Thoughts on an aphorism.

Quote :

Beyond Good and Evil, 175:
Ultimately one loves one’s desire and not the object one desires.

This movement of the s from one to desire is the very movement backward from valuation to self-valuation. In the same way we can trace a genealogy of desired objects back to the love of the capacity-to-desire itself, we can also trace one's valuations backward. One loves what one values. Such is a truism. But, "ultimately," as Nietzsche writes, underlying the love for what-one-values is the love for the capacity-to-value. To love the self's capacity to posit values is to self-value, to posit the self as valuable.

Without an object that one desires, we can never trace the genealogy back, we can never proclaim "ultimately" -- the fact that one loves one's desire remains elusive when one doesn't first love the object one desires, when one doesn't first posit the value of that object. In terms of valuation: the underlying fact of self-valuation resists apprehension and remains concealed when one doesn't first posit the value of something outside of the self.

This aphorism -- which turns on the realization that when one loves the object of one's desire, then it becomes clear that ultimately, one loves one's desire itself -- serves as a bridge to Zarathustra's proclamation of the ultimate importance of valuation -- explored in the Nietzsche subforum. To draw out a subtlety, however; Zarathustra speaks thus:

Quote :

Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones! Change of values—that is, change of the creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator.

Through valuation only is there value. The capacity-to-desire implies the existence of objects that one desires. But it also works backwards. The existence of objects of desire also implies the capacity-to-desire, just as the existence of value implies the capacity-to-value. And, to push Nietzsche toward our project here: the capacity-to-value implies a fundamental self-valuation. "Without valuation," Zarathustra proclaims, "the nut of existence would be hollow." Indeed: for without valuation, the capacity-to-value remains unfulfilled, and without the overflowing of the capacity-to-value, self-valuation conceals itself. And what is the "nut of existence" if not self-valuation! To change one's values necessitates a flexing of the capacity-to-value, for the stagnancy of values implies a weariness with the world: to hold onto the values of one's past, outdated and ineffective as they may be -- do we not see this in today's political climate, among the Last Men of today? Ceaseless overcoming of values is the Nietzschean way, which means, in our language: ceaseless overcoming of the self. Thus, a change of values is a demonstration of a superabundant capacity-to-value, which always implies an underlying "ultimate" self-valuation.

Ultimately one loves one’s desire and not the object one desires. And what better way to demonstrate this fact than to posit and affirm greater and higher objects of desire! What better way to affirm an underlying self-valuation, an overflowing capacity-to-value, than to posit and affirm greater and higher values! Which, of course, means the destruction of tired and old ones...

But this, too, is useful, for the ruins of a Church provide much material for the construction of a new temple.

without-music wrote:

Quote :

Beyond Good and Evil, 175:
Ultimately one loves one’s desire and not the object one desires.

This movement of the s from one to desire is the very movement backward from valuation to self-valuation. In the same way we can trace a genealogy of desired objects back to the love of the capacity-to-desire itself, we can also trace one's valuations backward. One loves what one values. Such is a truism. But, "ultimately," as Nietzsche writes, underlying the love for what-one-values is the love for the capacity-to-value. To love the self's capacity to posit values is to self-value, to posit the self as valuable.

The words of Guyau, whom Parodites made me aware of recently, ring well here: 'Finally, just as life makes it its duty to act because of its very power to act, it also creates its own sanction by its very action, for in acting it takes joy in itself: in acting less it enjoys less, in acting more it enjoys more.' Submit "to value" as "to act" here and we get a clear statement of Nietzsche's comment in BGE. Self-value, which is to say value in the self-as-object, underlying other-value, which is to say value in the other-as-object.

Yet I wonder if loving the object one desires is ONLY in fact loving one's capacity-to-desire itself. Does not the object ITSELF of value also disclose certain understanding of one's otherwise "self-valuing", or perhaps even more (or less) than this? In tracing backward the valuing act to the subject-that-values itself we do not necessarily lose the valued-object, at least I cannot see how this would necessarily be so.

Quote :

Without an object that one desires, we can never trace the genealogy back, we can never proclaim "ultimately" -- the fact that one loves one's desire remains elusive when one doesn't first love the object one desires, when one doesn't first posit the value of that object. In terms of valuation: the underlying fact of self-valuation resists apprehension and remains concealed when one doesn't first posit the value of something outside of the self.

This is interesting - I wonder to what extent we can confirm this. Hypothetically speaking I cannot see why not one might come to an understanding of one's self-valuation, of the valuing capacity "itself" (positing simplistically for the moment, that this capacity is "one thing" and "one thing only") absent valued-objects. Of course to be human is to value, so this is probably useless speculation. But we can at least side with Nietzsche that to disban or dissolve - to move beyond - one's value of a valued-object is to come into the possibility for immediate apprehension of the valuing-capacity itself, as itself and with/in itself.

