define the rose in a certain way, and build upon it a system of what you call "definitional" logic, including the attempt to get at some underlying truth of the Real -- if this is to be our task, then of course we're changing the objects we endeavor to define. Which is why I'm concerned with how you seem to pass over without blinking this facet of your "system."

Well now I'm going to have how it is you think a rose changes in any way so as to respond to the way anyone has defined or labeled it.

without-music wrote:

Quote :

Some people define "truth" to be the actual words themselves rather than the concepts or reality that those words represent. If you define truth as the words, of course changing the words changes what you have called truth, but reality doesn't change or care what you have called its portions. Some people use the word "truth" to represent the reality itself, not the words used to describe it, in which case, the words obviously are subservient to the reality.

Yes, obviously. I'm asking which side you lean toward.

Frankly, I don't personally care just so they specify and stick to one without confusing it mid-reasoning with the other.

without-music wrote:

Quote :

But logic, as mentioned above, is a recognition process carried out by humans. That process isn't something humans invented any more than they invented DNA replication.

Where do you think logic came from? Surely, you don't presume to claim that the universe is inherently logical, that it obeys the rules of logic and that our recognition of this underlying rationality is what we call truth...
Please correct me if I've read you wrong. Because this is a painfully superficial and outdated worldview.

Where did a circle come from or clouds?
Surely you don't think that before Man there was no such thing a circles or clouds throughout the entire universe...?

The process that we call logic is a process of recognizing and labeling things. Animals had been doing it long before Man ever scratched his ass.

Recognizing and labeling has nothing to do with creating or causing anything other than a means to communicate both outwardly and inwardly (thinking).

And yes, I certainly do proclaim that the universe is absolutely inherently logical, else we would recognize logic as whatever the universe really did do and then call that logical. Whatever the universe does is what we dub "logical" so of course the universe is logical to the hilt. The process of logic is merely tracking whatever the universe already obeys.

.. and btw, there really are times when "outdated" merely means not as screwed up as contemporary.

As abstract notions, as things giving themselves over to definition, circles and clouds come from us.

Quote :

And yes, I certainly do proclaim that the universe is absolutely inherently logical, else we would recognize logic as whatever the universe really did do and then call that logical. Whatever the universe does is what we dub "logical" so of course the universe is logical to the hilt. The process of logic is merely tracking whatever the universe already obeys.

I can't follow you here. Logic is something we throw over the unquantifiable chaos; abstraction is falsification. "Tracking whatever the universe already obeys" is doubly erroneous. First: the universe obeys no law, it adheres to no rule. Second: we put ourselves into thought; the subject influences, shapes and infects all of his reasoning. Metaphysical realism just doesn't hold. On this note, I will direct you to an older ILP thread I started on the Ontological Tyranny in science. Our attempts to get at the way the world works will always be, and always already are, filtered through human consciousness -- Locke's "veil of ideas."

Consider Nietzsche: "In [logic] reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem" (TI III, 3). The idea here being that the process of falsification reaches its climax in a totalizing system -- what you've presented as your "definitional logic" -- and thereby abandons entirely the question of the Real. It contents itself with its own auto-fixation.

Quote :

.. and btw, there really are times when "outdated" merely means not as screwed up as contemporary. Wink

Not here, James. My eyes are fixed on tomorrow's horizons. The task of philosophy, for me, is turned decidedly toward the future. If that means tarrying with the state of contemporary thought, then so be it. Blinding myself to the issues of today in favour of re-affirming the already discarded issues of yesterday just isn't an option.

without-music wrote:

As abstract notions, as things giving themselves over to definition, circles and clouds come from us.

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And yes, I certainly do proclaim that the universe is absolutely inherently logical, else we would recognize logic as whatever the universe really did do and then call that logical. Whatever the universe does is what we dub "logical" so of course the universe is logical to the hilt. The process of logic is merely tracking whatever the universe already obeys.

I can't follow you here. Logic is something we throw over the unquantifiable chaos; abstraction is falsification. "Tracking whatever the universe already obeys" is doubly erroneous. First: the universe obeys no law, it adheres to no rule. Second: we put ourselves into thought; the subject influences, shapes and infects all of his reasoning. Metaphysical realism just doesn't hold. On this note, I will direct you to an older ILP thread I started on the Ontological Tyranny in science. Our attempts to get at the way the world works will always be, and always already are, filtered through human consciousness -- Locke's "veil of ideas."