Yet still... there is something here worth exploring, it seems, in the notion that while humans are necessarily valuing entities valuing-objects it does not seem necessarily the case that to value-valuing itself requires firstly valuing-other and then later effacing this -other. Or does this process seem entirely necessary to discovering self-value? I wonder if instead the inverse may be the case: in order to value the valued-object (not-oneself) one must first be a self-valuing and also equally a self-valued self-valuing, at least to some minimally sufficient extent? Is there a barely-conscious understanding of self-valuation at work underlying the more conscious valuing of valued-objects?

Quote :

This aphorism -- which turns on the realization that when one loves the object of one's desire, then it becomes clear that ultimately, one loves one's desire itself -- serves as a bridge to Zarathustra's proclamation of the ultimate importance of valuation -- explored in the Nietzsche subforum. To draw out a subtlety, however; Zarathustra speaks thus:

Quote :

Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones! Change of values—that is, change of the creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator.

Through valuation only is there value.

Yes, but I feel this alone tends to veil an even subtler understanding that seeks to trace the whys/hows of the valued-object itself, as valuable to a valuing entity. Which is to say that the reasons why one object is valued and not another reveals something not only about the valuing subject but also about valuation itself, this capacity-to-value. What is this capacity?? I think this is the next step inward. I think this essential question can become lost or hidden when we restrict this analysis merely to "Through valuation only is there value".

Quote :

The capacity-to-desire implies the existence of objects that one desires.

Interesting, and I can see how I might agree with this, however on a secondary or derivative level, assuming firstly the valuing capacity itself already exists, I can see how this capacity in fact calls valued-objects into existence. I do not think the existence of the object need pre-date the existence of that object-as-valued by a valuing entity, since often what we value may literally be created "ex nihilo" by the subject overflowing with valuing-capacity. Perception itself seems mired within this capacity-to-value, perhaps little more than an extension and definite application of this capacity; we might say even more so that thought-conception and cognition are likewise definite and extensive applications. In this way it seems possible that valuing capacity overflows the confines of its previously-experiential boundaries and in so doing, and through its extension into tangential and derivative modes of valuation (e.g. perception, thought, expectation, imagination, etc), literally creates valued-objects both as objects and as valued-objects. Of course this does not do away with the clear and obvious affirmation that "something exists" with respect to a reality upon which the subject exercises its valuing or otherwise faculties, yet beyond this mere starting point there seems much interesting and potentially fertile terrain.

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But it also works backwards. The existence of objects of desire also implies the capacity-to-desire, just as the existence of value implies the capacity-to-value. And, to push Nietzsche toward our project here: the capacity-to-value implies a fundamental self-valuation. "Without valuation," Zarathustra proclaims, "the nut of existence would be hollow." Indeed: for without valuation, the capacity-to-value remains unfulfilled, and without the overflowing of the capacity-to-value, self-valuation conceals itself. And what is the "nut of existence" if not self-valuation! To change one's values necessitates a flexing of the capacity-to-value, for the stagnancy of values implies a weariness with the world: to hold onto the values of one's past, outdated and ineffective as they may be -- do we not see this in today's political climate, among the Last Men of today? Ceaseless overcoming of values is the Nietzschean way, which means, in our language: ceaseless overcoming of the self. Thus, a change of values is a demonstration of a superabundant capacity-to-value, which always implies an underlying "ultimate" self-valuation.

Yes I agree, however I do tend to think of it less in terms of a 'continuous overcoming process' or dialectic and rather in a more phenomenologically-centered way, which is to say that one's values are direct and immediate products of one's manner of valuing, which is itself a direct component and secondary derivation of the self-valuing capacity itself (again, assuming for simplicity's sake that this capacity is or can adequately be described as "one entity"). And while as I previously noted we may be able to make a case for calling into question the necessity of the claim that the capacity-to-value presupposes the valued object, the claim here that "the existence of objects of desire also implies the capacity-to-value" seems entirely beyond dispute.

And yes, I do see what you mention in the "Last Men" of today, especially with regard to politics-economics (and religion/morality). This stagnancy of valuing on which these social institutions seem entirely to rest does appear as a good example of a "weariness with the world" which I would interpret more precisely as: weariness with one's own consciousness in terms of how this consciousness inscribes itself upon its experiential world/s (which is always at least to some degree through exercising the capacity-to-value which flows firstly into generalized manners of valuation and then later into more specific valued-objects themselves).

Quote :

Ultimately one loves one’s desire and not the object one desires. And what better way to demonstrate this fact than to posit and affirm greater and higher objects of desire! What better way to affirm an underlying self-valuation, an overflowing capacity-to-value, than to posit and affirm greater and higher values! Which, of course, means the destruction of tired and old ones...

But this, too, is useful, for the ruins of a Church provide much material for the construction of a new temple.

Yes -- and also, even: what better way to demonstrate this fact (that one loves one's desire and not the object one desires) than to circumvent-arrest the entire valuing process itself, holding it in one's being at the more essential level of self-valuation. We might posit and affirm greater and higher objects of desire, certainly, yet we may also even posit and affirm without respect to objects of desire at all. Is this even possible? It is not possible if we are assuming that to value requires the valued-object and that this object cannot sufficiently be merely the capacity-to-value itself. But I would wager that the more we rather shrink and withdraw the horizon of object-valuing the closer we arc into the root of self-valuation itself in terms of the sheer capacity, the propensity and inner-mechanism/s by which the act of valuing obtains... or at least this possibility is interesting to speculate about.

The comment on the ruins of the Church is certainly spot-on. This must, I think, be one of our most fundamental points of departure (toward projecting value-ontology and all that it represents and implies out into the world/future).

Excellent, Capable. These were, of course, my initial thoughts, by no means certain. You have certainly demonstrated that the water runs deeper: there is much earth left into which we might dig. I intend to return to this thread when I have the time.

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What is this capacity?? I think this is the next step inward.

Yes, good. This is precisely what I intended when I posted my thoughts. That they be furthered.

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Yes -- and also, even: what better way to demonstrate this fact (that one loves one's desire and not the object one desires) than to circumvent-arrest the entire valuing process itself, holding it in one's being at the more essential level of self-valuation.

This appears to be the "nut" of your post. It is a beautifully articulated thought, and one no doubt pregnant with potential. I do wonder what can be done with it. I do not think we are in disagreement; I did not intend for my claims to be the last statement on the matter, nor do I ever. I'm pleased you found much to comment upon. Again, I must return to this thread/these thoughts later. This one specifically.

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But I would wager that the more we rather shrink and withdraw the horizon of object-valuing the closer we arc into the root of self-valuation itself in terms of the sheer capacity, the propensity and inner-mechanism/s by which the act of valuing obtains... or at least this possibility is interesting to speculate about.

Ah, I'm glad this forum -- these members -- came together. There exists something dazzling between you, Parodites, and Fixed. I'm glad to be a part of it. The thought you present here -- this is precisely where I want to extend my philosophical feelers, to take a crude metaphor. I don't have much to offer right now, but I will certainly ruminate on such possibilities.

It seems to me that the condition of consciousness, indeed even of life itself, is always-already valuating. As such, it seemed appropriate to speak as I have on the topic. But as you have demonstrated: we need not stop here, in fact, we ought not. If we challenge this "always-already," we are led far deeper, albeit far deeper into the dark since we are no longer dealing with the situation as it presents itself. But perhaps such a situation needs changing, perhaps it is possible to withdraw the horizon of the object of valuation and to correspondingly affirm the inner capacity (the spirit of life itself!) for valuation. This does, I think, get at the very heart of value-ontology. Excellent, excellent. I'm off to class -- Aesthetics is my great concern this term of mine, my last term as an undergraduate, I should mention.

without-music wrote:

Without an object that one desires, we can never trace the genealogy back, we can never proclaim "ultimately" -- the fact that one loves one's desire remains elusive when one doesn't first love the object one desires, when one doesn't first posit the value of that object. In terms of valuation: the underlying fact of self-valuation resists apprehension and remains concealed when one doesn't first posit the value of something outside of the self.

Indeed, by and in-itself, self-valuing remains elusive, hidden. Reading the posts of Parodites I have come to understand self-valuing as transcendental. I think that he, interestingly, places the terms differently in respect to each other, but in any case this is how I have come to understand the transcendental.

Because of this transcendental undisclosedness, self-valuing can not be seen as causally prior to valuing-in-terms-of-self-value, i.e. valuing the world. As you indicate, the two are seen/understood to occur at the same 'moment', and the latter is indeed needed to enable the former to be manifest. However, as we must infer from the terms, self-valuing is logically prior to valuing-in-terms-of-self-value. There is then a difference between the logic of value and the logic of causality.

The problem with applying causality to value is that we are here working with logic that is not adequate to the thing which needs to be explained. The logic of causality is derived from a classifying-observing the physical world in terms of a continuum, and so to be valid always requires a continuum, a chain, in which each cause is also an effect of something else than to which it is the cause.