Consider Nietzsche: "In [logic] reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem" (TI III, 3). The idea here being that the process of falsification reaches its climax in a totalizing system -- what you've presented as your "definitional logic" -- and thereby abandons entirely the question of the Real. It contents itself with its own auto-fixation.

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.. and btw, there really are times when "outdated" merely means not as screwed up as contemporary. Wink

Not here, James. My eyes are fixed on tomorrow's horizons. The task of philosophy, for me, is turned decidedly toward the future. If that means tarrying with the state of contemporary thought, then so be it. Blinding myself to the issues of today in favour of re-affirming the already discarded issues of yesterday just isn't an option.

Well, all of that constitutes your ToE. And you should have gleemed from prior discussions that we have had that there is nothing you could ever present that would get passed me to support your assertions.

But this thread isn't about your "Tyranny in Science" or your tyranny of mind. It isn't even about Science or ontology or magic worship or devil worship. It IS about the use of definitions for sake of constructing models "epistemology", without which even your version of the ToE has no meaning at all.

If you define the word "infinite" to mean "without end", isn't it necessarily true that such is how you defined it? That is not to say that you cannot change your mind later and define it differently, although a little note stating such would be appreciated in a conversation.

Definitional logic is not about what is or isn't true beyond what is valid within the proposed argument concerning the defined words. And those truths are based exclusively upon what has or hasn't been defined:

"It is true that you defined this word.. to mean this concept..", and
"It is true that you defined this word.. to mean this concept..", and
"It is true that you defined this word.. to mean this concept..", thus
"When you use those words together, their concepts agree".. or "disagree"
Valid or invalid logic.
True within the confines of the defined terms, or untrue due to the conflict or inconsistency between the definitions provided.

AFTER such rigor is established, one can develop a proposed model relating to ontology and even a ToE.
But that would be a separate issue.

First get the definitions and their use in order, THEN argue about what model of reality you think best fits.

Surely, you're aware that I was taking issue with your claim to be able to capture reality with definitional logic. If the universe isn't inherently logical, that is logical before and without human logic, then any given logical system (be it definitional or otherwise) is not capturing the Real, it is not disclosing it at all -- rather, it is shaping it, constructing it, constituting it for its own purposes or else abandoning it altogether. The issue at hand, then, must be ontology -- no? Perhaps it's easier to just stick within the confines of one's logical system, loudly proclaim, along with Hegel, that the Rational is the Real, and be done with all those silly, nagging, difficult questions for good -- for is this not what you're doing? You claim your system is absolutely rigorously immutably logical and that it contains within itself the ability to disclose reality as what it is, to get at the truth of the Real -- but then, you scoff at ontology and philosophies of science, insisting again and again that logic is logic and logic is rigorous and valid and truth is available and all we have to do is be stern about what we're defining and when and all will be given to us. Are you so blind, James, as to ignore the fact that this is itself an ontology, that this is itself a ToE... Obviously, if I concede all of your points, all of your ontologically slanted and metaphysically loaded points, the last question (of truth) will lean in favour of your system. But such has never been the way to deal with systematizers. The questioning must take place on the level of foundation, and in this case, on the basis of your claim that the universe is inherently logical to begin with and that therefore, if our systems of logic are rigorous enough, that we can disclose the universe, logically and truthfully.

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AFTER such rigor is established, one can develop a proposed model relating to ontology and even a ToE.
But that would be a separate issue.

Emphatically not. "Such rigor," as I've written above, is itself a model.

In a discussion like this, the profundity of Nietzsche is startling. "In [logic] reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem." Do you not propose that your system is to be built, its rigor established, before we are to deal with the question of reality? Is this exactly not what Nietzsche speaks of? At bottom, the question of reality is refused entry. At finish, the system contents itself with an auto-fixation that produces a simulacrum of the Real. The Real is never encountered, not even as a problem.

And I've always been rather fond of Herbert's Dune: "Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for a logical universe that makes sense. But the real universe is always one step beyond logic."