In the post linked to here I have discussed self-valuing as the activity of consistency. Consistency does does not itself have a cause, in the sense of transferring energy qwuantities, that is to say, in the proper sense of causality. As no cause can be inferred from it, there is no manifest ground to it, except “possibility”. I keep arriving at this ultimate ground for being in terms of value ontology – being is because it is not impossible, and its possibility escapes its impossibility because if its particular form/mode, which is consistency, sepcifically, consistent self-value.

Now, possibility flowing out into consistency may be described as necessity. Self-valuing is possible, not necessary –- valuing-in-terms-of-self-value is necessary where-ever this possibility is actualized. We see how necessity is subservient to possibility, whereas possibility is subservient to nothing, except to the absence of its negation, impossibility. Impossibility of anything is of course an extremely positive, active classification, entirely dependent on a general possibility of being.

As it requires only possibility and not necessity, self-valuing can be seen as transcendent. It stands “behind” the manifest world, and its logics of causation, quantitiy, sequence and temporality. If one were to apply such logics to self-valuing, it would appear as “self-caused”, but this goes against the very logic of causation, so it is wisest to simply dismiss the concept of causality if we are describing its ground as a principle.

As a manifest being, however, a self-valuing is indeed caused by that which it values in terms of itself. This is the case when temporality has taken hold, when we speak of growth, of being, matter. Self-valuing becomes itself by enabling the principle of causation, by which it is then indirectly self-caused, as an ongoing process, an open system, a 'causal chain'.

The logic of causation is called forth by the logic of valuing, which may perhaps also be described as 'the logic of logic'.

There is a small section in one of my books I titled "Erotoime," and if deep calls unto deep, maybe aphorism can here call unto aphorism.






The tenth aphorism of my Erotoime, or "Illustrations of Love." --


"Just as Aristotle threw himself into the tides because he could not understand them, just as Empedocles threw himself into the flames of mount Etna because he could not understand it, so the poet throws himself into time because he cannot understand the eternal, which is to say, he loves."



The sixteenth:

"What consoled us in hope can never be loved, while what we have loved can never console us in hope, for it is only when one of our desires denies the particular joy for which it had suffered to all the other innumerable desires which play upon our heart that one of life's graces manages to wholly confide itself to us, and will thereafter never betray itself again."



Number 23:

"In the fulfillment of one longing, another usually finds its birth. In those beautiful waters Narcissus found his own image which, rather than the waters, he then loved, while from the most beautiful vantage upon the sea creeps into our heart those melancholy suggestions of some distant mountain that seems to lie brooding overhead. Our greatest joys tend to renounce themselves."

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"What consoled us in hope can never be loved, while what we have loved can never console us in hope, for it is only when one of our desires denies the particular joy for which it had suffered to all the other innumerable desires which play upon our heart that one of life's graces manages to wholly confide itself to us, and will thereafter never betray itself again."

I would like to have a less abstract understanding of this. A picture of when and as what this occurs -- I can not grasp it as it is stated.

In my experience, things speak completely to the heart only once. If I realize the ideal beauty of a thing in a moment of pain and draw hope and consolation from it, then it is forever closed to all other passions in me. Things whose ideal beauty I have realized in a moment of health and loving, I can draw no hope or consolation from when I am in pain. I cannot even see them unless I am in health and love, I am blind to them in pain.

Perhaps the moods out of which we apprehend the world allow us privileged access to certain objects of experience, a privileged access that shifts and folds out of and back into itself as our moods change. This is, of course, a trivial observation. Where I think you've said something significant is in your statement that these privileged accesses happen only once, themselves available to only a specific mood (or perhaps a specific brew) or during a specific event or state of mind. My moods certainly colour the world around me, but perhaps such a colouring isn't as transient as we'd like to think. There is a specific record I have in mind; I came to it in a time of horrible longing -- it will always symbolize to me the painful beauty in an unfulfillable desire. But the record's meaning doesn't change along with my moods: it is forever fixed as I apprehended it in that initial encounter. Indeed, I cannot even bare to listen to it in periods of self-satisfaction.

Have I misspoken, Parodites?

No, very accurate. Only once, only in one particular moment and under the guise of one particular passion can the ideal be realized... or to use the quote I put at the title page of one of my books, by Antonio Feliciano de Castilho... Amais entre vós ternos suspiros que amor arranca aos peitos, we feel love only between breaths, only between the stirrings of the heart. And what lies there, perhaps forgotten, between those beatings of the heart, is immutable. To my mind, all objects of experience have their ideal and perfect form, even pain, which coincide with very particular states of mind and can be discovered only by them. Human experience is very transient, but it is crystallized in such moments, and rendered back to us in implacable forms, forms which become the object of artistic and religious reverence.